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Introduction 
 
The De Memoria et Reminiscentia (hereafter also, more briefly, De Memoria) is one of the 
treatises included among Aristotle‟s Parva Naturalia, and probably the most dense and 
difficult. It is strongly tied with the De Anima in many respects and represents at the same time 
a closer examination of a phenomenon neglected in the De Anima and a testing ground for 
some important ideas of that work, like Aristotle‟s theory of phantasia. Very briefly, the De 
Memoria deals with mnemonic capacities in humans and in some animals, which are divided 
into two main faculties, namely memory and recollection. The former is the capacity for 
retaining a trace of perceptual experiences and for distinguishing an actual internal presentation 
from one deriving from the past; the latter is the autonomous activity of retrieving the 
information stored in the memory trace after some time has passed. 
In the last few decades, the De Memoria has been studied in particular for its relevance in 
Aristotle‟s psychological theory. In fact, the stimulus to undertake this research came via 
renewed discussion of this work. Firstly, 32 years after its first publication, in 2004 Richard 
Sorabji offered a new edition of Aristotle On Memory, in which he basically confirms his 
achievements and defends his interpretation from the criticisms it underwent. Secondly, in 2007 
David Bloch released a very accurate critical edition of the text with an original interpretation 
of the main issues of the treatise and a study of its reception in Western Scholasticism. 
My interpretation of the De Memoria will try to develop some themes from these important 
works and to reconstruct, as much as possible, a consistent Aristotelian theory of memory and 
recollection, which is in itself a very ambitious aim, considering the obscurity and even the 
textual corruption of many relevant passages of the treatise. In the first chapter, I will try to 
extend the analytical method used by Bloch (2007) to elucidate Aristotle‟s lexicon about the 
activation of memory traces to all the keywords of the treatise. I thought it was necessary to 
apply this analytical criterion, because some of Bloch‟s conclusions, which are remarkable on 
the whole, are compromised by lack of contextualization. Such contextualization suggests, in 
my opinion, a rather different interpretation of how Aristotle conceived mnemonic activities. 
Briefly, whereas Bloch contends that when Aristotle speaks of activation of memory he only 
refers to recollection, I think Aristotle meant to include both memory and recollection. 
Sorabji‟s and Bloch‟s approaches are very different, but they share an interest in the 
reception of the De Memoria in later tradition. The treatise has been a milestone for the 
discussion and elaboration of mnemotechniques in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, but, 
inevitably, this aspect led the interpreters to emphasize the importance of artificial memory in a 
 6 
work that seems much more concerned with the explanation of the mechanisms of memory 
rather than with the prescription of mnemonic systems. The second chapter of this thesis is then 
devoted to reconstructing the sources of Aristotle‟s theory of memory and how the techniques 
of memorization were used and studied in Greece before Aristotle. From this survey it emerges 
that Aristotle‟s interest in mnemotechniques should not be overstated in light of the importance 
of memory as a means to transmit cultural patterns or to establish new ones in the previous 
tradition. The attempts at contextualizing Aristotle‟s theory made by Lang (1980) and Coleman 
(1992) are limited to Plato and in comparison with him Aristotle is certainly more receptive 
toward mnemotechniques; however, considering the broader context of poetry and sophistry, 
his interest seems insufficient to make him the champion of those techniques. Actually, I think 
it is the other way round: Aristotle studied the natural mechanisms of memory and starting 
from them considered it possible to enhance one‟s capacities of memorization; in other words, 
the primum of his research is always a psychological problem, which may have practical 
consequences. 
The third and last chapter focuses on the importance of the De Memoria within Aristotle‟s 
psychology. The treatise has been often regarded as the forefront of Aristotle‟s imagistic 
conception of phantasia. On the basis of the analogy with painting at 450a29-30, Sorabji 
(2006) and many other scholars have elaborated this interpretation considering the inner 
presentation of the past experience as an image within us. But this paradigm has been criticized 
in recent decades by many scholars; in this sense, an important contribution to the discussion is 
given by Nussbaum (1985), who radically questioned the visual nature of „imagination‟. I will 
try to include some of these criticisms in my interpretation of Aristotle‟s theory of memory so 
as to include „images‟ related to all senses, and not only to sight, in memory. Another 
interesting issue is the recognition of the gnoseological role of memory among the other 
faculties. My reconstruction is obviously tentative to a large extent, since Aristotle does not 
focus on this topic; in fact the sources for the connection of memory with sensation, on the one 
hand, and with „experience‟, on the other, must be looked for not in the De Memoria, but in the 
Metaphysics and in the Posterior Analytics. In addition, I will try to discuss some difficult 
passages of the treatise, summing up the most important interpretations and proposing, when 
possible, an original one. 
In conclusion, my thesis aims at discussing all the main problems of the text, starting from 
some philological considerations concerning a text corrupted in several places, continuing with 
the contextualization of the treatise within the previous reflections about memory, and 
concluding with an analysis of the main philosophical issues. From this analysis, the De 
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Memoria seems to occupy a prominent role in Aristotle‟s psychology, even if its convoluted 
prose sometimes precludes a definitive reconstruction of its arguments.  
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1. Memory words and mnemonic activities 
 
Aristotelian texts can be very difficult to interpret, not only for modern readers, but also for 
early commentators, and the De Memoria et Reminiscientia is no exception to this rule of 
thumb. The extant Aristotelian works were probably mostly notes for his lectures, and hence 
plenty of problems arise. The progress of Aristotle‟s line of reasoning does not always seem 
consistent, particularly on a first reading, and it is easy to find long and apparently superfluous 
digressions. Moreover, the vocabulary can suddenly switch from general meanings to very 
technical, pithy jargon within few lines and there are extremely versatile and ambiguous 
keywords – like pa/qoj and ki¿nhsij, just to name but a few among those included in the 
treatise I have studied – which deserve special attention.  
The aim of this section is to delimit and define as much as possible the meanings of the 
fundamental keywords. I think it is worth starting with such an attempt because the main 
interpretations of this treatise
1
 diverge considerably on crucial points of the Aristotelian theory 
of mnemonic activities, not least because they assume, explicitly or implicitly, some specific 
reading of these words, sometimes at a high degree of elaboration.
2
 
 
1.1   Mnh/mh and cognates: “memory”. 3 
 
Mnh/mh is the first of three „first objects‟ (with mnhmoneu/ein and a)namimnh/skesqai) 
that Aristotle claims he will examine in the treatise: it is necessary to define it, why this 
phenomenon arises and in what part of the soul it is inherent (449b4-5). In accordance with this 
statement he will conclude that the purpose has been accomplished at 453b8-11. Strictly 
speaking, the exposition of mnh/mh ends at 451a14-7. 
Aristotle uses this word for two basic capacities: mnh/mh is (a) the actual retention (and 
probably the potential for retaining – Aristotle uses a single word, eÀcij) in the perceptive part 
of a mnemonic trace, that can derive from a sensation or an intellectual apprehension and (b) 
the trace itself as being impressed at a particular time and possessing specific contents 
(pa/qoj).
4
 I individuate the former acceptation (a) at 450a29-30, 451a14-6, 451b2-4, the latter 
(b) at 450b16-8, 451a21-3 (implicitly). However, mnh/mh is a unitary phenomenon, which has 
                                                 
1
 Annas (1992), Coleman (1992), Sorabji (2006), Bloch (2007). 
2
 Cf. Annas (1992). 
3
 In chapter 1: 449b4; 449b15; 449b24 449b26; 449b28 (twice); 450a12; 450a23; 450a30; 450b2; 450b12; 
450b17; 451a5; 451a12; 451a14. In chapter 2: 451a20; 451a22; 451a24; 451b4; 451b5; 453b7. 
4
 It must be clarified that memory is only this quality of the traces, and not actually receiving or having them, that 
is sensation or knowledge. We are entitled to draw this conclusion from Metaph D 21, 1022b15-8. 
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three different aspects, strictly related: Aristotle uses three times the expression eÀcij hÄ pa/qoj 
(449b24-5, 451a23-4, 451a27-9) to cover the whole concept and employs them separately just 
to stress a particular facet that refers primarily to one of them. 
Aristotle explains that mnh/mh is neither sensation nor thinking because it arises only after a 
lapse of time (449b28): hence mnh/mh is of the past (449b15), whilst prediction is of the future 
and sensation is of the present (449b10-15, 449b25-28).
5
 This statement can appear almost self-
evident, but it is not. Annas (1992: 301) starts from this passage to support her conviction that 
mnh/mh means personal memory, that is a sort of resurgence of an episode from our past 
experience in the form of an image. She believes that this is the only way to avoid the 
untenable idea that Aristotle wanted to exclude from „memory‟ many occurrences, such as 
“timeless truths” like 2+2=4. So this different kind of memories must be subsumed under 
a)na/mnhsij, considered as non-personal memory. However, Annas‟ solution does not seem to 
respect Aristotle‟s psychological background, if we examine the renowned claims of DA Γ 7, 
431a16-7 and DA Γ 8, 432a13-4, duly presented again here at 449b31-450a1, that thinking 
necessarily involves fanta/smata. Hence we cannot perform any mnemonic (or anamnestic as 
well) act or retrieval toward noetic contents of our traces abruptly, but we need an intermediate 
vehicle, located in our historical experience, both for our previous sense-perception and the 
objects of thought, although the latter are related with the past only indirectly. 
Another remark on this – at first glance straightforward – passage is presented by 
Nussbaum (1985: 355-6). Translating at MA 8, 702a5 e¹lpi/j with “hope” could lead us astray, 
while “anticipation” restores the symmetry between mnh=mai and e¹lpi/dej. In Mem., only 
Mugnier translated “espérances”, while most translators choose a milder rendering: 
“expectations” (Beare, Hett, Bloch) or “prediction” (Sorabji) are preferred, but neither of them 
properly stresses the consequences of this symmetry, as Nussbaum does. 
As mentioned above, mnh/mh implies a trace impressed on a semi-fluid bodily organ 
(453a22-3), that undergoes several alterations (450a11-12, 450a14, 451a16-17, 453a24, 453b1-
2).
6
 These alterations are the same as those involved in the operations of sensation, common 
sense and thinking, i.e. „images‟ (fanta/smata) (450a12-14). The difference between mnh/mh 
and these faculties is that the latter consider the trace itself, in its representative and cognitive 
                                                 
5
 Actually, at 449b25-6 Aristotle says more specifically: tou= de\ nu=n e)n t%½ nu=n ou)k eÃsti mnh/mh. The 
expression nu=n e)n t%½ nu=n is a hapax in the corpus Aristotelicum. I think that this phrase could be an implicit 
reference to what Sorabji (2006: 21, 91) and Annas (1992: 302) call the „specious present‟ and refer to 451a29-
31. This „present at the present‟ (cf. Sorabji, ad loc.) entails a further specification: it is not only present, but „this 
precise instant‟, in which the aiãsqhma is impressed; if a perception persists afterwards, it is in virtue of mnh/mh, 
as the capacity for receiving traces, even if it is not mnhmoneu/ein (451a29-31), that is the representation of the 
same image after a lapse of time. 
6
 Probably the heart, cf. Ross (1955: 237). 
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respect, while the former demands additional awareness that the experience stored in the trace 
belongs to the past (449b22-23, 450a20-21). 
Since intellective faculties are not involved in mnh/mh essentially, not even for memory of 
the objects of thinking (450a13a-14), but only incidentally (kata\ sumbebhko/j), mnh/mh 
belongs to some animals too, but only those which have perception of time (450a15-16). 
Aristotle often advances empirical evidence and medical observations to ground and 
confirm his theoretical theses.
7
 Slow-witted people have good memory, because their fluids do 
not wash away the memory organ and the trace easily persists, but they must not be too slow, or 
the hardened surface of the organ will not receive new traces; the young and the elderly do not 
properly acquire the imprint, the former for the rapid changes occurring in growth, the latter 
because their organ is decaying; too quick-witted people are similar to the young: the image 
cannot be fixed because of the movement their organ undergoes. 
 
1.2  Mnhmoneu/ein and cognates: “remembering”.8 
 
Alongside the ideas of retention and alteration that memory implies, Aristotle must explain 
how humans (and many animals) are able to retrieve stored information. In order to do that, he 
needs to determine carefully which faculties govern mnemonic operations. As Labarrière 
(1984: 18) points out, defining borderline activities that hang between sensation and reason is 
critical in the recognition of the specificity that distinguishes humans from animals. Therefore 
Aristotle selects fantasi/a as the most promising on the grounds of its ductility: perceptive, 
deliberative and intellective faculties, though with different roles, rely on its power for a correct 
working. So, it is possible to define the scope of the mnemonic capabilities of a being on the 
basis of the set of faculties it possesses: only humans will remember items derived from an 
intellectual activity, such as numbers, words and so on, whereas the animals that have 
perception of time will be able to retain only memories of their past perceptions. 
The issue Aristotle wants to tackle in the first chapter is clearly expressed at 450a25-7, 
where he recognizes the intricacy of accounting for the main question related to memory: how 
could we remember something absent while we have an affection, i.e. whenever the content of 
the memory imprint is reactivated?
9
 This could create severe problems in the Aristotelian 
                                                 
7
 449b6-8, 450b5-11, 453a4-5, 453b4-7. 
8
 In chapter 1: 449b4, 449b11, 449b16, 449b29, 450a27, 450b12, 450b14, 450b14-5, 450b19, 451a10-1, 451a15. 
In chapter 2: 451a28, 451a29, 451a30, 451a31, 451b1, 451b5, 451b16, 452a3, 452b5, 452b25, 452b26 (twice), 
453a6, 453b8, 453b19. 
9
 The rhetorical locution a)porh/seie d' aÃn tij, with which this question is introduced, may deserve some notice. 
Similar expressions are common – a little less than a hundred times in the corpus Aristotelicum – whenever 
 12 
account, since he cannot solve them with a conception heavily loaded with rational capacities, 
like Plato did.
10
 Experiential evidence that some animals, which lack intellect, can be tamed 
and somehow trained
11
 leaves Aristotle no room for an essential use of intellectual activities in 
memory. So he draws his answer from another Platonic source, that is the wax block model, 
advanced as a hypothesis at Tht. 191d-197a and rejected by Socrates.
12
 His theory could be 
roughly summarized as follows: first, external objects affect our soul through senses. But, since 
our experience seems to be persistent and not punctual, cognitive occurrences must be stored 
somewhere in our body. Indeed, this is clearly displayed by the claim that any event of thought 
takes place after a former representation from which it can derive its object. So Aristotle needs 
an intermediate capacity, upon which several faculties could rely, that collects and preserves 
sensorial data, even though in a decayed way (DA Γ 3, 428a11-6) in comparison with the 
precision of sensation of proper objects (DA Γ 3, 428b18-9), and that supplies raw material on 
which the intellect could perform its operations (again, DA Γ 7, 431a16-20; 431b2-17 and 8, 
432a7-14). 
In Mem. Aristotle does not focus on this topic at all, but simply refers the reader to the DA 
exposition of fantasi/a. Some interest remains, however, in the negative explanation of why 
intellection cannot be essential for memory (449b30-450a25): hence, he ascribes memory to the 
same part of the soul to which fantasi/a also belongs. Aristotle is not completely satisfied 
with this answer, because it concerns only the genesis of the trace, or, as I am trying to argue 
here, mnh/mh.13 Still, a new question arises: do we remember the affection, or the thing from 
which it was produced? (450b11-5). In other words, after an imprint has been sealed in us, in 
which modality could it be presented again? Clearly not qua affection, that is present and 
cannot convey any information about the temporal depth of its formation; nevertheless the 
alternative left is not immediately obvious. The solution lies in the double essence of the trace, 
that can be regarded both in its cognitive content and as a token of a past experience that 
                                                                                                                                                           
Aristotle needs to stress a significant problem within a broader reasoning. However the very same expression 
reveals a peculiar kinship with other psychological works, like DA, in which it appears 5 times (410b10, 411b14, 
423a22, 424b3, 429b22-3), and Sens. (446a20). For an analysis of this passage, cf. below, pp. 91-6. 
10
 Cf. below, pp. 66-76. 
11
 HA A 1, 488a26-31 (theory partly rectified in PA A 3, 643b3-8); E 13, 544a29-30. Particularly interesting in this 
respect is HA Θ 1, in which Aristotle considers the hierarchy of animate beings without implying substantial 
breaks between species. Here, like in the often discussed Pol. A 5, tamed animals seem to be regarded as the most 
similar to human beings. For a curious example of domestication, cf. HA I 46, 630b18-21: an elephant has been 
taught to kneel in presence of the king, because of the particular „quick sensibility‟ (eu)aisqhsi/a) and „sagacity‟ 
(su/nesij) typical of this species. 
12
 Cf. below, pp. 70-3. 
13
 Particularly revealing of the difference, subtly introduced by Aristotle, between memory and remembering is the 
nexus that links the two clauses of the “impasse” (Sorabji [2006: 50]): a)ll' ei¹ dh\ toiou=to/n e)sti to\ 
sumbaiÍnon periì th\n mnh/mhn, po/teron tou=to mnhmoneu/ei to\ pa/qoj, hÄ e)keiÍno a)f' ouÂ e)ge/neto; (“But  
then, if this is the sort of thing that happens with memory, does one remember this affection, or the thing 
remembered?” [Sorabji, italics mine]). 
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produced the trace. But in order to do so, Aristotle must admit that mnhmoneu/mata have 
additional information, beyond the data content, about the time in which they were created, 
unlike standard fanta/smata
14
. Therefore, remembering involves only perception, both of the 
thing remembered and of the time elapsed, which allows Aristotle to attribute memory to 
animals that possess the capacity of perceiving time depth, even in a rudimentary way (449b28-
30, 453a6-9, 453b9-10). However, nothing prevents those who possess superior faculties from 
remembering objects of scientific knowledge, but only accidentally (451a28-9).
15
 In virtue of 
this distinction, Aristotle concludes in the first part of the second chapter the exposition of 
mnhmoneu/ein reasserting that remembering in itself (kaq'au(to/) occurs only after a time-lapse 
and could not occur simultaneously with the original experience (451a29-31). 
However, shifting perspective from regarding a representation in itself to considering it as a 
copy of something else entails a higher degree of error. Aristotle recognizes this structural 
weakness of remembering (451a3-4), describing both pathological deficiencies tied to specific 
diseases, like in the case of Antipheron of Oreus (451a9), and physiological failures, frequent 
in ordinary circumstances (451a2-14, 452b24-9). 
Repeating once again that Aristotelian uses of such terminology is neither definitive nor 
cogent every time is not superfluous: at least three occurrences of mnhmoneu/ein need to be 
explained in a way distinct from the one here outlined and call for a revision of the level of 
specificity of the concept. In particular, at 452b5 a)namimnh/skesqai or memnh=sqai should be 
expected rather than the aorist of mnhmoneu/ein. The case here described is paradigmatically 
anamnestic: “for the same reason also when we have to remember a name, if we know a similar 
one, we blunder onto that” (Sorabji). Bloch (2007: 104) tried to reconcile this occurrence with 
his interpretation of mnhmoneu/ein as not denoting any kind of activity, but the periphrasis one 
should resort to is somehow captious (“when we have the state of remembering a name”), and 
he himself admits that interpreting mnhmoneu/ein as closer to recollection “may be more 
tempting” here. But, in this case, we need to interpret the word in a broader sense, 
comprehensive of both mnemonic and anamnestic performances. So, mnhmoneu/ein and 
memnh=sqai can easily blunder one into another, although usually their meaning is distinct. An 
explanation of this occurrence of mnhmoneu/ein could lie in the fact that Aristotle derived these 
concepts from ordinary language, in which oÃnoma memnh=sqai and oÃnoma mnhmoneu/ein 
                                                 
14
 In modern terms, our psychophysiological system is capable of metadata storage and restoration: cf. below, pp. 
96-103. 
15
 This claim is not surprising in light of DA B 3, 414b28-415a13, where upper capacities are said to rely on lower 
ones, like in the case of the succession of figures, and “in every case the lower faculty can exist apart from the 
higher, but the higher presupposes those below it” (Hicks [1907: 335]).  
 14 
would be almost interchangeable; thus, the shortage of refined linguistic tools could have led 
Aristotle to mix these terminologies. The same explanation could be embraced for 451b1 and 
451b16, where Aristotle suggests that a kind of mnhmoneu/ein is implied in recollection. 
Quite different from this one is the case of 451b5, puzzling to the point that it is expunged 
from the text by most editors, because it has been seen as a serious threat to the structure of the 
whole argument. This occurrence is most probably an intrusive gloss, but it does not irreparably 
affect the argument, since recollection involves an activation of the trace as an intermediate 
stage, i.e. memnh=sqai, which is a species of activation of memory traces like mnhmoneu/ein: in 
this sense, they share some characteristics.16 Furthermore, Aristotle seems to commit himself to 
consider recollecting acts as reinforcement of mnemonic traces (451a12-4). 
 
1.3  ¡Anamimnh/skesqai and cognates: “recollecting”.17 
 
The last of the three objects of study mentioned in the opening, a)namimnh/skesqai, is the 
autonomous retrieval of the cognitive content of a memory trace. This definition is 
uncontroversial, since it is stated at 451b2-5. Nonetheless, it has been often discussed and 
subject to original interpretations. A first striking remark is that recollecting is not acquisition 
(lh=yij) or recovery (a)na/lhyij) of memory: if the former is quite easy to understand – and 
Aristotle successfully demonstrates it with a likely antiplatonic hint
18
 – the latter is not as clear 
as it is defended at 451a21-b6. In this case the argument is quite similar to Plato‟s (Phil. 34a-b): 
the acquisition of an experience in the broadest sense is not related to memory at all, since that 
acquisition could rely neither on a previous memory, because the subject is receiving the 
impression now, nor on the concurrent constitution of a memory, that requires a lapse of time 
for the emergence of the awareness of its temporal depth. Soon afterwards, Aristotle states 
again that what we acquire in the very instant
19
 of the cognitive experience is only some 
                                                 
16
 Cf. below, pp. 21-9. 
17
 In chapter 1: 449b6, 451a6, 451a12-3. In chapter 2: 451a18, 451b1, 451b4, 451b9, 451b10, 451b16-7, 451b23, 
451b28, 451b29-30, 452a4-5, 452a8, 452a13, 452a28-9, 452b6, 453a6, 453a8, 453a10, 453a12, 453a17, 453a18, 
453a20, 453a22, 453b3-4, 453b10. 
18
 Pace Sorabji (2006: 89), it is really hard to believe that Aristotle in this passage does not have in mind and 
somehow criticize the Platonic theory of knowledge: perhaps he does not refer to any specific passage, but the 
necessity of clarifying the different background is manifest. If ever Plato admits recollection after prior forgetting, 
Aristotle all the more wants to point out his psychophysical conception of memory, that is farthermost from the 
Platonic view, and how only it allows for a proper account of forgetfulness and retrieval mechanisms. 
19
 I am inclined to interpret t%½ a)to/m% kaiì e)sxa/t% at 451a25-6 with a temporal meaning, rather than 
identifying some kind of reference to a specific organ – although it is not completely implausible (cf. Ross [1955: 
244] who follows Sophonia Mem. 5,6.7.19, who reads e)n t%½ prwt¯% ai¹sqhthri¿%). If the consensus on the 
temporal meaning needs to be strengthened, just skimming through the preceding treatise Sens. reveals an 
unexpected kinship with this occurrence. In several places (447a13-4, 447b18, 448b19, 448b21-2, 449a3) we find 
similar expressions referring to temporal instant. 
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memory content. So the argument digresses from the main subject towards the description of 
what remembering in itself requires, i.e. a lapse of time that allows awareness of it to arise.
20
 
Only after this examination Aristotle gives his definition of a)namimnh/skesqai. After that, the 
philosopher describes in what this activity consists at 451b16-8 and 451b29-31, in particular 
the former passage says: “whenever we recollect, then, we undergo one of the earlier changes, 
until we undergo the one after which the change in question occurs” (Sorabji). 
So recollecting leads to the restoration of certain cognitive contents, but it is not learning or 
relearning: it is not the former, because Aristotle, as I have already claimed, holds a 
psychophysical conception of the memory trace formation; nor the latter, that is simply the 
consequence of the possibility of forgetfulness due to the disruption of the imprint. This last 
case is interesting, since recollecting and relearning seem hardly distinguishable from each 
other, as both of them presuppose a loss of information that is filled after a given time. The 
difference recognized lies in the degree of participation of the subject in the restoration of this 
piece of information: if it happens in concomitance with an external occurrence (di'aÓllou) that 
supplies again the lost content, that is a case of relearning, while if it happens exclusively 
through the agency of the subject (dìi'au¸tou=), recollection occurs. Nonetheless these two 
activities partake of the same principle, though recollecting partakes of it to a superior degree. 
The best interpretation of plei¿onoj a)rxh=j at 451b9 remains Beare‟s “some spring over 
and above” (ad loc.), that explains a particular case of relearning not to be confused with 
recollection, but very close to it. With forgetfulness all data are usually lost and relearning 
implies that an – almost – identical imprint just replaces the old ones. But sometimes, one can 
have not only the same information again at his disposal again, but also the awareness that he 
has already had it some time before. In other words, the kind of forgetfulness implied in 
relearning sometimes consists in the retention of metadata regarding contextual information 
about the creation of a trace, whose content has been lost and now re-established. When 
relearning, we do not merely have the same information at our disposal again, but we can have 
the awareness that we have already had it. 
The autonomy of recollective processes calls for further elucidations. Contrary to memory, 
they require the necessary intervention of intellectual capacities. For no animal can recollect, 
                                                 
20
 These lines seem to be the ones on the grounds of which Aristotle will assert at 453a6-7 that recollecting differs 
from remembering “not only in respect of the time” (Sorabji [2006: ad loc.]). Sorabji himself (2006: 111) refers to 
451a31-b6 in explaining these lines, but he probably inverts the Aristotelian argument: “Remembering can occur 
without a substantial time gap after the original perception, learning, or experience. Recollection cannot”. It has 
been also suggested (Bloch [2007: ad loc.]) that mo/non should be expunged as a hindrance to the understanding of 
that passage. 
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but only humans can (453a7-14).
21
 Perhaps Aristotle, in theory, leaves some room for including 
some animals, when he claims that none “of the known animals” (tw½n gnwrizome/nwn 
z%w¯n) is able to recollect; however, it cannot be determined to what extent this is 
methodological uncertainty or rhetorical redundancy. In any case, recollecting is an activity 
strictly akin to reasoning, oiâon sullogismo/j tij. Ross (1955: 252) ascribes this occurrence 
to a narrow logical context,
22
 while Sorabji (2006: 111) weakens that strained interpretation 
arguing that “sullogismos (reasoning) is not confined to syllogistic reasoning”. Indeed, 
recollecting resembles more a practical syllogism or a deduction than a logical inference and 
moreover Aristotle compares it with deliberation.
23
 After all, Aristotle‟s comparison is mostly 
based on the strategies implied in recollecting and deliberating. As in deliberation the subject 
considers many strategies of action before choosing the right one to perform in order to achieve 
an aim, recollecting consists in the mobilization of our cognitive assets, through the arousal of 
many movements, until the one that precedes the actualization of this process occurs. This 
conclusion is confirmed by 452a7-10, in which Aristotle clearly recognizes the possibility of 
miscarriage of many attempts, until the right one is found. 
Like any intellectual activity, recollection too requires a physiological medium to work on. 
In this respect Aristotle is again explicit in saying that recollecting means pursuing something 
within something bodily, in which the affection lies. He says this at 453a21-3, which can be 
considered the „biological manifesto‟ of recollection, just like 451b2-5 is for the theoretical 
front. Furthermore Aristotle makes several remarks about the relation between recollective 
capacities and physical constitutions. The most important and convincing one regards the 
explanation of unsuccessful attempts. In the last part of the treatise Aristotle aims to 
demonstrate that the theoretical framework he has built is not only consistent with 
physiological structures, but also accounts for pathological events. In particular, Aristotle draws 
on his reflections about melancholy
24
 and other diseases that affect recollection in some people. 
                                                 
21
 The same claim can be found at HA A 1, 488b24-6. 
22
 Ross‟ reconstruction lacks flexibility and does not account for the entire process of recollecting. He recognizes 
as major premiss of the syllogism that “one has a general impression that a fa/ntasma in one‟s mind must have a 
cause in previous experience” and the awareness of an actual representation as minor premiss. Therefore the 
conclusion is that one thinks this representation as caused by a previous experience. Only at this stage a search 
(zh/thsij) intervenes for that cause, and when it is successful, it leads to recollection. Now, this reconstruction is 
open to criticism. Firstly, recollection itself is zh/thsij (453a12), and not something ensuing from a previous 
search; secondly, the major premiss is purely Ross‟ conjecture, because the text does not give any hint of it, while 
it would deserve in-depth explanation by Aristotle. 
23
 Precisely, sullogismo/j is used for describing deliberative searches in EN Z 9, 1142b22-6; 12, 1144a31-3, or at 
least logismo/j in EN Γ 5, 1112b20-4, Z 9, 1142b1-2. 
24
 Cf. Prob. xxx 1. Even if it is not considered a genuine Aristotelian work, Prob. gives a trustworthy 
reconstruction of the Peripatetic position concerning melancholy, that is not too distant from the Hippocratic 
conception (Nat. Hom. 7; 15; Aph. III 14; Aër 10). Summing up, the spectrum of melancholic symptoms roughly 
resembles the modern polarization between hyperthymia and hypothymia: both classes denote an alteration of 
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Every obstacle those people run into is basically the same, i.e. once the recollective process has 
been set in motion, it is largely out of the subject‟s control. This event crops up in two different 
ways: sometimes, in particular in melancholics, the process cannot be stopped even if one 
wants to (it happens likewise with passions such as fear and anger); sometimes, on the contrary, 
an unbalanced weight in the upper parts, as dwarves
25
 and children have, does not allow the 
recollective movements to persist and complete the task. 
 
1.4 Memnh=sqai and cognates: “recalling”.26 
 
The individuation of memnh=sqai as a term that deserves a special place in the Aristotelian 
description of memory must be ascribed to Bloch (2007: in particular 85-109). This work is 
particularly interesting in the reinterpretation of Aristotelian terminology on memory, but the 
main concern of the author is clearly to shift Aristotle‟s use of memnh=sqai from memory to 
recollection. In this section, I will assess the advantages and disadvantages of such an 
interpretation, so as to suggest my interpretation at the end. 
It is true that the classification of the perfect tense of mnhmoneu/ein has never seriously 
been questioned, and there is no reason why it should be, given the nature of the verb. What 
could have aroused scholars‟ suspicions is instead the distribution of its occurrences, extremely 
unbalanced towards Chapter 2 of the treatise, which according to Bloch is the strongest 
argument for the reinterpretation of the meaning of memnh=sqai. Bloch (2007: 91) breaks up his 
main argument into two, in order to defend better the core of his proposal: he seeks a wide 
consensus on the attribution of the verb to an anamnestic sphere, but at the same time he leaves 
room for further discussion on its precise meaning. In the definition of memnh=sqai, Bloch 
condenses the two main aspects he recognizes in it, i.e. the dynamic power that leads the 
recollective process to its conclusion and the status of memory image it is supposed to have: 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
normal constitution, but they are more often a mental disorder, rather than a proper illness, since some 
hyperthymic (and „hot melancholics‟ as well) can achieve eminent social positions or demonstrate particular 
endowments. For a thorough account of Greek conception of melancholy, cf. Klibansky-Panofsky-Saxl (1964) and 
for a recent point of view about Aristotle, see van der Eijk (2005: 139-168). 
25
 This remark on dwarfism is in step with PA Δ 10, 686 b 3-12; b 24-32. Here for upper parts Aristotle means the 
whole trunk, while in Mem. he specifically refers to the upper trunk, above the first sensorium. However, there is 
no contradiction between these texts, because the excessive growth of the trunk involves a superabundance of 
movements, which are the very reason for the disease here described. 
26
 In chapter 1: 449b20. In chapter 2: 451b26, 452a7, 452a10, 452a16, 452a18, 452a20 (twice), 452a22-3, 452a24, 
452b27, 452b28, 452b29, 452b30, 453a2, 453a3. 
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[memnh=sqai is] a dynamic state of having in oneself an object (=image) with the potential 
of moving the possessor to something that one has previously experienced, learned or 
thought (Bloch [2007: 88-9]). 
 
In other words, memnh=sqai represents the capacity for retrieving an item in an anamnestic 
chain through a different one: in that respect, this is Aristotle‟s solution to the problem of 
connecting different items without an explicitly embedded link. When one recollects an item, 
there is a „moving potential‟ in it that leads to the right object and allows the process to be 
completed. Bloch‟s analysis of the one and only occurrence in Chapter 1 is exemplary of the 
progress allowed by his standpoint, but in general the suggestion of ascribing memnh=sqai to 
recollection rather than to memory fits the text better than the alternative. Indeed Bloch‟s 
interpretation casts light above all on the definition of memnh=sqai as a moving potential from 
the starting-point to the following one. Since now, it was problematic, comparing that with the 
nature of complete activity that mnhmoneu/ein seems to be attributed; on the other hand, 
memnh=sqai is an operation that connects different items, but is not the core of recollection, 
since the final stage is the retrieval of the cognitive content of the trace and not of its link with 
other traces. Nevertheless, the two verbs share at least three basic characteristics: the content of 
both the operations denoted is an image; a time relation with the experience from which they 
derive; the representative feature of what they stand for, and, finally, they are both states, a 
remark not explicit in the text and yet important in the argument. But mnhmoneu/ein and 
memnh=sqai cannot be confused, because the latter has not the “direct awareness” of the past 
event and, conversely, the former lacks the potentiality of moving a process beyond itself.  
So far I have described the positive consequences of Bloch‟s proposal, but of course it is 
not immune from criticism. The author tends to overstress the difference between „recalling‟ 
and „remembering‟ to mark off a distinction never noticed before, but he does so on the risky 
grounds of terminology, since he claims that “memnh=sqai is even closer to a)namimnh/skesqai 
than to mnhmoneu/ein” (Bloch [2007: 93]). On the contrary, I think it is sufficient to refer to the 
stative and resultative value of the perfect tense of the verb to explain sufficiently the 
difference that Aristotle clearly points out with his careful choice of the terms, without forcing 
the distinction into a grammatical one. In that respect, Bloch emphasizes the tension between 
memory and recollection (in order to demonstrate that they are not two species of the same 
faculty, i.e. “memory”) to such an extent that seems strange that Aristotle decided to treat those 
different capabilities in the same treatise. For example, in my opinion this strategy dictates 
Bloch‟s choice of denying any dynamism to mnhmoneu/ein (2007: 79-84), while it is difficult 
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to imagine that its essential representative nature could be conceived without an activity of any 
sort. So since Aristotle used an ambiguous, often interwoven, terminology, perhaps he did not 
intend to draw sharp distinctions, but to bridge the gap between mnhmoneu/ein and 
memnh=sqai. Furthermore, if we discard the idea that memnh=sqai is somehow related to 
mnhmoneu/ein, the author should explain why the former activity, like the latter, implies an 
image: the definition of memnh=sqai is focused on the capacity for connecting traces, but it does 
not entail the intervention of an image to justify the link. 
Another difficult passage for Bloch‟s argumentation is that he does not extend the 
attribution of this dynamic state to every intermediate step of an anamnestic chain, although 
Bloch maintains some uncertainty. It is clear that Aristotle is concerned in particular with the 
last link in the anamnestic chain and the realization of this dynamic potential could be 
estimated only when the process has achieved its goal, otherwise it dissipates. But Aristotle 
seems to extend a form of memnh=sqai to the intermediate links. Considering 451b25-6 as a 
methodological position rather than a pragmatic assumption strains the text: in my own opinion 
Aristotle simply says that it is a loss of time to inquire on how a modular process develops from 
its farthest elements, while the analysis of the last module can be sufficient. Moreover, the last 
and strongest piece of evidence I offer is Aristotle‟s use of the verb throughout the example at 
the lines 452a17-26, both for the intermediate of the chain and for the final one. 
In conclusion, as I have already mentioned, my attempt to reconsider the meaning of 
memnh=sqai is based on the peculiar nature of the verb as a perfect tense. This tense expresses 
the result of an action or a state. Memnh=sqai is not completely different from mnhmoneu/ein, 
because this word stresses the perfective character of the mnemonic activity involved in 
recollection. Briefly, in my opinion memnh=sqai is nothing other than a peculiar kind of 
activation of the memory trace, in which the retrieval process does not stop in the moment it 
regains the previous experience together with the awareness of the time lapsed since the event 
that generated that cognitive content in the subject. While in remembering, this awareness is 
sufficient, in recalling it is not, since the recollective process needs to get through one or more 
items that are not the end of the search, but are not simply discarded;
27
 on the contrary, since 
the recalled items are the new starting point for potential connections, the awareness of 
                                                 
27
 The example at 452a13-6 can deceive the reader. The items presented there (milk, white, air, moist, autumn) 
seem to follow one another arbitrarily, or at least weakly (even if Sorabji [2006: 104-5] tries to recognize a 
stronger link between moist and autumn, to which Rowe [1974: 195] adds white and air), but Aristotle‟s 
illustration aims to show how habituation, like a second nature, can affect and generate peculiar recollective chains 
in a subject, even starting from a rather low level of similarity. Obviously the stronger and the more natural the 
connection is, the better the recollective concatenation will be, like in the case of mathematical demonstration or 
arguments (452a2-4). Here the ease of transitions is grounded on the natural potential of the previous ki¿nhsij to 
activate the successive one(s). 
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contextual information about the formation of the trace would hamper the subject and bind him 
to the contingency of the memory trace. In this sense, memnh=sqai emerges as the dynamic 
potential to move beyond the activation of the image as related to its aetiological context: this 
element must be retrieved but will stay in the background for the rest of the process. In other 
words, a human being, once he has restored the movements both of the thing and of the time, 
discards one of them, in order to consider the cognitive content in itself, if the attempt is 
successful, or to connect this item with another having some degree of kinship: in this case the 
process is repeated, until the item sought is recollected. This procedure is the perfect 
reproduction for memory of what happens in thought.  The claim I have already mentioned, 
that an act of thinking cannot be performed without an underlying fa/ntasma is an 
archetypical model on which recollection is based. Grasping a cognitive content out of a 
fa/ntasma implies a simplification and a deprivation of the residual contingency of it, till the 
intelligible can be abstracted.
28
 
So far, my reconstruction seems to support Annas‟ (1992) interpretation. Indeed, her 
original interpretation of the treatise is far from being definitely overthrown because of its 
explicative power. Recognizing a sharp distinction between mnh/mh as personal memory and 
a)na/mnhsij as non-personal memory does make a lot of sense and would solve many textual 
problems. For instance, it would explain the Aristotelian insistence on the higher complexity of 
the objects of recollection;
29
 the weakness underlying Annas‟ main arguments resides, 
however, I believe, in the undervaluation of the zetetic rationale of a)namimnh/skesqai, that is 
an incomplete activity, if considered in itself. Aristotle‟s focus is unequivocally on the retrieval 
procedures
30
. 
Annas (1992) interprets recollection as if it were an alternative species of memory and she 
devotes only one short footnote (310, n. 21) to the possibility of a process ending with the 
acquisition of contextual information from our past personal experience as object of 
recollection. This possibility is suggested on the basis of 451a5-7 (in which Aristotle reaches a 
peak in mixing up mnemonic and anamnestic terminology) and 453a10-2: since the movement 
of the thing and the one of the time must be recalled in every case, both of them can play the 
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 Cf. DA Γ 4; Γ 7, 431b2-5; Γ 8, 431b28-432a14. Cf. Cleary (1985: 13-45). 
29
 Mathematical argumentations (452a2-3), chains of concepts (452a13-6), and single items, like names (452b4-6) 
are involved in recollection. Furthermore, if ta\j tou= trigwn¯ou oÀti du/o o)rqaiÍj iãsai is not expunged at 
449b20, this could be another excellent example. I find extremely tempting Gohlke‟s conjecture of translating, 
instead of secluding, this passage from 449b20 to 449b17, after qewrou/menon. That solution would restore the 
balance of an argument in which an example of perception (todiì to\ leuko\n) is counterpoised to one of scientific 
knowledge. 
30
 This is the reason why I try to keep the noun and the corresponding verb apart: while Aristotle uses 23 times the 
verb, the noun occurs only 5 times in the text.  
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role of starting point for a new connection. For instance, as Bloch (2007: 73) suggests, a good 
starting-point in recollecting something could be an event chronologically close to it, instead of 
an item linked with it in some way. This seems to be the gnoseological consequence of the 
doubleness of time movements (452b29-453a2): if recollection happens “without a unit of 
measurement” (mh\ me/tr%), only the movement of the object could be used as a starting point 
for further search, but if we recall the exact time in which we had an experience, e.g. the day 
before yesterday (453a1), time-related information could supply a sufficient drive for retrieving 
contextual items as well as movements related to objects could do.
31
 So once demonstrated the 
potential connectivity of time relations, nothing prevents us from including the reverse case: the 
aim of a recollective attempt can be the exact time of the day in which something has been 
experienced by the subject, recalling, for instance, the position of that experience between other 
events of the day, the time of which we happen to know. For these reasons I think it is 
inadequate to confine recollection within non-personal memory, even though non-personal 
memory is the more representative case, for Aristotle, of the demarcation between animal and 
human capabilities. 
 
1.5  ÐOtan e)nergei=n kata\ to\ mnhmoneu/ein; oÀtan e)nergei=n tv= mnh/mv: 
“remembering in act”.32 
 
Another major breakthrough allowed by Bloch‟s interpretation is the renewed focus on the 
specific lexicon Aristotle used to describe activities „towards memory‟. Again, his standpoint 
gives remarkable clarification on the prominent value of those expressions in the treatise, but 
some explanations seem to be vitiated by Bloch‟s preliminary assumptions. For instance, the 
author tries to limit every kind of activity to anamnestic contexts in order to avoid the 
attribution of processes to remembering. So activation of memory traces, also in remembering, 
is left to autonomous retrieval procedures due to Bloch‟s contraposition of memory as a state 
(eÀcij) and recollection as an activity (e)ne/rgeia) (2007: 79-109). In that respect, „movements 
towards remembering‟ – this is Bloch‟s terminology to indicate what I call „remembering in 
act‟ – becomes synonymous with one meaning of memnh=sqai, in which its potential is 
completely realized in a state of remembering, conceived as an actualization: hence “the 
representation found in memnh=sqai is logically prior to the state of having the representation as 
                                                 
31
 A plausible example could be the following: when someone asks me what I did yesterday at a specific moment 
of the day, I can answer by recalling the activity I usually do at that time or simply by reconstructing the sequence 
of events up to the one I want to recall. In those ways, the movement discarded is the one related to the objects, i.e. 
the representational content of the fa/ntasma. 
32
 In chapter 1: 449b22, 450a19-20, 450b17-8. In chapter 2: 452b24, 452b26. 
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a memory image” (Bloch [2007: 92]), a statement that implies to some extent a distortion of the 
Greek terminology, since the perfect tense of a verb is taken to precede a state denoted by the 
same verb in the present tense. 
The outcome of a fully accomplished actualization of the potential of recalling seems to be 
for Bloch an activity that brings some content to memory or remembering, if the subject lingers 
on that result as long as it takes to „fix‟ this potential in an abiding state, so I need not to 
recollect again one thing I recalled few hours ago, since a dispositional accessibility to this 
piece of information was retained (Bloch [2007: 75-6]). This conclusion is even more ingenious 
than Bloch‟s revision of the import of memnh=sqai and Bloch‟s interpretation of many passages 
benefits from it, but that of others does not, and probably a definitive answer is a long way 
from being reached. In my opinion, there is at least as much evidence that the „memory in act‟-
terminology could apply both to remembering and recalling, as for restricting it to the former. 
On the one hand, considering the expression oÀtan e)nergv= kata\ to\ mnhmoneu/ein as 
related to recollection could solve an old problem for commentators, namely the puzzling 
nature of the expression e)n tv= yuxv= le/gei (“one says in his soul”) at 449b22-3, which 
forced the commentators to imply a semantic activity in memory. Sorabji (2006: 9-10) stresses 
the consequences of this argument and recognizes in Aristotle a tendency to exclude animals 
from memory, as empiricists did on the basis of the same argument. However, evidence in the 
text for the attribution of this capacity to some animals is too conspicuous
33
 to be ignored and 
the passage to be interpreted should be the one now under examination. Annas (1992: 301-2) 
instead limits herself to highlighting the problem within an Aristotelian theory of knowledge, 
but together with a convincing analysis of the difficulties of Sorabji‟s view she does not offer a 
comprehensive account capable of replacing that one. 
However, in the occurrences at lines 450a19-20 and 450b17-8, „remembering in act‟ 
expressions are included in crucial descriptions of remembering. The latter, in particular, seems 
in contrast with Bloch‟s interpretation and is deliberately undervalued by him. The context 
clarifies that in this case the activation described is not the one implied in memnh=sqai, but only 
the basic mnemonic capacity for „perceiving‟ the image qua copy and not in itself. The mention 
of aiãsqhsij is very important here, like at 450a19-20. In this section of Chapter 1 Aristotle 
resorts to a massive use of mnhmoneu/ein (four times in ten lines), which leaves no doubt about 
the activity he is referring to here. 
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 Aristotle confirms several times in the treatise this conviction (449b28-30, 450a15-9, 453a6-9) and it seems that 
he never questioned it, whereas the distance between memory and recollection – again associated with deliberation 
– is reasserted at HA A 1, 488b24-6; once more at Sens. 1, 436a6-11 memory is included among the capacities 
ascribable to animals in virtue of their psychophysical character. Almost certainly it is not one of the common 
affections, like sensation, but it is peculiar to some species, namely those which possess perception of time. 
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Furthermore, at 450a19-20 it is evident that the oÀtan e)nergv= tv= mnh/mv-phrase is the 
culmination of an argument in support of attributing memory to animals. The activation here is 
characterized again as a kind of sensation, a prosai/sqhsij
34
 and, even if Bloch could argue 
that recalling as a state of having an image does not require intellective faculties in its 
representation, it does rely on a previous intellectual activity, i.e. recollection, that has supplied 
a content subsequently fixed in remembering as a lasting state. So it is very unlikely that 
Aristotle described animal capacities of remembering with the jargon of a mnemonic ability 
they do not share with human beings, namely recalling. At 449b18-23 the expression most 
probably refers instead to humans only. In all this long section (449b4-30), Aristotle makes 
preliminary methodological delimitations and empirical observations, outlines the main topics 
of the chapter, but always dealing with problems arising from ordinary experience. For that 
reason this example can be regarded as an approach to the reader‟s ordinary experience, while 
the delicate issue of animals that have mnemonic capacities is left for later discussion. So it is 
plausible that 450a19-20 is an extension of the „remembering in act‟-terminology to other 
forms of activation of the memory trace, after having considered which faculties are essentially 
implied in memory and remembering.  
Therefore I argue that the activation of the memory trace conveyed by „remembering in 
act‟-expressions should be concerned both with remembering and recalling, although there are 
remarkable differences between them. Even if both rely on the same essential trait, i.e. they 
bring forward a mnemonic representation to the subject, they are different, since recalling is 
involved in a process which requires some intellectual intervention. However, unifying the two 
main mnemonic operations as species of the activation of memory traces seems a promising 
strategy to justify the dispositional possession of information as distinct from the 
representational moment in both activities:
35
 in other words mnhmoneu/ein and memnh=sqai 
activate in different ways the same dispositional content, which is latent until one of these 
                                                 
34
 The verb is a neologism coined by Aristotle and is a hapax in his own work, particular that is supposed to be a 
hint for considering it as a technical term. 
35
 At Sens. 1, 436b3-6 Aristotle deals with this problem in a broader context, which is very important for 
recognizing the place of memory among the other capacities and testifies to his interest in retention. All the 
attributes of animals – sensation, memory, passion, appetite and desire – are eÀceij or pa/qh, but also swthri/ai or 
fulakai/, or fqorai/ or sterh/seij. In these last cases the philosopher certainly has in mind what memory should 
be at the lowest and broadest level: ai)sqh/sewj swthri/a, that is the same definition of memory given by Plato at 
Phil. 34a-b. Indeed, it is not sufficient to stress only the preservative role of those activities for the life of animals 
(Beare), even if in this passage Aristotle is also concerned with waking and sleeping, youth and old age, inhalation 
and exhalation, life and death, health and disease. In that respect, Ross (1955: 184-5) offers a valuable comment 
that follows Alexander of Aphrodisias, although the lines concerning memory are disputable: “memory and 
recollection are fulakai/ and swthri/ai of sensation, forgetting and death are fqorai/ and sterh/seij of it”. 
Apart from the suggestive juxtaposition of forgetting and death, the polarity well represents the physical nature of 
memory and forgetfulness, while the unforeseen inclusion of recollection needed some criticism: in so far as it is 
an activity upon the bodily trace, it does not concern its preservation or disruption, if not through a mnemonic 
activation, and this is the reason why Aristotle never mentioned it at Sens. 1, 436b3-6. 
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faculties bring it to one‟s attention. In conclusion, Aristotle describes with the lexicon of 
activation the two possibilities of representing the same trace with a temporal awareness, but 
they are not the only two ways. At 450b20-451a2 we can definitely assume that the imprint 
involved in memory, i.e. the fa/ntasma with additional information about the time of the first 
acquisition, is ontologically the same as the one on which imagination and scientific knowledge 
rely:
36
 those activities differ only under an aspectual standpoint, since the activation of the 
same movement
37
 can constitute the premiss of both experiences. Thus, three different 
activities can arise from the same bodily trace: imagination or knowledge, if the subject 
considers the imprint in its cognitive content, remembering and recalling, if the additional time 
movement occurs. 
This interpretation seems to have positive consequences for 452b23-9, a passage used by 
Bloch (2007: 100-3) in support of his reconstruction, although he is forced to break down the 
text in chunks which are not exactly obvious. His aim is to attribute the activation-lexicon to 
memnh=sqai only. 
 
oÀtan ouÅn aÀma hÀ te tou= pra/gmatoj gi¿gnhtai ki¿nhsij kaiì h( tou= xro/nou, 
to/te tv= mnh/mv e)nergeiÍ.––(1) aÄn d' oiãhtai mh\ poiw½n, oiãetai mnhmoneu/ein! 
ou)qe\n ga\r kwlu/ei diayeusqh=nai¿ tina kai\ dokeiÍn mnhmoneu/ein mh\ 
mnhmoneu/onta. (2) e)nergou=nta de\ tv= mnh/mv mh\ oiãesqai a)lla\ lanqa/nein 
memnhme/non ou)k eÃstin! tou=to ga\r hÅn au)to\ to\ memnh=sqai.––a)ll' e)a\n h( tou= 
pra/gmatoj ge/nhtai xwriìj th=j tou= xro/nou hÄ auÀth e)kei¿nhj, ou) me/mnhtai.
38
 
 
It is not a matter of pedantry to discuss whether Bloch‟s way of segmenting the text is 
appropriate or misleading. I think that Bloch‟s division is skewed again towards his theoretical 
purposes. I will try to show that this passage is an attempt made by Aristotle to draw some 
epistemological consequences and to mark the difference between the two kinds of activation 
implied in remembering and recalling. The passages examined so far, I think, do not exclude 
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 Cf. Bloch (2007: 82), even if it does not consider the “mere retention” of the image as sufficient for defining 
memory. 
37
 oÀtan e)nergv= h( ki¿nhsij au)tou= (450b27-8). Maybe this occurrence is neglected by Bloch because of its 
relationship with remembering, but nevertheless it is strictly related to the other expressions of that kind not only 
in virtue of the verb e)nergei=n, but also of oÀtan introducing the clause. 
38
 “Thus, when both the movement of the thing and the movement of the time occur simultaneously, then one 
actualizes his memory.––(1) And if one thinks that he does, without really doing so, he thinks that he remembers; 
for there is nothing to prevent that one is deceived and thinks he remembers, when he is really not remembering; 
(2) but when one is actualizing his memory it is not possible that he does not think he is, but is unaware that he is 
recalling; for this is what recalling essentially was.––But if the movement of the thing occurs separately from the 
movement of time, or if the latter occurs separately from the former, then one does not recall” (Bloch [2007: 100-
1]). 
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my understanding of the twofold nature of the activation, in fact they seem to support it. 
However, Bloch himself places a great deal of confidence in this last occurrence of the 
„remembering in act‟-phrase for demonstrating his interpretation.39 A simplification of the 
argument in its nuclear items can help to reconstruct the line of reasoning: 
(m): „the movements both of the time and of the thing occur simultaneously‟; 
(a): „memory is actualized‟; 
(b): „the subject thinks that he is remembering‟;40 
(r): „the subject is remembering‟; 
(d): „the subject thinks that he is recalling‟; 
(c): „the subject is recalling‟. 
In my opinion, Aristotle does not seem to consider these propositions as coordinate, but 
structured in a relation of species and subspecies as follows:                                            
                                                      m 
 
                                               b             d 
where the stress is on the awareness of the subject who is having a mnemonic experience, 
specified in the particular cases of remembering and recalling, while the subdivision 
                                                       a 
 
                                               r               c 
is focused on the activation in itself. Therefore, (m) and (a) represent general processes that 
take place in mnemonic and anamnestic processes, (b) and (r) the instantiations respectively of 
(m) and (a) in remembering, (d) and (c) those concerning recalling. 
 Thus, Aristotle wants to test a first hypothesis:
41
 
(1)     m  a. 
                                                 
39
 Actually, one possible objection would invalidate Bloch‟s view from the beginning. He does not consider or 
mention the possibility that the object of oiãhtai at 452b24 could be „the condition in which one‟s memory is 
activated‟ and not „remembering‟. Thus interpreting the sentence as “if one thinks that his memory is activated, 
when it is not, then he thinks he is remembering” is possible and would automatically include remembering as a 
kind of activation. Actually, Bloch tries to keep the ambiguity in the text with a Beare-like translation, but most 
modern translators (Hett, Mugnier, Lanza and Sorabji) are more explicit and attribute the „memory in act‟-phrase 
to remembering (e.g. “if one thinks that he experiences these impulses [scil. the one relating to the fact and that 
relating to its time] without doing so” [Hett]). Nevertheless, Bloch denies this possible interpretation arguing that 
the scenario (1) only describes a case of deception about remembering and “there is no real mixing of terms [i.e. 
between recalling/activation and remembering] in the passage” (Bloch [2007: 101]). 
40
 It will soon be clear that Aristotle does not question that remembering is an activation, but (b) may be more 
precisely “the subject is aware that he is undergoing a mnemonic activity” as well. 
41
 452b23-5: oÀtan ouÅn aÀma hÀ te tou= pra/gmatoj gi¿gnhtai ki¿nhsij kaiì h( tou= xro/nou, to/te tv= mnh/mv 
e)nergeiÍ. 
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in which (m) can be both (b) and (d). He assumes this implication in its strong logical 
sense: there cannot be cases in which (m) is not satisfied and (a) is. But actually such cases can 
happen sometimes in remembering:
42
 
(2)      (b  ¬r)   ├   ¬  (b  r). 
The biconditional implication (1) has not satisfactorily described the kind of activation 
involved in remembering, because there are cases in which (m) is satisfied and (a) is not, i.e. 
that one thinks that the movements are occurring without actually taking place. Therefore, a 
weaker implication replaces the first hypothesis:
43
 
(3)      m  a. 
But (de\) we can have another case of activation, i.e. recalling, in which (3) is not sufficient, 
because:
44
 
(4)    a  ¬◊ ¬d   ├   a  d. 
In addition, this makes clear again for Aristotle:
45
 
(5)    d  c. 
This is the full demonstration that recalling reaches a perfect correspondence between the 
activity and the awareness of it that the subject must have, as in the cases of intellectual 
operations. The test for the biconditional implication (1) is satisfied because, since there cannot 
be found a single case in which the subject experiences both the movements without an 
effective activation of the trace, there is no essential difference between the awareness of 
recalling and actually recalling. A fortiori the other way round, i.e. (3), can be satisfied, because 
it was the necessary condition for every kind of activation.
46
 
(6)    ¬m    ¬c    ├     c  m. 
In conclusion recalling requires a stronger affinity between the four elements, precisely an 
equivalence between the four terms (d), (m), (c) and (a). 
It is reasonable to ask what Aristotle meant with this passage, and what my interpretation 
tries to clarify: probably an example could help to understand this. Let us consider two simple 
cases of „remembering‟, “I remember I saw Coriscus yesterday” and „recalling‟, „I recall that 
2+2=4‟. So we have two activities, apparently interchangeable, the simultaneous activation of 
the movement related to the object and of that related to the time, that I called (m), and the 
                                                 
42
 452b25-6: aÄn d' oiãhtai mh\ poiw½n, oiãetai mnhmoneu/ein! ou)qe\n ga\r kwlu/ei diayeusqh=nai¿ tina kai\ 
dokeiÍn mnhmoneu/ein mh\ mnhmoneu/onta. 
43
 It is not explicit in the text, but it is the obvious outcome of the combination of (1) and (2). 
44
 452b26-7: e)nergou=nta de\ tv= mnh/mv mh\ oiãesqai a)lla\ lanqa/nein memnhme/non ou)k eÃstin. 
45
 452b27-8: tou=to ga\r hÅn au)to\ to\ memnh=sqai. 
46
 452b28-9: a)ll' e)a\n h( tou= pra/gmatoj ge/nhtai xwriìj th=j tou= xro/nou hÄ auÀth e)kei¿nhj, ou) 
me/mnhtai. 
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condition in which one‟s memory (i.e. the physical trace one has in one‟s soul) is activated. 
Aristotle observes that these two activities are the same only in recalling; for I can think I 
remember Coriscus without doing so, for example if I imagined meeting Coriscus when I was 
walking in the agora yesterday and I mismatch this act of imagination with my remembering 
an encounter with him which I never had. In this case, the movements take place, but no 
physical trace created by a past experience is (or can be) activated. Conversely, when I recall a 
piece of knowledge retained in a trace apart from the context of the experience that created it, I 
must have activated a trace, otherwise the object of knowledge I am contemplating would not 
be restored. Therefore, when I recall, there is no difference between thinking I recall and 
recalling, and between the occurrence of the movements and the activation of the trace. This 
has interesting consequences. When one restores a piece of knowledge from a trace, the related 
movements undoubtedly take place in him and there is no room for deception when one thinks 
he has recalled something; conversely, in remembering one has an additional awareness that 
can derive from the wrong attribution of temporal depth to a fa/ntasma. In epistemological 
terms, we can consider how remembering and recalling differ: the product of an episode of 
recalling is a piece of knowledge restored from the trace and for that reason it is impossible to 
conceive an intermediate state: I have or I have not it; on the contrary, in remembering, there 
are several possible errors, confusions and misattribution of a temporal depth to the wrong 
trace, or to a trace that instead is only a fa/ntasma, etc. 
For Bloch this passage explains instead “how to proceed from the result of recollection to 
remembering” (Bloch [2007: 101]), but Aristotle‟s argument would be bizarre, because the two 
scenarios described should be inverted, since the first one – about remembering – can ensue 
from the second, about recalling, as a case of fixation of the content recalled in a lasting 
memory. On my reading the scenario about remembering is not related to the premiss 
concerning recalling.
47
 
Another argument in support of my interpretation of this passage comes from 
contextualization. I follow Sorabji (2006: 108), who takes 452b7-453a4 to apply “to all 
remembering”. Even after the revision required by Bloch‟s demarcation of recalling, that I 
accept, there is no need to consider this section as exclusively concerning recalling and 
recollection. At 452b7-17 Aristotle describes the very broad issue of analogy between external 
                                                 
47
 It is a controversial point for Bloch (2007: 102, n. 191) too, since the propaedeutical actualization essentially 
requires an awareness that can be lost when the process fully achieves its goal. But the justification produced, i.e. 
the fact that Aristotle is confusing the activation and its result, is too bold. Aristotle often used blurred 
terminology, but in this case he is strongly committing himself to describing the phenomenon of recalling 
essentially (452b27-8: tou=to ga\r hÅn au)to\ to\ memnh=sqai). Simply, Bloch should admit that Aristotle is 
inconsistent here. 
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and internal objects and he draws a parallel between how we think size and shape and how we 
establish time-lapses. Now, in these lines there is no single occurrence of the word memnh=sqai 
or its cognates, while Aristotle carefully avoids this verb and talks about the „production‟ of a 
movement
48
 from the coordination of the other two concerning the object and the time. But, as 
a matter of fact, the philosopher introduces a strong noetic terminology
49
 and this obviously 
supports Bloch‟s reconstruction. However, at 452b23, a detour from the main topic, i.e. the 
acquisition of time with or without measure, takes place, since the double nature of time 
movements is explained only starting from 452b29 and this time with a pronounced recalling-
lexicon.
50
 Emphatically, we can ask ourselves what happened in between. My response is that 
452b23-9 is a methodological digression about which kind of activation is worth studying.  
Indeed, the following description of time-movements is related to these lines, since the 
safest ground for demarcating possible further discriminations within them is allowed by the 
higher epistemic level of reliability of recalling processes, in which there is no possibility of 
deception about those movements. With this articulated argument, Aristotle warns about the 
reliability of the time relationships involved in remembering, since these ones are sometimes 
liable to errors. Moreover, there are other obstacles to adopting them, since measured time-
lapses imply a soul capable of applying numbers or orders to a continuum and then only 
humans can apply a me/troj for estimating those spans.
51
 
To justify the possible failures of mnemonic processes, Aristotle adduces some evidence 
from ordinary experience, and at 451a2-14 he analyzes the consequences of conceiving 
memory as regarding an image as a copy. The double modi spectandi allowed by a single trace 
is the fundamental mechanism of memory, but, at the same time, it increases the rate of error of 
memory. The commentary on this passage by Sorabji (2006: 85-7) is brilliant in the 
individuation of four problems, but the background I set obviously changes the scene. Aristotle 
considers the consequences of the fact that the same trace can be regarded as a fa/ntasma or as 
a mnhmo/neuma, depending on the aspect assumed each time from it. First, he seems to describe 
a case of déjà-vu, but applied to mental images and not to actual perceptions:
52
 “when changes 
like this are produced in our soul as a result of former perception, we sometimes do not know 
whether this is happening in accordance with the previous perception, and are in doubt whether 
it is memory or not” (451a2-5: transl. by Sorabji). Here, one is deceived and thinks that an 
                                                 
48
 poiei=n is used twice (452b17; 452b19). 
49
 noei=n and cognates are used seven times. 
50
 Three times, in every occurrence Aristotle wants to convey the result of activation. 
51
 Memory and recollection play an important role in creating e)mpeiri/a (cf. below, pp. 87-91). 
52
 Lanza (1971: 1128, n. 13) seems to be the only one to advance this proposal, even if he extends it to 451a5-8 
regardless of the correlation e)ni/ote...o(te\, which suggests an alternative. 
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actual object of his imagination accords with one of our past, while it does not. The context is 
unequivocally bound up in aiãsqhsij.  
Then Aristotle says: “at other times it happens that we have a thought and recollect that we 
heard or saw something earlier. This happens when one changes from contemplating the image 
as the thing that it is to contemplating it as being of something else” (451a5-8: Sorabji). In this 
second case Aristotle considers recalling without mentioning it directly, but he uses e)nnoh=sai 
and a)namnhsqh=nai, words which immediately refer to recollection. Sometimes we can 
proceed in coordinating both movements involuntarily and activate the trace as a memory,
53
 
even if we are focusing on the item recalled. However, it does not necessarily imply any 
deception about it; on the contrary we only regain an additional piece of information, that can 
distract our attention towards it, away from the cognitive process meant to be retrieved.
54
 This 
case is analogous to the one at 451a2-5, since in both of them the subject switches from 
considering the trace in itself to associating it with a temporal location. 
The next two possibilities are the extreme consequences of these first examples.
55
 In the 
first case, “Antipheron of Oreus and other mad people [...] used to speak of their images as 
things that had occurred and as if they were remembering them. This happens whenever 
someone contemplates what is not a copy as if it were” (451a8-12: Sorabji). Antipheron 
considers an image as something from his past: he lives in a perpetual state of deception, illness 
obviously serious to such an extent that Aristotle catalogues this man among those “out of 
themselves”.56 The case relative to recollection is quite singular: “exercises safeguard memory 
by reminding one. And this is nothing other than contemplating something frequently as a copy 
and not as a thing in its own right” (451a12-4: Sorabji). It is not a deficiency, on the contrary it 
is a way to familiarize oneself with the duplicity of the trace. The switch from regarding it in its 
nature to the contemplation of it as a copy, if it is often performed, reinforces the differences 
between the two directions towards activation and prevents deceptions. In this respect, it is 
even clearer that recollection does not admit delusion in virtue of its intellective nature. 
  
                                                 
53
 It is worth remembering again that recollection does not need to be intentional, but it is only an autonomous 
search, which can take place without one‟s drive, like in the case of melancholics. 
54
 An example could be explicative. While we are reconstructing, for instance, a geometrical demonstration, it 
could happen that we regain the past moment in which we first apprehended a certain step. But it is not what our 
intellectual performance was demanding and we need to distract our attention away from that particular. 
Therefore, there is no need to conceive of this case of „unrequested recollection‟ as of a deception. 
55
 Aristotle says “on the contrary” (tou)nanti¿on), but this does not seem exact, at least in the first example, that is 
a radicalization of the deception into a pathology. 
56
 ¡Ecistame/noij (451a9). This word is again a hapax in Aristotle and it is only occasionally used in Greek 
medical terminology by Hippocrates (Prorrheticon, 1.14.2 and relative Galen‟s comment, In Hippocratis 
prorrheticus I commentaria III, 16.631.3) and once again in Galen (De temperamentis libri, III, 1.690.15) 
 30 
1.6  ¡Ana/mnhsij and cognates: “recollection”.57 
 
¡Anamimnh/skesqai is not the counterpart of a)na/mnhsij in the same way as 
remembering is of memory: the way in which the defining activities stand for the whole 
process differs. Remembering is exhaustive of the set of capacities embedded in memory, while 
recollecting seems to be the preliminary stage of seeking the right trace in an anamnestic 
process, after which it steps aside for recalling. So „recollection‟ is composed of at least two 
different moments: one sets in motion several movements towards the memory trace he is 
looking for, and then „recalling‟ focuses the attention on the piece of knowledge one wants to 
restore. This is a module that can be applied several times: if the piece of knowledge retrieved 
is not the one the subject wanted to recollect, it will be used as an intermediate item to 
approach the right one. Thus, as I have already argued above about Annas‟ (1992) 
interpretation,
58
 „recollecting‟ cannot be considered a fully-fledged faculty, as many scholars 
do. 
Indeed, it is quite hard even to talk of „recollection‟ in the usual sense attributed to it, in the 
light of a thorough analysis of the occurrences of the word. Firstly, a)na/mnhsij does not appear 
among the subjects of the treatise, neither in the opening nor in the conclusion. Unlike other 
elements, including memnh=sqai, Aristotle never gives a definition of it and he only 
sporadically uses the term, while the focus is clearly on the dynamic nature of the activity, 
which is better conveyed by the corresponding verb. Another relevant feature in this respect is 
the number in which the noun is used. While mnh/mh is conceived as a unitary phenomenon, 
and as a proof of this fact, it always occurs in the singular,
59
 Aristotle uses a)na/mnhsij in the 
plural in two out of five occurrences.  
Aristotle uses this noun to refer to the repetition of the same module in a concatenation in 
order to reach the one that allows us to retrieve what was sought from the beginning. In 
particular the occurrence at 451b10-1 (sumbai¿nousi d' ai¸ a)namnhseij e)peidh\ pe/fuken h( 
ki¿nhsij hÀde gene/sqai meta\ th/nde: “acts of recollection happen because one change is of a 
nature to occur after another” [Sorabji]) could be translated “anamnestic chain” without 
detriment to the text. Moreover, not only in this case, but also for 451b20 and the section to 
which they belong (451b10-22), a)na/mnhsij is used to describe the succession of movements 
                                                 
57
 In chapter 2: 451a21, 451b10-1, 451b20, 452a1, 453a15. 
58
 Cf. above, p. 21 and n. 31. 
59
 It is striking that no occurrence in the singular can be found in 25 occurrences, while in the rest of the corpus the 
ratio is approximately one plural to five singulars. And actually, it will be necessary to discuss further the plural 
forms, in particular those of Metaph. and MA, because they seem to suggest a slightly different conception of 
memory, cf. below, pp. 87-91, in particular p. 89, n. 202. 
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which follow one another before the occurrence of the right one. The so-called „rules of 
association‟ are described here as linking different kind of movements, while the goal towards 
which they are directed is left to further discussion, or at least is not the centre of Aristotle‟s 
attention. In virtue of this remark, the claim of lines 451b25-7, according to which there is no 
need to inquire further on the more distant links but rather it is sufficient to concentrate on the 
modules closer to the goal, represents a shift of perspective from regarding a)na/mnhsij as a 
whole to focusing on the part of it that is the aim of the process.  
In the long section that extends into the chapter from this last occurrence to the final 
empirical observations of the treatise (451b28-453a4), the only occurrence of a)na/mnhsij is in 
the beginning of it and it is clearly related to the succession of movements that connects several 
pra/gmata. After that, only a)namimnh/skesqai and memnh=sqai are used and they seem to 
represent the core meaning of the entire process: thanks to them it is possible to regain 
information by means of a coordination of movements as I shall analyse later.
60
 In conclusion, 
a)na/mnhsij is excluded from this discussion and it only reappears at 453a15. Here, the 
distance between a)namimnh/skesqai and a)na/mnhsij reaches its peak: the former in itself 
does not imply any achievement, but it is only a process through which the latter could be 
achieved. 
Annas (1992) instead talks of „recollection‟ throughout and tries to unify as much as 
possible the bulk of Aristotle‟s indications into a unitary complex. She emphasizes the outcome 
of the process and perhaps it is more correct to attribute her conclusions to recalling rather than 
to recollection. If we do this, Annas‟ interpretation can be reproposed with renewed strength, 
even if it remains a “bold one”, because “Aristotle himself does not discuss the matter in these 
terms” (300). Indeed, even admitting that Aristotle used recalling to describe a non-personal 
memory, not every problem can be solved. In fact, it is true that in many cases recalling implies 
the retrieval of a piece of information separately from the memory of the acquisition of that 
particular content, but it can only be a preliminary operation on the trace, needed in order to 
locate the item within the metadata
61
 – in which it is embedded and through which it can be 
retrieved. This passage cannot be eluded and then Aristotle can only come to conceive non-
personal memory not independently from personal memory, but as an extension of this 
capability. 
In addition, one of the arguments supplied by Annas is the priority of memorizing facts 
rather than experiences and she claims to be unsure whether it is possible – or useful – to 
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 Cf. below, pp. 96-103. 
61
 Probably this is what Aristotle means with „movements of the object‟ and „movements of the time‟, see below, 
pp. 96-103 for a possible interpretation in this sense. 
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improve personal memories, even if Aristotle gives advice at 451a12-4 to preserve one‟s 
personal memory at best by recollecting it over and over (308). From my standpoint, this 
statement is not disturbing at all. Here Aristotle only reasserts once again his conception of 
mnemonic traces as a sort of „magnetic field‟, in which the more times a subject goes along the 
trace again the firmer the connection will be for future efforts; for the subject will be able to 
separate the content and the aetiological context of the image he is having and, eventually, the 
personal memory of the event will become more definite and vivid. 
The movement towards retrieval reinforces the material trace in which the information is 
imprinted and is the opposite of a „movement towards forgetfulness‟. In two very interesting 
parallel passages about the impossibility of changes of changes, Phys. E 2, 225b31-3 and 
Metaph. K 12, 1068a30-3, Aristotle says that in fact the subject is the one who undergoes the 
change, because sometimes he could change towards recollection, the result of which is 
scientific knowledge, some other times towards forgetfulness and, in this case, ignorance. 
These are not only generic suggestions, if they are read in the light of another passage, DA A 4, 
408b15-8. Here Aristotle is dealing with the refutation of the idea that changes or movements 
must be attributed to the soul rather than to the whole human being. He seems to recognize in 
the ordinary usage a sort of synecdoche
62
 that must be corrected, since some changes are not 
admittedly confined to the soul. Among those, he says that a)na/mnhsij is a movement that 
departs from the soul to affect the traces stored in bodily organs, in opposition with aiãsqhsij, 
which goes in the opposite direction. Therefore from the same substrate different activities 
could lead to different results. 
In step with it is also Long. 465a22-3, where recollection and learning are compared again, 
in contrast with forgetfulness and error, which are their corruption. Aristotle has an authentic 
psychophysical conception of memory and uses it in these passages as a theoretical tool for 
explaining other activities which can take place in the soul. In line with 451b8-10, recollection 
is not only above learning, but this gives it raison d’être, since learning presupposes both a 
lasting state after original apprehension and the possibility of autonomous retrieval of the 
content learnt, otherwise it should imply a new acquisition every time and it could not be called 
learning anymore. In the same relationship I conceive forgetfulness and error: the latter is 
somehow an active subspecies of the former.  
                                                 
62
 Of course, as Wedin (1988: 11) says, this “is not a plea for linguistic reform”, but this arguments falls within the 
main argument‟s concern of tracing back psychic capabilities to the whole subject that carries out them. Cf. 
Polansky (2007: 112-7). 
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So we can reconstruct a unitary account of the bodily substrate on which recollection 
works. Recollection and learning
63
 have a positive action of reinforcement or creation of the 
trace; they act on the organ deepening the imprint so as to give prominence to that connection 
for future attempts to re-establish it, to the detriment of other wrong paths: this conception, I 
believe, can account for the movement described in the DA passage, which originates from the 
soul and reaches its end in the body. Conversely, forgetting implies the corruption (fqora/) of 
the physical device that contains a piece of knowledge; this can happen if a trace is not recalled 
for such a long time that the movements which the organ undergoes wash away the patterns of 
possible connections leading to the trace and the trace itself; but it can also take place whenever 
some movements establish erroneous associations of information, i.e. errors, diverting the 
anamnestic efforts towards a wrong item. 
Another consequence of this conception is worth noticing. The dynamic nature of the 
process supports what has been said before about the attribution of memnh=sqai not only to the 
last successful stage, but also to the intermediate steps.
64
 Considering error as an „active 
forgetfulness‟ entails a more complex view of recalling, if we consider that it has also a 
physical effect. Errors originated by our autonomous attempts at recollecting equally affect the 
bodily apparatus as successful cases of recalling, even if they lead to adverse results. Thus, 
what actually defines memnh=sqai is only the dynamic potential towards the objects one wants 
to recollect, no matter whether the objects retrieved are the right ones or not, and both 
successful and unsuccessful attempts have physical repercussions. If this is the common feature 
of recalling, the extension to the other steps of an anamnestic chain is the natural consequence. 
Indeed, it should explain what happens when undesirable results occur. As a vicious circle, a 
wrong path is more and more difficult to abandon the more we linger over it. Several examples 
are offered in the last part of chapter 2 (453a14-b7), but the most interesting is the one about 
melancholics and people who suffer excessive humidity in the part that houses the organ. In 
them, once a recollective process is set in motion, it cannot be stopped easily, since it does not 
find the movement that leads straight (eu)quporh/sv) to what is searched for. However it could 
happen that the items recalled in between do not lead to the last one. Thus Aristotle recognizes 
that establishing some wrong connections could compel the subject to repeat the succession, 
even if he is trying to stop it, because a habit – grounded on a physical alteration – has been 
established. In conclusion, here also the physical potential of memnh=sqai is expressed in the 
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 Certainly, some kinds of learning exclusively rely on intellective faculties, which are not located in any organ, 
but it is equally important to consider that each episode of thought requires a bodily substratum to work upon, and 
that these traces are modified, even if indirectly, also by intellectual activities: for instance, an imprint often used 
in abstractive operations will be „deeper‟ than an inactive one. 
64
 Cf. above, pp. 19-20. 
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succession from a link to another of the connection, even if it leads the process in wrong 
directions. 
 
1.7 Pa/qoj and cognates: “affection”.65 
 
Our understanding of the meaning of pa/qoj is a keystone for a correct understanding of 
the entire treatise. Defining this meaning is difficult as a result of the extreme flexibility of the 
word and the diverse extent of its uses. In the De Memoria pa/qoj has one specific meaning 
and four more uses, but each one can be traced back to the same notion of „alteration‟. 
Obviously, it is impossible to catalogue these acceptations in a definitive way, but what I am 
going to outline must be regarded as a provisional guide to figure out the range of meanings 
which Aristotle is thinking of. 
(a) Pa/qoj is a twofold alteration that occurs in the animal involved in a mnestic process: it 
covers both the material cause, i.e. the alteration of the bodily organ, which is produced by an 
internal or external experience, and the final cause, i.e. the representation produced by this 
alteration after a lapse of time, which is in itself remembering. At 449b5, 449b25, 450a13
66
 
(even if here the reference is, more generally, to the fa/ntasma), 450b12, 451a26, 451a26-7, 
451a28, Aristotle does not seem concerned to distinguish between these two functions, but we 
can easily grasp this distinction from those passages in which only one aspect is involved. On 
the one hand, at 450b5, 451a24 (twice), 453a15, 453a23, pa/qoj stands exclusively for the 
physical imprint, in the form of which memory is stored;
67
 on the other hand at 450a26, 
450b18, 450b32 Aristotle seems to convey the representational side of the word and in any case 
it refers just to remembering rather than to memory, as the second actuality of mnemonic 
activities. Aristotle is not interested everywhere in distinguishing these two meanings because 
they are usually merged for him and the representational facet issues simultaneously from the 
trace whenever a movement stirs it up. In this respect, the alteration and the representative 
capacity are the same in act.
68
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 In chapter 1: 449b5, 449b25, 450a1, 450a11, 450a13a, 450a26, 450a30, 450b1, 450b5, 450b12, 450b18, 
450b32. In chapter 2: 451a21-2, 451a24 (twice), 451a26, 451a26-7, 451a28, 451a30, 451a31, 451b2, 453a11, 
453a15, 453a23, 453a28. 
66
 Cf. DA A 1, 402a9, for a strict affinity with this peculiar reference, that seems to be poised between (a) and (c). 
67
 Here Aristotle maintains the same procedure applied for sensation (DA B 5): the bodily organ undergoes an 
alteration from the object, because it is dissimilar; but since the alteration is received, the organ becomes similar 
(417a20: pa/sxei me\n ga\r to\ a)no/moion, peponqo\j d' oÀmoio/n e)stin): in conclusion the pa/qoj involved in 
this case represents the first actuality of the mnemonic capacity. I will not linger over the discussion of the 
mechanism of perception, which is a very controversial topic, cf Sorabji (1992) and Burnyeat (1992) and (2002). 
68
 Once more a comparison with the De Anima and the theory of sensation therein put forward could be useful: 
eÃsti me\n ouÅn tau)to/n, to\ d' eiånai eÀteron! me/geqoj me\n ga\r aÃn ti eiãh to\ ai¹sqano/menon, ou) mh\n to/ 
ge ai¹sqhtik%½ eiånai ou)d' h( aiãsqhsij me/geqo/j e)stin, a)lla\ lo/goj tij kaiì du/namij e)kei¿nou (DA B 12, 
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(b) At 451a21-2, 451a30, 451a31, 451b2, 453a11 pa/qoj means “what one has experienced” 
from anything which is capable of producing alterations, both external and internal. It can be 
used only for sensible experiences, in opposition with a superior intellectual acquaintance 
(451a21: ma/qv), or more generically to include any experience that goes beyond sensation 
(451b2), or even to epitomize sensorial acquisitions, instead of enumerating them (451a30, 
453a11).
69
 
(c) There are also two occurrences (450a11, 450a13a) in which Aristotle uses pa/qoj in the 
sense of “property” or “quality”, sense well documented in other Aristotelian works,70 even 
though these occurrences could be also referred to (a), i.e. as the physical alteration. 
(d) At 450a1 and 453a28 the word means in the broadest sense “state”, “condition” or 
“phenomenon”.71 
(e) Pa/qoj at 450b1 deserves special mention. Commentators usually opt for evasive 
translations: Beare warily translates “passion” – partly followed by Ross, who means 
“emotion” –, Mugnier “impression”,72 Bloch “affection”, everyone without further explanation; 
much better is Sorabji with “trouble”, but the best understanding still remains Thomas Aquinas‟ 
“passio” with an impressively detailed following note: “hoc [scil. that memory does not arise] 
fiat propter passionem (vel corporis, sicut accidit in infirmis et in ebriis, vel anime, sicut in hiis 
qui sunt commoti ad iram vel ad concupiscenciam)” (1985: 113). Aristotle‟s point is just that 
memory can be affected ex parte subjecto by an internal condition, but in a broader sense than 
“disability” (Hett), an interpretation that forces Aristotle‟s purpose of describing a kind of 
failure into a permanent condition of inability. Furthermore, at DA Γ 3, 429a7 we come across a 
similar use, but it is revealing that there pa/qoj is separated from no/soj. In conclusion, 
“passion”, or better “alteration”, seems to be the most satisfactory translation.73 
 
1.8.  ÀEcij and cognates: “possession”.74 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
424a25-8: “Thus the organ is one and the same with the power, but logically distinct from it. For that which 
perceives must be an extended magnitude. Sensitivity, however, is not an extended magnitude, nor is the sense: 
they are rather a certain character or power of the organ”; trans. Hicks [1907, ad loc.]).  
69
 A very similar use can be recognized at DA A 5, 411b3. 
70
 E.g. DA A 1, 402a9; 403a3; 403a16; B 7, 419a33; Γ 1, 424b25; 425a12; 8, 432a6;  but also in De sensu: 445a9, 
445b12. 
71
 Cf. DA Γ 3, 427b18. Cf. De Insomniis, 459a28-9 for a construction very much similar to 453a26. 
72
 The suggestion that here pa/qoj is a too strong alteration is tempting and supported by DA B 12, 424a28-32 (cf. 
Sisko [1996: 146-7]); however it would not be consistent with the context of this passage, even though Aristotle 
implicitly holds this position here when he says that the subject in which the trace is not formed is e)n kinh/sei 
pollv=. 
73
 An equally ambiguous occurrence can be found in De Insomniis, 462b10.  
74
 In chapter 1: 449b25, 450a30, 451a16. In chapter 2: 451a23, 451a27, 451b3. 
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  ÀEcij is opposed to pa/qoj, as persistence is to modification, but Aristotle uses this pair of 
terms to define and describe memory (449b25, 451a23-4) and scientific knowledge (451a27-8). 
As I have already mentioned concerning pa/qoj (a), the alteration implied in memory (and in 
scientific knowledge) is a modification that realizes our nature and capacities, as Aristotle 
states at DA B 5, 417b14-6.
75
 This sort of alteratio perfectiva must not lead us to believe that 
Aristotle uses eÀcij and pa/qoj „interchangeably‟.76 It is undeniable that Aristotle is not clear in 
marking out this difference, but a closer look at the occurrences
77
 in the treatise can authorize 
us to draw a distinction. For example at 450a30 Aristotle says that memory is the possession of 
a picture, or of a pa/qoj. Most probably Ross is right in bracketing pa/qoj, because it is likely a 
gloss; nevertheless, this is a very clever gloss, that underlines the necessity for the affection to 
last in order to be a memory: the same applies to 451a16 and 451b3, further occurrences that 
bear witness to the fact that this sort of formula must be regarded as a technical statement. 
Thus, three times Aristotle claims that memory is eÀcij of a content, whose acquisition Aristotle 
regards as a pa/qoj. Therefore equating these two words seems rash. 
With eÀcij Aristotle indicates again a twofold reality, that is strictly related to pa/qoj, but 
has its own characteristics. Just as pa/qoj means both the alteration and the representational 
side of memory, eÀcij includes the natural capacity of some animals, which possess perception 
of time, of being actualized by the alteration caused by an experience; this alteration bears an 
„image‟ of the object of the impression, but also a temporal structure that relates the trace to 
other pa/qh. Furthermore this word denotes the state of having the image, previously stored: 
once again, these two aspects are the same in act,
78
 but the emphasis is now on the duration and 
the permanence of mnemonic processes. In short, eÀcij and pa/qoj are complementary, not 
overlapping, concepts. Bloch‟s equation of eÀcij and pa/qoj does not properly consider that 
pa/qoj by itself could not guarantee the persistence of the physiological imprint, while eÀcij 
would understate the fundamental capacity for receiving traces and stirring them up again after 
a lapse of time. Moreover Bloch reduces this pair to their representative feature, while Aristotle 
is clearly concerned to address the issue of the preservation of the traces, even while the 
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 “Two modes of change should be assumed, one to the negative states and the other to the normal habits (ta\j 
eÀceij) and the true nature” (transl. Hicks [1907, ad loc.]).  
76
 Pace Bloch (2007: 81). 
77
 In particular those in which eÀcij is used alone, and – as I want to argue – as a separate concept: 450a30, 451a16, 
451b3. 
78
 Aristotle probably adopts here the same difference about concerning something already used by Plato in the 
example of the aviary at Tht. 196d-199c. Plato distinguishes between possessing a piece of knowledge, namely 
having a bird in one‟s aviary, and having it in actual use, namely catching the same bird and having it in one‟s 
hand.  
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stimulus is absent (450a25-7; 450b11-20 – not to mention all the medical and physiological 
notes in the treatise). 
 
1.9. Ki¿nhsij and cognates: “movement” (“motion”, “change”).79 
 
“For indeed movement is a kind of activity, although an incomplete one” (DA B 5, 417a16-
7, transl. Hamlyn [1968, ad loc.]).
80
 Aristotle considers ki¿nhsij as a process towards an end, 
not as an end in itself, but the term is not used univocally in the De Memoria. 
(a) First of all, movement is one – actually, the fundamental one – among the common 
sensibles (450a10) recognized by Aristotle at DA B 6, 418a17; Γ 1, 425a15-6 and De Sensu, 
437a8-9. Thanks to perception of koinaÜ it is possible to have perception of time, that is 
essential for any mnemonic activity. 
(b) The first type of ki¿nhsij directly involved in memory is the alteration caused in us by the 
external object through sensation, as a seal does on a wax block (450a31, 450b2-3, 451b15). It 
brings about a physical alteration, that persists in our common sensorium as a pa/qoj. Too 
strong or simultaneous changes can prevent the shaping of the affection (450a32-b3); 
sometimes we can confuse the movement resulting from sensation with the one that is object of 
remembering (451a3). 
(c) However, as witnessed by the distribution of the occurrences throughout the treatise, 
ki¿nhsij is Aristotle‟s preferred tool in describing recollective activities. In fact, the best 
description of a)namimnh/skesqai to be found in the treatise is at 451b17-8: “whenever we 
recollect, then, we undergo one of the earlier changes, until we undergo the one after which the 
change in question habitually occurs” (trans. Sorabji [2006], ad loc.). The retrieval of these 
„movements‟, which Sorabji translates „changes‟, has its prime cause in ourselves (di'au(tou=) 
and not in external reasons (452a4-7, 452a11-2).
81
 But it is not entirely clear what kinh/seij 
are: my interpretation is that anamnestic movements create and re-create the connections and 
fill the gap between various pa/qh; furthermore, they shape the unconnected bulk of sensations 
and experiences of the subject by mirroring external configurations of things and events or by 
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 In chapter 1: 450a10, 450a31, 450b2-3, 451a3. In chapter 2: 451b11, 451b12, 451b12-3, 451b14, 451b15, 
451b17 (twice), 451b17-8, 451b20-1, 451b22, 451b24, 451b25, 451b29, 451b31, 452a2, 452a6, 452a9 (three 
times), 452a11, 452a11-2, 452a12, 452a21, 452a25, 452a27 (twice), 452b3, 452b12, 452b13, 452b17, 452b20, 
452b23, 453a19, 453a22, 453a25, 453a26 (twice), 453a26-7, 453a27-8, 453b2, 453b5. 
80
 The same concept is expressed at DA Γ 3, 431a6-7. For a complete examination of ki¿nhsij, cf. Metaph 6, 
1048b18-35; Phys. Γ 1, 201a10-2; 2, 201b31-2; EN K 4, 1174a13 ff. 
81
 For Aristotle clearly points out that recollecting is neither sensation nor intellection: the former consists in being 
moved rather than moving (DA B 5, 416b33-4), and so it is not a spontaneous human activity; the latter is instead a 
state of quietness (DA A 3, 407a32-4), while recollecting is a kind of search (zh/thsi¿j: 451b30-1, 453a10-2) 
performed through one or more movements. 
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creating new connections.
82
 Aristotle at 452a1-2 puts forward a fairly optimistic theory of 
knowledge: “for as the things are related to each other in succession, so also are the changes” 
(trans. Sorabji [2006], ad loc.). Thus, what a person does in recollecting is not only recovering 
a previous sensation or scientific knowledge, but doing this by going along the movements – in 
the sense (b) – that has been inscribed in us with the pa/qoj. For kinh/seij seem to be here the 
texture of our whole e)mpeiri¿a, what we can use to connect the traces of our experiences, 
otherwise unrelated. At the same time as we undergo the physical alteration, we also receive 
some „metadata‟, both about the physical configuration and about the temporal coordinates, in 
which we received the alteration. This allows us to place a new trace inside the existing 
structure of our experiences. So, in recollection we can retrieve the content of a memory by 
reconnecting the movements it shares with other memory traces of which we are already aware. 
As said above, those movements are related to each other in a sort of succession, like 
things or events are (452a1-2), and we recollect by following the links of a chain of successive 
movements related by nature (451b10-1). This does not mean that recollecting processes are 
ruled by necessity in all cases (451b11-3).
83
 When changes occur e)piì to\ polu/ (451b13-4) – 
and Aristotle mostly describes this case – they are influenced by eÃqoj, that can be caused by 
repetition (451a12-3), even though sometimes we can form a stronger habit on the basis of a 
single experience rather than repeated ones (451b14-6),
84
 and by the nature of the things 
connected, naturally fitted one to another (452a2-4). The outcome of a recollection is not 
predetermined: for we can pursue different images from the same one we are examining and 
move in multiple directions (452a20-1, 452a24-6). What results is a sort of „magnetic field‟ in 
which the poles, i.e. the images, gain their powers from habit (452a26-7) or from an external 
cause that attracts our attention towards them (452b3-6).  
The movements connect things similar, opposite or neighbouring and they could be the 
same, but in other cases they are together or include a part (451b18-22). Of course it is very 
hard to understand what Aristotle wants to claim here,
85
 how these connections could happen, 
but in particular the difficulty concerns the „same movements‟.86 I argue that ai¸ kinh/seij 
au)tai/ are the movements that lead us directly to what we are looking for and put an end to that 
recollective search. I identify this kind of movement with that which occurs after the 
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 Cf. below, pp. 96-103. 
83
 It is difficult to admit that there could be recollection e)c a)na/gkhj (cf. Sorabji [2006: 94-5]). 
84
 Aristotle is often scrupulous in clarifying this, because for him it is evidence of the physical nature of the 
process that memory and recollection involve: see e.g. DA A 1, 403a16-25. 
85
 Perhaps the difficulty does not concern the relationship between things, already considered in a similar way by 
Plato at Phd. 73d2-74a4, but chiefly the movements. 
86
 Sorabji (2006: 98) mentions too briefly this central question, because it could not be squared with his account. 
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penultimate change in the definition at 451b17-8, which, otherwise, has no name. Otherwise, 
recollecting processes should be regarded as incomplete – from what the definition says – since 
they only seem to arrive up to the penultimate movement, because Aristotle fails to describe 
what happens then in the rest of the treatise, exactly as for the movements e)c a)na/gkhj, that 
raises the same problem. Perhaps Aristotle also gives for this kind of movement both a graphic 
representation at 452b17, i.e. the production of the movement ΓΔ,87 and a physiological 
suggestion at 453a26 (ou) ga\r r(#di¿wj pau/etai kinhqeiÍsa, eÀwj aÄn e)pane/lqv to\ 
zhtou/menon kaiì eu)quporh/sv h( ki¿nhsij: “for once moved, the fluid is not easily stopped 
until what is sought returns and the movement takes a straight course” [Sorabji]). 
(d) Aristotle often uses this kinetic phraseology to describe physiological incidents as well. At 
450b1, 453a19, 453a26, 453b2 and 453b5 ki¿nhsij is connected with and explains particular 
conditions due to age, emotions, like anger
88
 and fear, or pathologies, like dwarfish constitution 
or melancholy,
89
 that affect mnemonic retention and recollective activities. 
But Aristotle also considers the physical implications of movements, since he who 
recollects moves and pursues in something corporeal (453a21-2). Thus, as for anger and fears, 
even if we can start this movement only by ourselves, nevertheless we set in motion 
something
90
 that could have unforeseen results and can happen that the motion keeps up its 
course, although we arouse the opposite movement to stop it (453a2). 
 
Now I shall try to summarise the main results of this chapter integrating them as a 
description of the mnemonic activities Aristotle considered in the De Memoria. Firstly, 
Aristotle‟s theory of memory is essentially „empirical‟, in the sense that that in which our 
memories originate is an internal or external experience, which alters a physical organ in us and 
leaves a lasting trace of its occurrence. However, this is not sufficient, since the „image‟ of the 
event could only represent an atemporal content, e.g. „Coriscus‟; what makes it possible to 
preserve a memory of an experience is that it must have at least a sort of „label‟, which says 
that the „image‟ I am contemplating comes from a past experience and not from an actual one. 
This is not the only possible activation of the trace for a mnemonic activity. On the one 
hand, as we have already seen, one can „remember‟, that is, have the awareness that the actual 
„image‟ comes from the past; on the other hand, one can „recall‟, that is retrieve a cognitive 
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 Cf. below, pp. 96-103. 
88
 For anger as a movement, cf. also DA A 1, 403a26-7. 
89
 These people undergo an excessive internal movement that makes the imprint fade faster than normal. But, if the 
excessive movement comes from the external object in particular internal conditions, the memory trace does not 
get fixed at all: cf. above, p. 17, n. 25. 
90
 Aristotle talks about a sort of fluidity (u(gro/thj), that, once set in motion, is difficult to stop, until the 
recollective process comes to an end (453a25-6). 
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content from the trace. These activations differ because „remembering‟ gives a temporal depth 
to an „image‟ and leads us to consider it not in its content, but as derived from a past 
experience; on the other hand, „recalling‟ does the exact opposite and diverts the subject from 
considering the trace as related to other „images‟, either for the time of acquisition or the 
relation of their objects, to the informative content included in the imprint. This is the reason 
why Aristotle admits deception for „remembering‟ and not for „recalling‟: the former entails an 
additional awareness of the time lapsed that ensues from the contemplation of the „image‟, but 
sometimes this kind of perception can be fallacious; the latter instead is essentially the 
possession of both pieces of information, i.e. the temporal coordinates and the content of the 
trace, from which I restore the sought item. 
However, „recalling‟ is only a part of the second mnemonic activity besides „memory‟. 
More precisely, it is the final stage of „recollection‟, which includes the preliminary operation 
of setting in motion several movements to connect the trace the subject is actually 
contemplating towards the one he is looking for. 
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2. Sources and resources of Aristotle‟s theory of memory 
 
pu/rg%] d' e)gkate/lec?en e)mh\n li¿qon ou)de\ to\ gra/mma    
v)de/sqh to\ le/gon to/n [m]e Lew?pre/peoj  
keiÍsqai? Kh/i+on aÃndra to\n i¸ero/n, oÁj ta\ perissa/    
!!kaiì] mnh/mhn prw½toj oÁj e)frasa/mhn 
(Callimachus, Aetia 64, 7-10).
91
 
 
The extraordinary complexity of the De Memoria leads, and has led in the past, to a 
consideration of the instruments Aristotle may have used for his theorizing in what is the first 
organic attempt to address the issue of mnemonic capacities in the history of philosophy. Lang 
(1980) offers a convincing reconstruction of the connections between Plato‟s reflections on 
memory and Aristotle‟s work. In her own words, “Plato‟s idiom is reinterpreted according to 
Aristotle‟s views, and so we find Platonic language impressed into the service of an anti-
Platonic conclusion” (Lang [1980: 379]). In other words, Aristotle reworks some terminology 
and ideas discussed and rejected by Plato and uses them as cornerstones of his account. In 
particular the wax block model, discussed and then rejected by Socrates and Theatetus (Tht. 
191d-197a) will become the archetype of the analysis of memory. Indeed the similarities are 
striking, but the very fact that this model is somehow rejected in the Theaetetus makes us 
suspect that Plato‟s pages are a criticism of a „materialistic‟ model of memory probably 
common in contemporary Greece, and that the character Socrates is warning his interlocutors, 
both Theaetetus and the readers, against the adoption of it. In addition, how is it possible that 
Aristotle and Plato share the same terminology, but give such different interpretations? Or 
rather, are they trying to elaborate upon a common previous model in their account of 
mnemonic capacities? 
On the other hand, a different guiding principle for the contextualization of the theories 
expressed in the De Memoria is the reconstruction of the potential audience of the work. In this 
case, the temptation to recognize Aristotle as the „inventor‟ of the application of mnemonic 
techniques to public discussion (e.g. in the case of rhetors and orators) has been too strong. 
Coleman (1992) argues that Aristotle‟s conception of memory and knowledge, unlike Plato‟s, 
is compatible with the development of oratory and Aristotle is supposed to have supplied 
powerful instruments to rhetors to reach probable truths. For the utility of public discussions 
relies on this kind of truth: they cannot be demonstrated through arguments with the same 
rigour as scientific proofs, but nonetheless they are not „sophistic rhetoric‟ and the orator is 
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 “He built my tombstone into a tower, nor did he reverence the epitaph which said that I [sc. Simonides], son of 
Leoprepes, the sacred man of Ceos was buried there, who (knew) rare things … (and) was the first to devise a 
system of memory (?)” (Trypanis). 
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allowed to appeal to the audience‟s emotions in order to display this kind of truth (Coleman 
[1992: 30]). However, as a matter of fact, Coleman does not – and cannot – use a single 
passage from the De Memoria when she moves from considering Aristotle‟s reflections on 
memory to describing the consequences that those theories may have on rhetoricians‟ skills. 
Therefore two significant gaps can be found in the main attempts to contextualize this 
treatise. From a diachronic point of view, nobody has tried to connect Aristotle with any other 
thinker before Plato, also because of the shortage of comprehensive pre-Platonic treatments of 
memory. This is certainly true, because Plato and Aristotle were the first two philosophers 
concerned with addressing the memory of individuals, but I want to argue that their reflections 
emerge from a broader interest in cultural transmission and in collective memories, which 
considerable sections of Greek society demonstrated through the previous centuries, and that 
philosophers borrowed many concepts from those considerations to describe memory as an 
„inner faculty‟. From the synchronic side, however, the application of new theories of memory 
to important roles in the public life should be considered more carefully. Aristotle has been 
seen as the welded joint between mnemonic techniques and rhetoric, a fortunate path Roman 
authors will follow more and more. In my opinion, Aristotle completes a process of 
secularization of memory started between the end of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth 
century, in which Plato plays a relevant part. Aristotle reduces the influence of mnemonic 
techniques to very narrow sections of Greek society, whereas only a few decades before they 
were a pillar of the social space. In addition, now they assume the role, at best, of an aid for the 
orator for bearing in mind the structure of the argument or for similar cases, instead of the 
prominent function they presviously had in the preservation of a lasting cultural heritage. 
 
2.1    Collective memory and oral culture 
 
In this chapter I shall consider how memory was conceived by Aristotle‟s predecessors and 
more generally in Greek society and literature. Even if no organic treatment of this topic is 
extant, the impressive survey made by Simondon (1982) on the testimonies as far as the end of 
the fifth century reveals the complexity and the versatility of the concept of memory. 
Moreover, many studies have reflected upon the slightly different conception of memory in 
societies in which cultural transmission takes place through oral practices – that is the case of 
the pre-classical Greek age – and that this ability is a heritage of the social group rather than of 
the individuals. Actually, it has been questioned whether this model should be applied only to 
that kind of societies, and not to every human culture.  
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It is a matter of fact that in the last fifty years a stream of thinkers, mainly sociologists and 
anthropologists, has started to consider memory outside the narrow context of the description of 
an individual ability, in explicit disagreement with the mainstream psychological interests. 
Halbwachs (1992) was the first to analyse how internal models fail to describe this faculty 
because they start from the surreptitious hypothesis that human beings should be considered as 
isolated subjects, a widespread tendency that has somehow marked our culture in the modern 
era. On the contrary, in many cases the drive for recollection
92
 is external and the society of 
which the subject is a member often presses the individual to reconstruct the past in pre-
determined ways. Besides, this past is not in complete possession of the subject, because it 
relies on a social framework, a series of instruments which allows us to place the events of our 
lives in a coherent system: this is the reason why the coherence of one‟s memories is often 
achieved through several selections and distortions to the detriment of „accuracy‟, since the 
efforts of reasoning stress the fragments of our experience towards a consistent and 
communicable plexus of sense. Halbwachs calls this plexus “landmarks”, which are within us, 
but are inscribed all through our lives by social practices and relations and orientate our 
mnemonic performance. These landmarks are associations of chronological orders or meanings 
that the subject inherits from the cultural environment where he lives (Halbwachs [1992: 171-
83]). Such a reconstruction of the past has been considered a source for the legitimation of 
social orders (Connerton [1989: 3-4]). 
Greek society is no exception and recent studies have highlighted the dynamics of cultural 
transmission and its role in setting those landmarks. These affect in particular societies with 
oral methods of enculturation. For instance, Sakellariou (1990) is a remarkable study on oral 
traditions about migrations in pre-classical Greece. These traditions, transmitted by word of 
mouth generation after generation, undergo a complex process of erosion and alteration through 
the centuries. A representative example is the fictitious connexion of all Ionian people to Attica 
to justify the Athenian “imperialistic vision” (246). Therefore transmission is subjected to 
distortion and even construction, but some traditions belonging to declining social groups can 
fade and disappear (22-3). Their survival and continuity, however, depend on a group of 
specialists required to apprehend and reproduce a very diverse range of items, from 
cosmogonies to family genealogies. In many societies these figures, called by the scholars 
„traditionalists‟, „griots‟ or „jeli‟,93 transmit the historical legacy in highly ritualized 
performances: “to help them they use mnemotechnical devices. They undergo a long and 
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 Obviously in this chapter the use of terms like „remembering‟, „recalling‟ or „recollecting‟ will be much looser 
than Aristotle‟s vocabulary. 
93
 Cf. Hale (1998). 
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assiduous training” (21). An illiterate society makes use of cultivated individual memories to 
preserve social traditions and to satisfy the request of archiving the past.  
In Greece this kind of roles was not confined to priests; poets and singers had the same 
duties, even if in a less institutionalized way. Thomas (1989) helps us to recognize the 
peculiarities of that system. The unsteady success of writing allowed the coexistence of both 
traditions late into the classical period. The author considers the case of Athens, but this case is 
surely representative of widespread customs; actually, it is likely that the adoption of writing 
penetrated into Athens more than most other places in Greece. But even there the 
reconstruction of the past remained to a large extent ahistorical and uncertain. For instance, 
familiar genealogies, often contrasting in chronological order, seldom trace back the ancestors 
beyond the third or fourth generation and then skip the intermediate links in the chain of 
successions to reach directly an Homeric progenitor. This practice, documented among the 
members of the aristocratic class, also involves the voluntary omission of inconvenient 
forefathers. Even with the appearance of written records the genealogists‟ reconstructions 
continued to imply the same operations of synthesis and distortion (Thomas [1989: 95-186, 
284]).
94
 
Having briefly sketched out this scenario, it should not be surprising that the goddess 
Mnemosyne is far from being a personification of the capacity humans possess individually. 
The goddess embodies rather “an impersonal memory; it is not concerned with the individual‟s 
past” (Vernant [2006: 134]). The past is a dimension beyond common experience and only a 
divine intercession can grant access to the knowledge of the mythical and cosmogonical origins 
of the society and of the world. On the other hand, memory shared by the group has a peculiar 
verificatory power conferred by divine sanction. Thus the several offspring of the goddess, later 
set definitively at nine daughters, reflects the specialization of the agencies of socialization in 
charge of guaranteeing the correct transmission and reproduction of an heritage, of which they 
are guardian, through artistic activities, although the Muses are often invoked anonymously. 
Again, this is not surprising, since the tragic chorus represents a collective subject.
95
 Figurative 
arts are instead supported by Athena and therefore they are considered less influenced by 
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 Thomas (1989: 174-5) also reminds us that this use of boastful genealogies had been stigmatized by Plato at Tht. 
174e-175b. This was part of a broader criticism of Athenian society: cf. below, pp. 58-63. 
95
 For our purpose it will be sufficient to say that the tragic chorus must not be conceived as “an association of 
citizens” to whom the hero contrasts as an eccentric element (Vernant [2006: 24]), but more loosely as an 
expression of a homogeneous collective entity: however “the tragic chorus is never a random, ad hoc gathering of 
unconnected persons: it has the cohesiveness that only consciousness of a group identity, and of a wider 
community of which it is part, invariably gives it” (Gould [2000: 402 n. 89]). Simondon (1982: 232-8) 
reconstructs the evolution of the relation of the chorus with memory considering the works of the three great 
tragedians of classical Athens. In parallel with what I believe about philosophical thought, she construes the 
development of their conceptions of memory as a process of secularization.  
 46 
inspiration (Small [1997: 73]), if this consideration is not to be taken as just a mark of a more 
practical and quasi-instrumental wisdom, embodied in the artists‟ craftsmanship or technē. 
In the case of epic poetry, for instance, the relationship of memory with sight has prominent 
consequences for what has been argued so far and is worth considering briefly. The poet and 
the singer connect the audience with a shared past in a present representation, this past being 
shared because epic subjects are already known by the listeners, since they are included in the 
set of information constituting paideia; so the invocation to the Muses confirms a divine 
inspiration that enables them to gain direct access to past events and simultaneously reinforces 
and sanctions the bond between the singer and the audience. And yet, this reconstruction is not 
an automatic reproduction of traditional contents, but the poet is aware of taking part in the 
process of building the shared space of „memory‟, of influencing the common notion of history 
through his decision to sing one episode from among the mythological traditions. 
Of course this is not only a prerogative of epic „authors‟, but of all the followers of the 
Muses. Firstly, historians have a prominent place in transmission, even if we should not 
confuse our conception of historiography with the Greek one. However, the incipit of 
Herodotus‟ Histories is evidence of the deep consciousness of his role in handing down the 
memory of those events to posterity, and at the same time it marks the transition to an extended 
record of deeds worth celebrating. 
More distinctly this practice occurs in celebratory songs, for instance in Pindar‟s epinikia, 
in which the commemoration of contingent success keeps pace with the exaltation of the values 
of the polis, the diffusion of the winner‟s fame with immortalization of him and of the values 
he represents (Simondon [1982: 126-7]). I have chosen some significant verses among many 
others to show this peculiar relation between memory and the Muses. The poet‟s art is devoted 
to him who exalts the city and to keep the memory of the triumph alive; his duty is directly 
linked with divinity. Thus, the outstanding merits of the winner are the cause of the songs, but 
nobility of actions alone is not capable to prevent oblivion:  
     
    ei¹ de\ tu/xv tij eÃrdwn, meli¿fron' ai¹ti¿an  
    r(oaiÍsi Moisa=n e)ne/bale! taiì mega/lai ga\r a)lkai¿  
    sko/ton polu\n uÀmnwn eÃxonti deo/menai!  
    eÃrgoij de\ kaloiÍj eÃsoptron iãsamen e(niì su\n tro/p%,  
    ei¹ Mnamosu/naj eÀkati lipara/mpukoj  
    euÀrhtai aÃpoina mo/xqwn klutaiÍj e)pe/wn a)oidaiÍj (Nemean VII, 11-6).
96
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 “If a man have good hap in his attempt, he throweth into the Muses' stream sweet cause of song: for even deeds 
of might for lack of song fall into deep darkness, and in but one way have we knowledge of a mirror for fair deeds, 
if by the grace of Mnemosyne of the shining fillet they attain unto a recompense of toils by the sound of voice and 
verse” (Myers). 
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This passage is particularly interesting for our inquiry, because it displays an elaborate 
dialectic of visual and auditory memory. The feats everyone saw in the games are bound to be 
forgotten without a song to preserve them; the resulting blindness can only be healed by the 
illuminating property of the Muse. The poet mirrors this light by an auditory medium, but this 
one is raised to a quasi-visual status by means of divine inspiration. On the other hand, the 
individual by himself, as it is stated a little further on, seems to be inclined toward forgetfulness 
and incapacity of discerning genuine glory from false, that is again represented with the image 
of a „blindness of heart‟.97 In what does the memory of the poet consist, then? Pindar describes 
it as inscribed like a „heart-writing‟ that, once forgotten by the poet, can only be revived thanks 
to the reading (a)na/gnwte) of the Muse, who reminds him of his duty to sing: 
 
      to\n ¹Olumpioni¿kan a)na/gnwte/ moi  
     ¹Arxestra/tou paiÍda, po/qi freno/j  
    e)ma=j ge/graptai! gluku\ ga\r au)t%½ me/loj o)fei¿lwn    
    e)pile/laq'! wÕ MoiÍs', a)lla\ su\ kaiì quga/thr  
     )Ala/qeia Dio/j, o)rq#= xeri¿  
    e)ru/keton yeude/wn 
    e)nipa\n a)lito/cenon (Olympian X, 1-6).
98
 
 
However, it has been demonstrated that the bond of sight and poetry is tightly rooted in epic 
poetry. Divine inspiration of Mnemosyne, connected with Apollo‟s gift of interpretation, let the 
poet gain a “second sight” on past, present and future events, a privilege he shares with the 
prophets (Vernant [2006: 116-7]). It is not surprising, then, that this capacity dulls sight of the 
external world for a more authentic kind of vision: indeed, tradition passed on many figures of 
blind poets and prophets, starting from Homer himself, to Tiresias and the old Oedipus, who 
receives those gifts after a dreadful self-mutilation. 
Actually, the poets‟ art seems to lie in their capacity for evoking images through words.99 
But access to the divine plane allows them to do that both in an objective and in a subjective 
sense within the poem. Firstly, they present to the audience not a mere description or narration 
of what happened in the past, but they use several figures of speech to convey a „neutral‟ 
                                                 
97 tuflo\n d' eÃxei / hÅtor oÀmiloj a)ndrw½n o( pleiÍstoj (“Blind hearts have the general folk of men” [Myers]) 
(Nemean VII, 23-4). Cf. also Isthmian VII, 17: a)mna/monej de\ brotoi¿. 
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 “Read me the name of the Olympic winner Archestratos' son that I may know where it is written upon my heart: 
for I had forgotten that I owed him a sweet strain. But do thou, O Muse, and thou Truth, daughter of Zeus, put 
forth your hands and keep from me the reproach of having wronged a friend by breaking my pledged word.” 
(Myers). 
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 The connection between writing and image will be central in Plato‟s model of memory at Phil. 34a-b, cf. below, 
pp. 73-5. 
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content. The important contribution of Rubin (1995: 39-64) makes clear the role of imagery in 
oral traditions and Minchin (2001) and Bakker (2005) have applied this result to Homeric 
poetry. The frequent use of similes and epithets, the constant resort to deixis and anaphorae 
contributed to the fame of “graphic vividness”100 – or enargeia – which Homeric poems have 
earned since the classical age. For instance, the strategy of the similes is to enhance the 
memorability of an item through its representation as an image the listener can picture before 
his eyes (Minchin [2001: 132-3]). 
However, the use of imagery to which the Muse gives access is not confined to the artistic 
rendering in the performance, but it is an invaluable mnemonic aid for the moment of 
production and reproduction of an epic poem. The idea of the use of a formulaic set of 
expressions in oral traditions, initially studied by Parry (1971) and Lord (2000), is now 
generally accepted and deeply studied in Greek literature too. Formulas are often used as 
reminders in the course of the narration and they offer precious solutions within metrical 
schemes; in addition, for the singer these stereotypical expressions constitute a pause during the 
performance, giving him the time necessary to recollect the following verses. Thus the Muse 
also presides over the mnemonic facet of composition and declamation and, as Vernant (2006: 
118-9) has pointed out, invocations to the divinity happen to precede very demanding pieces in 
terms of memorization skills, like catalogues, pieces that at the same time have a particular 
importance as dense sources of information about the past.
101
 
Obviously this framework did not go unchanged through the centuries until the definite 
success of written records. A pivotal figure in my brief survey on Aristotle‟s sources for his 
theory of memory is Simonides of Ceos, not only for his supposed invention of the influential 
„place-system‟.102 With a bold parallel, he represents for poetry what the sophists had been for 
philosophy. According to a series of testimonies springing from some verses by Aristophanes 
(Pax 695 ff.),
103
 Simonides is the first poet to ask remuneration for his compositions. Aristotle 
sarcastically comments on this at Rhet. Γ 2, 1405b23-8, but Simonides was commonly censored 
as an example of meanness.
104
 Thus, his invention of a place-system can fall within the same 
process, in which techniques embedded in centuries-old practices are now pinpointed and 
studied in themselves, just as poetry became a pragmatic instrument of exaltation of the client, 
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 Cf. Bakker (2005: 63 and passim). Ford (1992: 46) even claims that vividness is the “purpose of poetry”. 
101
 Cf. also Minchin (2001: 86-7). 
102
 For a valuable introduction to his work see Bowra (1961: 308-72). 
103
 A scholiast quotes a reply by Pindar in Isthmian X, 10: “For the Muse was no seeker of gain then, nor worked 
for hire…” and another scholiast on this passage writes that the custom of composing epinikia by pay began with 
Simonides.  For the sources on Simonides‟ life I use in particular Edmonds (1922-7). 
104
 Plut. Sen. 5; Stob. Fl. X, 62; Hibeh Pap. 17; Stob. Anth. 2, 42; Ath. 14, 656d. Cf. Edmonds (1922-7). See also 
the scathing words used at Rhet. B 16,1391a8-14. 
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instead of the whole community. Yates (1966: 1-26) and Small (1997: 82-6) reconstruct the 
legendary tale of the invention as transmitted by two Roman authors,
105
 by whom this invention 
is warmly greeted: “gratiam habeo Simonidi illi Ceo quem primum ferunt artem memoriae 
protulisse” (Cicero, De Orat. II, 86, 351). The occasion is a dinner held by Scopas, the winner 
of a boxing competition, who commissioned Simonides to compose an epinikion in his honour, 
to celebrate the event; but in the client‟s opinion the poet lingered too much over a digression 
on Castor and Pollux. Thus, Scopas, showing his shabbiness, told Simonides to ask half of the 
agreed sum to the sons of Leda. During the banquet, though, the poet was told that two young 
people were asking for him and as soon as he went out of the hall to meet them, the roof 
collapsed, killing Scopas and all the other participants. Since the two persons suddenly 
disappeared everyone thought that the Dioskouroi saved Simonides and punished Scopas for 
his ungratefulness. Ironically Simonides was called to identify the disfigured crushed corpses 
and this is the most important part of the narration: for the poet resorted to a rudimentary 
mnemonic technique. He was able to recall each of the participants from the place they 
occupied in the hall. Therefore, Cicero concludes, the best training for memory consists in 
memorizing the order of the places (locorum ordo) instead of the order of the things, preserving 
likenesses (effigies) in place of the things themselves. When one needs to recollect the items, he 
will substitute the wax of the tablet, in which he has drawn the disposition, with the item to 
recollect he bears in his soul and the letter with the image it stands for (ut locis pro cera, 
simulacris pro litteris uteremur). Indeed Aristotle, at 452a19-26, used a very similar 
terminology, leading the scholars to interpret the wax model and the letters used in that 
example as a clear hint for ascribing to Aristotle the mention of a mnemonic technique in the 
mould of this one to the philosopher. 
I shall return to this passage later.
106
 But what I have been interested in highlighting here is 
the evolution of a sensibility towards memory in ancient Greece. Techniques of memorization 
have been used since the dawn of literature, but they were limited to this practice and protected 
by gods for their role in the transmission of a centuries-old legacy. The evocation through 
images allowed by the Muse is the greatest gift for the poet and the Pindaric „poetic of light‟ 
testifies to it at its best: the song defends the past from the darkening process of oblivion and 
guarantees the glorious present is remembered by posterity. Finally Simonides contributed to 
definitively dispelling this aura also explicitly pointing out the strong kinship between poetry 
and figurative arts, a bond rejected in the early ages with the exclusion of those technai from 
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 Cicero in the De Oratore II, 86, 351-4; Quintilian in the Insitutio Oratoria IX, 2, but cf. also Long. Rhet. 1, 2, 
201. 
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 Cf. below, pp. 106-11. 
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the number of arts protected by Mnemosyne and her daughters. Plutarch quotes three times
107
 
Simonides‟ belief that “poetry is vocal painting (zwgrafi¿an lalou=san), painting is silent 
poetry”, that Horace condensed in the famous motto ut pictura poiesis. Thus it is revealing that 
whereas the increasing technicality of poetry and secularization of its methods attracted the 
censure of Simonides‟ contemporaries, Roman theorists of oratory hailed him as the initiator of 
a study crucial for Latin society, since the orator does not work anymore in contexts of cultural 
transmission, but rather in the judicial and political field, in which the organization and the 
sophistication of the arguments are a requirement for the success of a position. However, this 
level of social complexity was yet to come in the early fifth-century Greece pending the 
appearance and strengthening of sophistic teachings. 
 
2.2 Other traditions: Lethe and metempsychosis 
 
Indeed, what I have sketched above can be considered the main background of the pre-
classical age, but some processes, both historical and philosophical, which took place in the 
early fourth century should be traced back to different traditions. Written records, which had 
been used only as a mnemonic device for „intellectuals‟ (Thomas [1989: 20-1 and n. 22]) or as 
a temporary receptacle of information, useful only thanks to the public readings that were given 
of them (54; 62-3), in less than a century became the chief medium of transmission. For 
instance Thucydides, in a passage very important for our inquiry, reports Pericles‟ funeral 
speech in memory of the Athenians fallen in the first year of the Peloponnesian War: 
 
a)ndrw½n ga\r e)pifanw½n pa=sa gh= ta/foj, kaiì ou) sthlw½n mo/non e)n tv= oi¹kei¿# 
shmai¿nei e)pigrafh/, a)lla\ kaiì e)n tv= mh\ proshkou/sv aÃgrafoj mnh/mh par' 
e(ka/st% th=j gnwm¯hj ma=llon hÄ tou= eÃrgou e)ndiaita=tai (Hist. II, 43, 3).
108
 
 
The inscription of a memorial stone is not sufficient to reach remote countries, but an 
unwritten memory (aÃgrafoj mnh/mh) retained in the heart would do it better than any other 
record. Similar expressions can be found in Oenopides and in Antisthenes, who blamed the 
excessive use of books and notes, because knowledge should be inscribed in our souls 
(respectively sth=qoj and yuxh\) (Thomas [1989: 33]). Therefore knowledge was not 
conceived as completely liable to external espression and codification deep in the fifth century. 
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 Glor. Ath. 3 (346 f); Aud. poet. 17 f-18; Quaest. conviv. IX, I5. 
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 “For heroes have the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the column with its 
epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every breast a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that of 
the heart” (Crawley).  
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Indeed the very concept of gnwm¯h shows that the sources of Aristotle‟s views on memory were 
rooted in this context. This term primarily stands for a mark or a token and afterwards it was 
extended to denote the organ through which one perceives or knows and finally the abstract 
capacity of thought and judgement (LSJ [1996: 399]). Thus, the model of memory as 
inscription and the primacy of „internal‟ over written memory are far from being a brand-new 
Platonic acquisition. However, coming back to the evolution of written records, only a century 
later we find an author like Aeschines who exalted the capacity of writing to retain information: 
 
kalo\n h( tw½n dhmosi¿wn gramma/twn fulakh/! a)ki¿nhton ga/r e)sti (In Ctes., III, 
75, 4-5).
109
 
 
This akinesia, somehow akin to the modern conception of archive, was under discussion 
during the troubled years of Plato‟s youth. The political instability that distinguished the post-
Periclean Athens was the scene of an oscillation between recording history in permanent 
supports and organized oblivion. Pinotti‟s (2006) vivid reconstruction reaches the heart of the 
matter: in Athens the succession of events of the last quarter of the fifth century hinged upon 
the articulation of some unresolved “blind spots of memory”. On the one hand, we assist a clear 
process of stabilization and organization of collective memories and proof of this emerging 
sensibility is the institution of a city archive, the Mētrōon, in which official and political 
documents began to be gathered since 410-405 B.C., when the bouleuterion moved to a new 
building (Thomas [1989: 38-40]). But the case of Athens was not isolated, since magistrates 
known as mnēmones were in charge of the preservation of private contracts – orally and later in 
written records – in many poleis (Sakellariou [1990: 26]).  
On the other hand, still, alongside this effort to preserve the past in reliable records, the 
necessity of a selection became more and more urgent for two reasons. Firstly, as Small (1997: 
83) highlights very well, “there were simply too many words to cope with without some kind of 
improved retrieval system”; this concerned poetic production, since the strategies of 
versification radically changed from the rather fixed use of stereotyped phrases of the epic 
poems to a more varied kind of composition, in which the exact reproduction of the text was 
extremely important. But a second, and more relevant reason, required the application of a 
method of memory organization. In political disputes an „excess of memorization‟ can prove to 
be self-defeating as it is a potentially destabilizing element and indeed the political events 
Athens went through after Pericles‟ death demonstrate this threat. On this point it is interesting 
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 “The preservation of the public documents is a fine thing since they remain unaltered” (Thomas [1989: 70]). 
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to note that the restoration of democracy in 403 B.C. is followed by the erection of an altar in 
honour of Lethe and the slightly earlier institution of Mētrōon falls within the same strategy of 
centralization of the „official memory‟. In addition, the seal of the new social unity was an oath 
“not to recall the misfortunes of the past” and a broad amnesty. This ban of mnhsikakeiÍn also 
occurs Lett. VII, 336e-7a, probably Plato‟s work, and Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 39, 6), because 
memory can be exploited to foment hatred within the city.  
However. this idea has many antecedents in Greek culture, as Loraux (2002) points out. 
The tradition ascribes to the Muse not only the power to preserve the past, but she also “opens 
the way to a good anamnesis” (169). Her reconstruction is remarkable in this sense and helps 
us to recognize the true importance of the Hesiodic epithet (Theog. 55), according to which the 
Muse is called lhsmosu/nhn te kakw½n (“forgetting of ills”).110 Far from being the 
attribution of a hedonistic trait of divertissement to arts, the intervention of the divinity 
becomes necessary when conflict penetrates the community. Loraux quotes several relevant 
passages to demonstrate this. First of all, the proem of the Iliad begins exactly with the poet‟s 
invocation to the Muse to sing him the frightful wrath of Achilles against Agamemnon, a 
conflict that endangered the success of the expedition. Only when Achilles got over his anger 
could the reconciled army defeat the enemy. At the end of the Odyssey (XXIV, 482-5) there is 
a similar call to forgetting by Zeus and Athena and to swear an oath to forget the deaths after 
vengeance has been taken by Odysseus. Also in tragedies the articulation of (and the filter on) 
memory is central to the stability of the polis. The author mentions Sophocles‟ Electra, but I 
suggest the Antigone is even more relevant, because of the contrast between two kinds of 
forgetting. First Creon committed hybris not allowing a decorous burial for Polyneices. This is 
a clear act against the „normalization‟ of memory, that is the reconciliation of the sides in 
recognizing the same history and accepting to live together again, the gods require after the 
conflict, but the attitudes of the two sisters of the son – and brother – of Oedipus are opposed: 
on the one hand, Ismene resigns herself to a condition of submission, on the other hand 
Antigone struggles to bring back with the corpse the remembrance of her brother within the 
city. Therefore, if in general the refusal to forget is dangerous to the city, a kind of forgetting is 
still guaranteed by the divinity, whose laws must be followed and in whose name alone a 
correct pacification can be undertaken. In this case time becomes a positive element, because it 
allows the reasons of the present to prevail over apparently unforgettable mourning. Thus, the 
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 Cf. also Vernant (2006: 121-2) and Simondon (1982: 128). 
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Muses, once again, help the community to elaborate its past through preservation, but also 
selection and oblivion.
111
 
The passing of time is instead despised in another tradition. As Aristotle reports in Phys. Δ, 
13, 222b17-8 the Pythagorean Paron is said to consider time as the most ignorant thing 
(a)maqe/staton) because it brings forgetfulness, whereas someone else stated that it was the 
wisest, and Aristotle concedes that Paron‟s opinion was more correct (le/gwn o)rqo/teron), 
not a minor detail in our inquiry. This capacity of time for dulling human minds is a remarkable 
shift from the idea that what is ancient is more valuable and the traditional conception of 
passing time as healing that we have analysed thus far; Vernant (2006: 129-30) rightly points 
out the new stress on the individual this change entails. The “flux of becoming” does not 
smooth contrasts any more but corrodes the acquired knowledge of human beings. In addition, 
this is true in a cultural environment in which the knowledge lost extends for more than a 
lifetime and complete oblivion of those lives implies the incapacity of leaving the painful circle 
of reincarnations. For this reason it is necessary to look at the origin of this idea. A great deal of 
study has been devoted to the belief in transmigration of souls in ancient Greece in the last 
century, but the shortage of testimonies – mostly late and vitiated by non-neutral standpoints – 
affects the possibility of reaching definitive answers and this crux has been recognized by the 
subtlest interpreters.
112
 However, for my present purposes, I will try to outline a framework as 
plain as possible without questioning the reconstructions we possess, which collected important 
evidence scattered in Greek literature about those „unofficial‟ practices which were kept secret 
since the antiquity. 
Dodds (1951: 135-78) was the first scholar to connect the Orphic-Pythagorean theme of 
metempsychosis with shamanic figures active in Greece. The belief in survival, reward and 
punishment after death has been a standard feature since Neolithic times (136-7), but the 
shaman interprets primitive elements of superstition and condenses them in his persona. Healer, 
prophet, „scientist‟ and philosopher, the shaman is a holy figure who is able to control events 
thanks to his supernatural powers; therefore, he symbolizes a superhuman wisdom, whose 
authority is grounded in his own past experience. For instance, Epimenides, a semi-mythical 
figure supposed to have lived in the sixth century, is the first – known – person to combine 
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 Divinity permeates Greek society to a deep level: for instance, still remaining in the field of mythology, the 
element which can undermine social cohesiveness is recognized as a primeval divinity just like Mnemosyne. The 
Erinyes symbolize that refusal to forget – the whole Oresteia turns on this problem. Thus, once again, the result of 
this dialectic between memory and forgetfulness should not be forced towards a straightforward justification of the 
social order, but always as the fruit of mediation between two pressures, the centrifugal force of revenge and the 
centripetal one of common interests: the balance that follows – like Pindar‟s charis – is always uncertain and 
renegotiable.  
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 E.g. Burkert (1972: 133-5) and Philip (1966: 152-3) raise a series of doubts hardly surmountable.  
 54 
alleged experiences of ecstasy and reincarnation in Greece (Simondon [1982: 152]). He himself 
claimed to have lived many lives and to be the reincarnation of Aeacus and Aristotle mentions 
him as a seer (Rhet. Γ, 17, 1418a24-6).113 Epimenides was not an isolated case: the journey of 
the soul, like the one into the underworld, is a recurrent theme in Greece. The example of 
Hermotimus of Clazomenae demonstrates how these figures were respected and honoured in 
the polis (Burkert [1972: 152-3]). Therefore, shamanic activities share a high level of 
individualism and are focused on the charismatic individual. But even entire cults could be 
established on those ecstatic experiences. Once again Burkert ([1972: 154]) gathers the 
different testimonies on the oracle of Trophonius in Lebadaea. “Before the sanctuary were the 
springs of Lethe and Mnemosyne” and there the initiates underwent a katabasis that could last 
for days. The believer must drink the water of the first spring to forget all his ordinary thoughts, 
which hinder him in this extraordinary experience, and only afterwards can he drink the waters 
of Mnemosyne that propitiate the connections with the underworld. 
However, this conception of soul is rather new. Dodds (1951: 138) reminds us that often in 
Greece the psychē was conceived as a “mental correlate” of the sōma not detachable from it, 
but the ordinary language admitted wide fluctuations even in the fifth century. These cults 
required a radical reassessment of the belief in a soul detachable from the body. The existence 
of a demonic self permeated Greek culture and extended its influence from chosen individuals 
like the shamans to a more general theory on the nature of the soul. A testimony of this 
framework has been found in two important texts by Pindar, Olympian II, 56ff. and fragment 
131 S. In the latter, to which Dodds (1951: 135; 156-7 n. 1) rightly ascribes a prominent 
position in his reconstruction, the poet declares that while the body is subject to death, there is 
an image of life that survives, because of its divine nature (zwo\n d' eÃti lei¿petai ai¹w½noj 
eiãdwlon! to\ ga/r e)sti mo/non e)k qew½n). A further confirmation that it is detachable from 
soul is that precisely when the body ceases its activity, this eidōlon reveals itself in prophetic 
dreams.
114
 Olympian II, 56ff. is less important for us, even if it was object of debate on the 
nature of punishments the body must endure after death.
115
 However it is worth noting that it is 
addressed to Theron, an athlete of Akragas, the native city of Empedocles, an element that may 
strengthen the conviction that the belief in this kind of soul was already rooted in Magna 
Graecia. 
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 Aristotle here refers that Epimenides was able not only to forecast the future, but also to describe the unknown 
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As Simondon (1982: 157) argues, the extension of a doctrine of metempsychosis to all 
mortal souls required a moralization of it, because whereas such ecstatic experiences may be 
explained in shamans in virtue of their exceptional nature and harmonized within traditional 
beliefs, the same prodigies require an underlying theory of soul and a coherent eschatology, 
when everyone can potentially experience them in dreams or under different conditions. This 
evolution from an individual exception to a collective cult was accomplished, before Pindar, by 
the so-called „Orphic-Pythagorean‟ tradition. Once again, we find another tangled skein, whose 
main thread seems to be lost or irreversibly compromised. Actually, Orphism and 
Pythagoreanism in Greece are very hard to reconstruct faithfully, because the sources are often 
late or from Neopythagoreans, corrupted, openly or implicitly ironic and sceptical, legendary. 
In addition, Orphic and Pythagorean members were bound to keep the secret of their rituals, 
and finally the two movements are often confused and superimposed. 
However, a few solid points seem to have been established. There is no direct mention of a 
doctrine of metempsychosis in the Orphics, but it is certain that they claimed that the human 
soul is detachable from the body. For it exists prior to the body in which it is temporarily 
imprisoned, and this exile is the consequence of a punishment the soul can undergo in a 
judgement to which it is subjected after death.
116
 The punishment is decided on the basis of the 
way one behaved in the former life: this fact contributed to the development of the „puritanism‟ 
Dodds (1951: 149 ff.) described in his work. From the organization of probably archaic vetoes 
and taboos derived an organic doctrine of purification to mend this life‟s sins or those of former 
lives. 
This element has particular relevance in Pythagoreanism: Pythagoras himself was 
considered an incarnation of Hyperborean Apollo, with a clear reference to purification cults 
(Philip [1966: 156]). Metempsychosis is a more central issue in Pythagoreanism and attracted 
criticism in antiquity. Indeed, some of the miracles and prophecies attributed to Pythagoras, 
which Burkert (1972: 141-4) enumerates are used by later authors to ridicule and discredit him, 
but from them we can reconstruct a trustworthy portrait. One of those testimonies is very 
interesting for our inquiry. Hermippus‟ account of Pythagoras‟ katabasis reported by Diogenes 
Laertius (Vit. Phil. 8, 41)
117
 relates how Pythagoras gained his fame after his arrival in Italy. He 
built an underground room and instructed his mother to take note on a tablet of events and the 
time in which they will happen (ta\ gino/mena ei¹j de/lton gra/fein shmeioume/nhn kaiì 
to\n xro/non) after his descent into the room. When he eventually came back, he claimed to 
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 Cf. Burkert (1972: 126) and Simondon (1982: 165-6). 
117
 This passage is translated and commented on by Burkert (1972: 156). 
 56 
have visited Hades and returned, and read his mother‟s notes to the assembly, who considered 
him a divinity. Even if “the mocking tone of this account [...] is of course unmistakable” 
(Burkert [1972: 156]), still it accounts for and introduces a new element: the importance of a 
precise memory connected with ecstatic experiences. It is almost certain that Pythagoras 
believed in metempsychosis
118
 and that a soul could clothe itself with both human and animal 
bodies, since at DK 21B7 Xenophanes – again taunting him – refers to the fact that Pythagoras 
blamed a man for clubbing a dog, because he recognized in its barks the voice of a dead 
friend.
119
 Two other important passages on this doctrine are supplied by Aristotle‟s De Anima 
(A, 3, 407b12-26 and B, 2, 414a24-5).
120
 Aristotle too believes that animals have a soul, but it 
is impossible that theirs can share the same capacities as a human soul, or be incarnated in a 
human body, because every soul „fits‟ its own species‟ kind of body and they who believe in 
metempsychosis fail to justify a similar conjunction. 
We can now return to the conception of time Aristotle appreciated in Paron. In order to save 
some information from the flux of time the Pythagorean practice included a mnemonic training, 
preliminary to the remembrance of previous lives. It consisted in constant exercises (mele/tai) 
to remember every act the initiate performed during the day. Iamblichus (Vit. Pyth. 164 ff.) 
describes one of those techniques:
121
 on waking up the Pythagorean tries to recollect all events 
of the day before, but not randomly. He should recall the first one, then the second, the third 
and so forth. In the end, he will be able to give an order to every event and reconstruct the 
whole day. Through this askesis he constantly examines the relation between his soul and his 
body and has the awareness of the events of his life; for the Pythagoreans this awareness is 
propedaeutic for recollecting the events of previous lives he had lived. Consequently the 
Pythagorean is somehow subject to an „obligation to remember‟ that induces him to cultivate 
his mnemonic capacities to achieve that recollection: the constant exercise leads the initiate 
towards the synchronization of the individual and the cosmos, the time of one‟s life and that of 
history (Vernant [2006: 132-3]), that had been an unsolved problem since the „collective 
memory tradition‟ I sketched above was abandoned, or at least whose importance was 
drastically reduced. 
The last philosopher I will examine before Plato is Empedocles. He condenses Pythagorean 
doctrines with a pronounced tendency to shamanistic attitudes and he acts as the ideal link 
between these traditions and a new „rationalistic‟ generation of philosophers, even if he surely 
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 Cf. Simondon (1982: 158-9). 
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remains an original thinker. I will try to show this through a brief review of the most significant 
extant fragments. As Trépanier (2004: 116-29) demonstrates, the Orphic-Pythagorean tradition 
had a great influence on Empedocles‟ thought and many commentators interpret fragment 129 
as a direct tribute to Pythagoras‟ wisdom, who gathered his immense knowledge “in ten and 
even twenty generations”.122 From him Empedocles inherited the same attention to askesis and 
method. For instance, in fr. 24
123
 Wright (1981: 185) sees “the suggestion that E[mpedocles].‟s 
method is to give the main points of his argument [...] and then to develop in further (but not 
exhaustive) detail the sections of especial relevance or interest”. This might be read as a kind of 
technique of memorization that consists in the isolation of the main points of an argument from 
which we can easily regain the whole structure, in order to allow more freedom in exposing the 
doctrine. This model bears some similarities with the „technique of mid-points‟ described by 
Aristotle at 452a19-26.
124
. But those suggestions are connected to an underlying theory of 
knowledge as fr. 110 shows. Here the “throbbing, crowded thoughts in the thorax under which 
they are to be pushed [...] and then contemplated” (Wright [1981: 258]) must be firmly retained 
as a quasi-physical representation before the initiate‟s mind125 with constant effort 
(mele/t$sin) that will establish a habit (hÅqoj). Moreover the appearance of thoughts is caused 
for Empedocles by the flow of blood around the heart (fr. 105). The dynamism implied in this 
account of psychic capacities will find an echo in Aristotle. 
However, the training needed to reach Empedocles‟ level is not easy to acquire and makes 
these teachings hard to learn for common people (fr. 114). Indeed Empedocles presents himself 
as a revered prophet and healer, who possesses divine powers (fr. 112) and guarantees his 
disciples that they can gain similar gifts thanks to his teachings, including the power of 
resurrecting dead men from Hades (fr. 110). So Empedocles believed in metempsychosis and 
he himself mentions which transmigrations his daimon has undergone before joining its present 
body (fr. 117);
126
 since he too admits transmigration in animal bodies, he firmly prescribes 
vegetarianism in two evocative fragments (139 and 141). However, the daimon‟s exile 
(Simondon [1982: 162]) is included in a cosmological framework, in which the terminology of 
                                                 
122
 From now on I will use Wright‟s translation (1981), but keeping Diels‟ numeration of the fragments. On the 
basis of Iamblichus and Porphyry, Dodds (1951: 143-4), Burkert (1972: 137-8) and Wright (1981: 256-7) tend to 
believe that the anonymous wise man quoted is Pythagoras, despite Diogenes Laertius‟ suggestion that the person 
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another, so as not to pursue only one path of discourse”). Cf. also fr. 35, 1-2. 
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 Cf. below, pp. 106-11. 
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 Cf. Wright (1981: 258-9). 
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 Arguably the kind of memory of Empedocles‟ daimon is not merely personal in modern sense, but it testifies to 
his ascension to the top of the ladder of beings as a wise man; however, once a man has reached such heights, he 
nevertheless has more than „philosophical‟ awareness of his position in the world and this makes him speak as if  it 
was personal memory. 
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individual experiences and the metaphors borrowed by collective practices are merged. 
Fragment 115 is exemplary in this sense. Here the decree of necessity that forces the sinful soul 
to reincarnate is eternal and “sealed by broad oaths” (plate/essi katesfrhgisme/non 
oÀrkoij), the same oaths that seals the succession of Love and Strife in ruling the world (fr. 
30). Thus, the souls purified are able to understand this harmony between the individual and the 
cosmos
127
 and reach a divine level of existence. In conclusion, it is worth mentioning the 
invocation to the Muse,
128
 in fragment 3: she guarantees some techniques of memorization, but 
while in the epic poem they were directed to preserve the contents of a collective past to new 
generations, here they are the instruments of the bold ambition of the shamans to eternalize 
themselves and the initiates individually. 
 
2.3 Plato‟s synthesis 
 
Oral cultural transmission and cults and beliefs like Orphism and Pythagoreanism were 
significantly opposed each other, but they coexisted in Greek society without explicit contrasts 
because some beliefs, like metempsychosis, always had an aura of mystery for common people, 
that prevents those ideas from circulating in large sections of the population in highly 
structured forms; however, they always remained available to a limited number of people 
initiated into some secret rituals. Thus, it is very interesting to consider how Plato dealt with 
these two traditions and used one to demolish the other. The complexity of his reflection could 
not be reduced to sheer support for a pre-established model, but the idea of metempsychosis 
will be included by Plato in a peculiar theoretical framework. 
 
– Plato as a critic of his contemporary society 
 
Plato was a fierce opponent of the traditional ways of cultural transmission and in particular 
of the manipulation they underwent in his age, which caused huge corruption in public life 
according to his view. The first target of his criticism was the class of poets and rhapsodes, that 
played a key role in transmitting many educative messages through the poems. Platonic 
rejection took two different forms, but both share the exclusion of poetry (as it was in his age) 
from any acceptable pedagogic process.  
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 In fragment 146 he gives some examples of public figures that can aspire to acquire a divine status: “prophets, 
minstrels, physicians and leaders”. Each kind seems to me to correspond to the Empedoclean ideal of knownledge 
of this harmony, only in different respects. 
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 Cf. Trépanier (2004: 52-65). 
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First of all, he thought that the poet during the composition and the rhapsode in the 
performance are under direct divine influence that accords them artistic mastery
129
 and their 
peculiar attractive power is beautifully described in the metaphor of the magnet at Ion 533d-
536d: inspiration is set in motion by the Muse, then it passes through the poet and the rhapsode 
to reach the audience as the last link of this chain. However, for this reason, even if they claim 
to be wise or skilled in many areas, Plato argues that poets and singers do not have any true 
knowledge by themselves, but they only offer the appearance of a polymathia like Proteus who 
changes his form into everything he wants (cf. Ion 536e; 541e-542a), thus any attempt to 
demonstrate this wisdom will be easily refuted by Socrates in the Ion. Besides Plato criticizes 
the poets because they, like the sophists, are bound to please an audience that grant them 
material comfort with rhetorical subtleties (Ion 535e; Tht. 173b), while there is no need to 
embellish the truth as it can be reached with plain language by an ordinary man (Ion 532d-e). 
Correct pedagogic processes, therefore, should not rely on poetry, since poetic inspiration is not 
primarily directed to education, but it is only a gift from the Muses and is not under their 
power. This idea can be traced to Ap. 22a-c, in which a supposedly less „platonized‟ Socrates 
expresses the same judgement. 
Moreover, attributing divine traits to poetic practices meant the exclusion of that art from 
the compass of logos, and Plato took more radical positions about poetry in other works. 
Firstly, the poets are completely embedded in the social dynamics of transmission; with the 
sterile imitation of those schemes no one will be able to reach a critical position towards the 
status quo (Ti. 19d-e). But in particular in the Republic (II 376c-383c; III 386a-398b) 
traditional poetry is not only neutral, but even harmful for a good education.
130
 Honoured poets 
like Homer and Hesiod wrongly depicted gods and heroes as engaged in unjust behaviour or at 
least as immersed in the kind of passions which every human being should avoid for 
themselves. This is not only morally unacceptable, since gods should not be capable of evils, 
but it also causes an educative deformation of the younger generation. Thus the mythoi the 
poets transmitted shape young souls
131
 and prepare them to imitate wrong models;
132
 to these 
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 For instance, this influx is included among the species of divine madnesses at Phdr. 245a-c; cf. also Meno 99c-
d. Actually, to attribute divine features to human activities – when Plato wanted to demystify their pretence of 
knowledge – is a standard strategy. Concerning the use of the word qeiÍoj at Symp. 209b2, Rowe (1998: ad loc.) 
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politicians, who (seem to) manage to get things right without knowing what they are doing”. And actually, in 
particular in the Ion, it is hard to distinguish whether Plato is mocking the singer or he is somehow serious in that 
respect. 
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 Havelock‟s (1963, in particular pp. 3-35) analysis remains a milestone for the perspective I hold here. 
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 It is worth noting that Plato often uses the metaphor of moulding (the verb pla/ttein occurs with the same 
meaning also in Ti. 88c and Resp. 500d – in both of these passages it is connected with the idea of exercise, 
mele/th – but also at Resp. 374a, 420c etc.). In particular, at Resp. II, 377b the philosopher says of a young man‟s 
soul that “it is best moulded and takes the impression that one wishes to stamp upon it” (from now on the 
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deceptive models Plato wants to substitute a rationalized edifying poetry and yet limited as 
much as possible. In the third book Plato‟s criticism gradually shifts into a general 
condemnation of the mimetic character of poetry and he argues that in the ideal polis the mythoi 
should be chosen carefully to instil virtue and not looseness in hearts. But at the beginning of 
Resp. X (595a-608a) Plato will come back to this topic and will confirm the condemnation on 
an ontological level. Poetry – but also every art that reproduces objects of the physical world – 
steps back from the truth a degree further compared to our experience, because it imitates what 
is already an imitation of the true model: the result is a mere phantasm. As painting does with 
colours, poetry represents with words those appearances beyond which we should go: both 
kinds of artists create for themselves and their „public‟ an hermeneutic circle in which the 
physical object or event reproduced and its copy constantly refer to each other without any 
possible insight into the nature of things. Thus indulging in this circle is a form of corruption 
since the observer/listener remains shut in a world of appearances that appeal to his 
desiderative part, instead of leading him toward the essences, like philosophy does. The resort 
to arts which Plato allowed in a reformed way in the previous discussion is here reduced still 
further. 
These charges are partly based on the central role of poets and rhapsodes in transmitting 
cultural models, a role that began to be questioned around Plato‟s time. At this time the 
traditional paideia proved to be insufficient in a society in which specialization became more 
and more important and the repetition of that static repertoire would not satisfy the 
requirements of a new society; at the same time the gradual adoption of written records 
substituted and confined poetic performances to a sheer display of mnemonic virtuosity,
133
 that 
was the consequence of rote memorization and not of true knowledge. In this sense, any 
development of mnemonic techniques is useless, because it is indeed true that the artifices the 
poets use can impress their audience and help them to remember their own composition, but 
they do not help the listeners to approach the truth in any way, or at least they are not primarily 
concerned with that result. Coming back to the Ion, at 530c Plato significantly argues that a 
good rhapsode should better try to penetrate the poet‟s dianoia and interpret it for us rather than 
mechanically “learn by heart” (e)kmanqa/nein) his words. It is interesting to note that this could 
be, at least partly, an „authentic‟ Socratic conception, since some hints of it can be found in 
                                                                                                                                                           
translation used will be Shorey [1930-5]) (ma/lista ga\r dh\ to/te pla/ttetai, kaiì e)ndu/etai tu/poj oÁn aÃn 
tij bou/lhtai e)nshmh/nasqai e(ka/st%). The echo of this terminology will be clear at Tht. 191d and will be part 
of Aristotle‟s theoretical toolkit. 
132
 This conception can be seen as operating in Euthphr. 5e-6a, where Euthyphro adduces Zeus‟ uprising against 
Kronos as a justification for suing his father. 
133
 Cf. above, pp. 42-50. 
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Xenophon (Mem. IV 2, 10; Symp. III 5-6), in which the rhapsodes are depicted as a vacuous 
breed. 
On the one hand, the disapproval of rote memorization is the link that allowed Plato to 
extend the criticism to the sophists.
134
 For the process we can see operating in the sophistical 
movement is the externalization – some would say „reification‟ – of culture: for instance 
Gorgias, at DK 82B11a.194-5 considers written laws as custodians of justice and letters as 
“instrument of memory” (mnh/mhj oÃrganon). Many sophists, furthermore, elaborated 
mnemonic techniques and required passive memorization from their students. As can be seen in 
the Dissoi Logoi,
135
 memory is regarded as the most important invention (e)ceu/rhma) – not as a 
faculty or a capacity – and some basic principles for the improvement of memorizing capacities 
are offered. But, in particular, Plato gives some sarcastic testimonies about Hippias‟ renowned 
mnēmonikon at Hp. Mai. 285e-286a and Hp. Mi. 368d-e.136 In the latter passage, along with a 
humorous playing on Socrates‟ pretence of forgetting Hippias‟ merits, this technique is hinted 
as the sophist‟s most important achievement, but in the former, more detailed information can 
be found, since Hippias states that he is able to memorize fifty names at a time and repeat them 
in the exact order. However, Plato‟s irony is not ultimately directed against the technique in 
itself, but only against the worthless use to which the sophists apply it; for it is used for 
pleasing the masses with tales of genealogies, foundations of cities and so forth: therefore 
Hippias is “forced to learn by heart” (h)na/gkasmai e)kmemaqhke/nai) those stories. Besides 
the passivity of this, the problem Plato raises here is the intrinsic wothlessness of what is duly 
memorized, while the true philosopher should especially teach the truth and direct the citizens 
towards the best political goals, instead of being guided by the people. That Plato dreads the 
dangers of a political ability enslaved to the masses is explicit at Grg. 517b-c; furthermore, 
sophists and rhetoricians are always constrained within the rules of the polis, whatever they are. 
For instance, Plato often notes that the time in which they must complete their pleas is always 
limited, while the true philosopher takes all the time he needs to exhaust an argument (Tht. 
172c; 201b; Grg. 485b-c). 
On the other hand, with their ability the sophists can deceive the masses in a new way and 
make them think that they are able to answer any question the audience would like to ask them. 
Plato was not impressed by this capacity. At Gorgias 447c and 462a Socrates displays 
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contempt towards this activity of deception,
137
 and the pretence of polymathia is generally 
satirized in his works.
138
 Still the sophists‟ teaching had an immediate utility, because the 
appearance of knowledge and the ability to persuade the interlocutors were mainly elaborated 
for agonistic contexts like judicial and political debates. So, they offered this technē for a fee 
that was arranged on the basis of the „amount of knowledge‟ the pupil wanted to learn. Again, 
this falls within a process of reification of knowledge,
139
 which was offered as a mere means to 
reach some end, without any interest in the students‟ eudaimonia.140 One of the best standpoints 
from which we could epitomize those charges and which will allow us to introduce a very 
important point in our later discussion is the Sophist, a dialogue in which a stranger from Elea, 
a disciple of Parmenides, and the promising boy Theaetetus discuss the definition of a sophist. 
The first one, established after a paradigmatic display of the diairetic method, states that “the 
sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting [of promising youths], contests, commerce 
[of notions], and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive arts” (265a; transl. by 
Fowler). 
This last definition, namely that their art is acquisitive, but also concerned with likenesses, 
is the one that persuades the citizens of their utility for the polis, but the stranger will 
demonstrate with new divisions that the art they profess is fictitious, because the sophists 
imitate but do not know the object, but only the likeness they reproduce. Although in many 
senses they were the continuators of a settled pedagogic method, the sophists adapted it to an 
evolved scenario. Plato‟s attack is not of course dogmatic or uncritical like many of the charges 
his conservative fellow citizens moved against the sophists and indeed he satirizes at Meno 
90e-92e Anytus‟ spite, which is not based on real understanding and could lead to the wrong 
targets – like Socrates himself. But in the Sophist Plato shows how difficult it is to understand 
who they really are and how complicated their banishment from the polis will be, confused as 
they usually are with philosophers. If in the case of poetry it is clear that the message that 
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 For instance, the word pa/ssofoj is often used ironically, both for the sophists (Euthphr. 271c-272a; 287c; 
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has to indulge, while philosophy “always holds the same” (Lamb). Also at 511c-513d Socrates reproaches 
Callicles‟ reluctance to agree that the rhetorician does not save the citizens or pilot them to the good (like in the 
example of the ship of the State in the Republic VI) “because of his love for Demus”. 
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traditional poets transmitted was suffering from a deep crisis because it was largely inadequate 
for the new kind of society, for the sophists the criticism had to be subtler.  
The sophist, like the poet, used to resort to several rhetorical skills to achieve the audience‟s 
praises; but the use of them was slightly different. While for the poet rhetorical and mnemonic 
skills were required to transmit the historical heritage of the community, and nevertheless were 
subordinated to those contents, in the sophists the effectiveness of those techniques began to be 
studied systematically and autonomously, thus detached from their cohesive role in society. In 
the Sophist, their art consists in producing „spoken images‟141 that, like painters‟ works, are 
constantly related to us and not to the object depicted.
142
 In this sense the reality they produce is 
a qau/ma (233a; 235b), a magical replication that mirrors reality and gives the people the 
impression that the rhetor is versed in many arts, while he has a „knowledge‟ that is “based 
upon mere opinion” (232a), because it derives from the substitution of the truth with the eikos 
(Meno 70c – cf. also DK 82a1a; Phdr. 272b-274b). The definition of image (eiãdwlon) at 239c-
240c is the climax of this criticism, since it introduces an intermediate realm of objects, neither 
completely real nor unreal, to which the hydra-headed sophist forced the stranger of Elea and 
Theaetetus to admit. Cornford (1946: 212) rightly connects this kind of image with the 
fantastikh\ te/xnh Plato attributes to the sophists at 236a-c. It is opposed to the likeness as 
accurate replica of the object, which is essentially related to its denotatum; the semblance, 
instead, qua false, loses even this tie with reality. 
The poets‟ aim, as we can see, is radicalized: for the sophists try to pass off this fiction as 
reality. Consequently, Protagoras in the eponymous dialogue (338e ff.) has to commit 
„parricide‟ against Simonides too, as the stranger of Elea had to do against Parmenides, in order 
to defend his relativism, that for Plato is nothing other than the philosophical outcome of these 
rhetorical approaches. The method of distinguishing in the poet what it is good from what is not 
consistent or is openly contradictory cannot be accepted by Socrates (347b-348b) since it 
means remaining idly entangled in the qau/ma instead of removing that veil. This reply silences 
Protagoras. 
 
– The grounds for a new conception 
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 Also in the Cratylus (439b ff.) Plato stigmatizes the idea that knowledge may be gained through the names, 
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142
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Havelock (1963: 215-233) interestingly reflects on this new perspective that Plato first 
introduced in the history of Greek thought against poetry, but applicable against the sophists as 
well. What Havelock calls “the recognition of the known as object” is the result of the process 
of separation of the subject from collective history expressed by the poems, history that absorbs 
him: “[…] the poem‟s structure, rhythm, syntax, and plot, its very substance, have all been 
designed for a situation in which „I‟ do not exist” (217). Once detached from the “tribal 
encyclopedia”, the interpretation of the fragments of knowledge scattered throughout the poems 
– what Protagoras has tried to do in the Protagoras – becomes useless, since the framework has 
been definitively damaged. We can briefly analyse these two facets of the phenomenon. As to 
the subjective aspect, Plato clearly shows the crisis Socrates‟ irony provoked in his 
interlocutors. His attempt at demolishing the false convictions acquired through education was 
meant to reach firmer ground to continue the progress towards the truth. In this sense Meno‟s 
numbness (79e-80d) is the most celebrated example, but Tht. 177b is even more eloquent: the 
sophist is only a child without his technē and therefore his rhetorical skills do not grant any 
significant growth, either for himself or for his pupils. 
The crisis of the old implicit and somehow negative idea of subjectivity corresponded to the 
need to reform epistemology too. The typical sophistic way of proceeding was to enumerate the 
particular cases in which the listener could come across the object (Tht. 146c-e; Meno 71e-72b; 
Euthphr. 5d-6e; Soph. 239d), a method that still reflects – although in a refined and more aware 
way – the paratactic conception of truth typical of poetic transmission. But enumeration, in 
particular in the sophists, of the ways in which the object appears to us conceals the threat of 
relativism, that disregards the real nature of the object: at Crat. 385e-386e the belief that things 
have an essential relationship with the appearances we experience of them is clearly rejected as 
false. To this method Plato opposed the Socratic constant and often incomplete search for the 
answer to the question ti esti, namely of a definition capable of grasping the essence of the 
object itself. 
However, the elaboration of a new model of knowledge had to deal with two main issues. 
Firstly, Plato had to rethink the means of cultural transmission. The requirements of the new 
society, as we have already seen, imposed the adoption of written texts to preserve memory or 
to address speeches in formal contexts, like the Assembly or the law-court, and it was a 
prevailing practice among the sophists and the rhetoricians to write – and sell – pleas for 
defendants. Certainly Plato rejected this habit, but he provided a more penetrating criticism of 
the use of written records in the „myth of Theuth‟ (Phdr. 274c-275b). Here Plato considers 
whether written teachings could be an alternative model to traditional oral ones. The Egyptian 
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setting of the myth itself contributes by giving a sacred halo to the warning about the 
externalization of memory.
143
 It narrates Theuth‟s gift of writing to the Egyptians as an 
instrument to become mnhmonikwt¯eroi and King Thamus‟ criticism of its effectiveness: the 
use of external aids – he says – causes forgetfulness due to a lack of exercise (a)melethsi¿#) 
and, in this sense, the subject would not be able to find out the truth by himself, because he 
relies on books. Therefore written texts can only be used as u(pomnh/mata (275a; d; 276d; 
278a), i.e. reminders of something already known by the reader and, perhaps, drawn up by 
himself too. Plato disavows this medium
144
 because in his opinion every theory must be 
measured by interlocutors who should end up agreeing on some points of the discussion; 
writings, like the paintings, are static and therefore mute to a possible opponent: they are only 
weakened eidōla of a true logos (276a). The apparently lush growth of the garden of Adonis 
(276b-277a) cannot fail to remind us of the sophistic use of writing; in this example, Plato 
reduces the sophistic agonistic conception of knowledge into an amusement for the true 
philosopher. Consequently, the model Plato opposes to this one is the pursuit of truth through 
constructive dialegesthai (276e-277a) that takes time,
145
 but, like the art of agriculture, 
produces permanent fruits. 
Therefore, someone might believe that Plato theorized an alternative pedagogic method. 
This is, strictly speaking, only partially true, as the Meno shows very well. Plato again takes a 
severe stance against the sophists, the first who made teaching a profession; for Plato radically 
questions the very possibility of teaching. What we can find in the Dissoi Logoi about the 
teachability of virtue and knowledge is interesting from this perspective.
146
 DK 90B8 is a 
brilliant specimen of the sophistic quantitative idea of knowledge, since “knowing everything” 
(pa/nta e)pi¿stasqai) is reduced to the ability to answer “about anything” (periì pa/ntwn). So 
the polymathia is even deepened in comparison with other sophistic testimonies, since those 
who know the “nature of all things” will be able to teach anything and simultaneously this idea 
helps to create an asymmetrical relationship with the students. Plato instead – following 
Socrates – refuses to conceive of education as pouring notions into the learner in order to 
appear wise to the community, but more as a personal maturation given by an intersubjective 
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 Cf. Yates (1966: 39). 
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 Of course, the question is much more complicated than that, since Plato used the „written dialogue‟ form, that is 
somehow an oxymoron, as the medium to transmit his own reflections. 
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 Cf. above, p. 63, n. 150. 
146
 It is not my aim to demonstrate who has been influenced by whom (cf. above, p. 62, n. 148), but it would be 
striking if the formulation of the third objection against teachability, i.e. that many wise men did not teach their art 
to their relatives, and Meno 93c-95a about the same topic were not connected. However, the explicit rejection of 
innatism naturally makes me think of a post-Platonic work, which takes into account Plato‟s model.  
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intercourse.
147
 This is what is ultimately meant to be the maieutic art Socrates claims to have 
inherited from his mother (cf. Tht. 148e-151d; Grg. 457e-458a). The learner must constantly 
face the risk of aporia (Meno 80a) and the „teacher‟ should only help him to recognize if his 
offspring – as we will see later, what he has recollected – is worth retaining or should be 
dispelled like a phantasm (eiãdwlon) (Tht. 151c-d). In this sense, Plato in the Meno has 
voluntarily left the issue of the teachability of virtue undecided to show how an appropriate 
method like the dialegesthai is not fixed and it is really open in its results, even leading to 
unexpected increases of knowledge. 
Thus, the lack of a method is a major failure and the Symposium is a superb example of the 
inadequacy of volatile opinions in the polis. Every speech of the participants has some points of 
truth, but none of them has a theoretical background to justify what has been said, with the 
consequent risks of error. 
What I meant to do in these pages is setting the landscape of the discussion about memory 
and memorization before Aristotle to highlight how Aristotle cannot be considered the inventor 
of mnemonic techniques and how his contribution to these practices is not so original as it 
could be imagined. Plato‟s reaction against the incautious use of mnemonic artifices, included 
writing, testifies the pervasiveness of memory as a central issue in the definition of Greek 
society. In fact Plato‟s reflection can be considered a reassessment of the traditional ways of 
cultural transmission and of their role in the society and he tried to reform those ways to reach a 
stable knowledge instead of the questionable results they achieved in his age. 
 
– Models of memory and recollection: continuities and differences 
 
Therefore, the starting point for a consideration of Plato‟s conception of memory and 
recollection must be the inadequacy of the observation of the physical world and of the instable 
opinions in the city as foundations of human knowledge. I believe the introduction of 
recollection is one of the answers Plato put forward to propose a new foundation in a way 
communicable to a larger audience. In fact, he renewed the interest, in particular in the 
Phaedo,
148
 in the Orphic-Pythagorean tradition so as to justify the detachable and immortal 
nature of the soul and attack the ordinary, often incongruous conceptions of the afterlife,
149
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 Scott (2006: 13) very helpfully points out how Socratic teaching was the reversal of Gorgias‟ way, “where the 
learner asks one short question, and the teacher replies with a speech”, while Socrates constantly asks the learner. 
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 In this dialogue Socrates directly mentions Orphic doctrines (62b; 63c; 67c; 69c-e; 70c-d; 107d) as an authority 
that corroborates what he is arguing. 
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 For a reconstruction of the beliefs in transmigration before Plato see Bluck (1964: 61-75). 
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even though we must remember that at Phd. 114d the philosopher subordinates his commitment 
to those beliefs to the truths they convey.
150
 
The theory of recollection presented in the Meno, in the Phaedo and in the Phaedrus and 
some analogous ideas of which can be found in the Republic, in the Symposium and in other 
dialogues
151
 is the kernel of many Platonic reflections. If an origin can be recognized, it is to be 
attributed to the attempt to solve the so-called „Meno‟s paradox‟ (Meno, 80d-e).152 The paradox 
the young man proposes is prompted by the failure in his inquiry about arētē and, then, it is a 
consequence of the Socratic elenctic method. The paradox is quite serious, since Plato‟s 
withdrawal from the physical world poses the problem of justification of inquiry, whereas 
sense-experience cannot be invoked as the source and ultimate confirmation of our knowledge. 
Foreknowledge combined with recollection in this sense is a way through which Plato can 
conceive the passage from (true) beliefs to knowledge without any sensible confirmation and 
furthermore it allows Plato to admit the coexistence in the subject of knowledge and ignorance, 
since the knowledge the soul eternally possesses is lost in the very moment of his (re-)birth as 
incarnated living being: hence our permanent condition is one of latent knowledge which we 
can rediscover through inquiry. As we have already seen, in the Sophist Plato will deal with a 
similar difficulty concerning the twofold status of the image, that both is and is not, depending 
on our level of description: if we consider it as an object in itself, it certainly exists, but as to its 
representative content it is not. 
As in the case of the myth of Theuth, the Egyptian origin represents an authoritative source 
of the story on which Plato could rely. However, this must not be confused with a sheer assent 
to that authority: actually, what seems to happen is quite the opposite, because Plato always 
uses alternative traditions, to a large extent mysterious and never fixed in a static corpus of 
beliefs, in order to keep a high level of possible manipulation. Of course he embraced too many 
„unnecessary‟ elements of Orphism to say that Plato‟s mentions of its doctrines are only 
cosmetic, and he described at length the processes of reincarnation, but we must keep in mind 
the note of caution of Phd. 114d, to which we can add Meno 86b-c. In this sense the problems 
of innatism, of when and where we acquired our innate knowledge, of how we are connected to 
it, which continue to puzzle the commentators, will stay in the background in my analysis. 
What I want to emphasize, instead, from the slave-boy „experiment‟ is that the solution of the 
paradox consists in the recognition of something as the reason of our beliefs. Through the 
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 On the religious background of Plato‟s theory of recollection see Scott (2006: 92-7). 
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 Here I present the theory as a consistent account, but I am aware that this is not uncontroversial. Cf. Williams 
(2002: 132), who mentions some alternative interpretations, but he himself considers the theories of the Meno and 
of the Phaedo as the same one on the whole, like Gentzler (1994: 286, n. 55). 
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 For an in-depth discussion cf. Vlastos (1994), Moravcsik (1994), White (1994), Scott (2006: 75-91). 
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recollective process, our beliefs can be tested, changed or confirmed, but only in virtue of a 
principle removed from the everyday life, they are definitively stabilized. As Vlastos (1994: 
97) points out, recollection leads to “the perception of logical relationships”. The final result of 
recollection is the progressive disclosure of a realm of logical nexuses akin in themselves, 
which, like the ropes that bind the statues of Daedalus (97d-98a), give access to the underlying 
pattern the physical world conceals. As to the paradox of inquiry (according to which, whether 
one knows or does not know what he is looking for, inquiry turns out to be unnecessary or 
impossible), it is still not resolved, but it may have a self-evident solution: when it arises the 
inquiry has already begun. For Meno misinterprets his incapacity to give a definition which can 
resist the elenchus as a mere negative moment of the inquiry, because while any attempt at 
giving a definition fell short of Socrates‟ cross-examination, it is nevertheless an important part 
of the inquiry itself, since it allows the interlocutor to get rid of his groundless conceptions and 
makes him aware of the instability of the beliefs he acquired through his education and 
experience.  
In the Meno, Plato presents an ultrasensible solution about the nature of the objects of 
knowledge. We can isolate three stages of this formulation. Firstly, the true philosopher 
recognizes the inadequacy of common opinions, even when true; human beings, in fact, can use 
some criteria of organization of their cognitive experience,
153
 but they seldom reflect upon 
them, thus never being able to give a consistent explanation for their convictions.  
The completion of this inquiry is condensed as a journey of the soul in many dialogues of 
the „middle period‟. The knower must complete a vertical movement of withdrawal from the 
world to discover what provides foundations to the logical relationships we have seen in the 
particular instances; in addition, this inquiry allows the subject to reach a whole realm of such 
concepts, which now he identifies as the true world. This seems to be the gist of Plato‟s mature 
works: there is no reason to reduce this mythological exposition, often very detailed, to mere 
allegory, but it must be very likely considered Plato‟s holistic answer – at the same time 
philosophical and religious, mundane and eschatological – to the inherited problems of cultural 
transmission.  
In this sense, the first proof Plato offers of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo (72e-
73a) is to be considered a continuation of the arguments of the Meno:
154
 the pre-existence in us 
of what we are recollecting guarantees the possibility of recollecting it, thus compelling the 
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 Cf. Ferejohn‟s (2006: 224-5) criticism of Scott (1995), who tends to debase pre-philosophical acquaintance. 
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 Cf. Rowe (1993: 163-5). 
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philosopher to postulate the pre-existence of the soul itself.
155
 But in what follows Socrates 
reintroduces sense-experience in the explanation of anamnēsis. For if we try to account for the 
singular events of recollection, we have to admit that the starting point of the process is always 
a particular object or event, which reminds us of something else, that we must have 
experienced previously. From a descriptive point of view, experience teaches that the senses 
trigger recollection (taiÍj ai¹sqh/sesi xrw¯menoi: 75e), but ontologically, the direction must 
be inverted, since we should have previously acquired a grasp of the equal in itself before we 
can recognize particular cases of equality. In other words, the Forms supply us with the 
conditions of organization of reality, otherwise unrelated and chaotic. In that respect it is 
interesting to consider Scott‟s (1995: 13-86) position on the attribution of recollection to 
philosophers only. Certainly, he is right in his criticism against the excess of a „Kantian‟ 
interpretation of Platonic recollection as a feature common to mankind, but nevertheless in 
considering anamnēsis as a „philosopher‟s thing‟ he underestimates the claim that “the soul 
which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form” (249b; transl. by Fowler). 
Thus, having in us some truths – the philosophers‟ souls have seen all of them, while the others 
but a few – is a marker of humanity: even if recollection of the Forms will be a complex 
process, still the capacity for activating this process defines us as humans. The difference 
between the philosopher and the other destinies Plato enumerates at 248d-e is that specialized 
men will be able to have a partial grasp of that realm, while the philosopher will be able to 
carry out an inquiry on the Ideas per se. For an opposite – „quasi-Chomskyan‟ – standpoint cf. 
Gentzler (1994: 292-3), who suggests that “these innate beliefs constrain our conceptualization 
of the world as an „innate representation of a universal grammar‟ may constrain our use of 
language”. 
A very good point Plato makes is the possibility of establishing recollective connections 
between both similar and dissimilar items. We can recognize (eÃgnwsa/n) the lyre and be 
reminded of the beloved who possesses it, or we can see Simmias – or even his portrait156 – and 
be reminded of his friend Cebes (74d-e).
157
 So Plato concludes that we had seen previously 
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 Suddenly, Socrates produces this argument as a proof of the immortality of the soul, even if it is not a 
straightforward conclusion. I cannot linger over this topic, but it is clear that the contents the soul possesses might 
have been acquired in a former life, not necessarily in the very beginning of its existence, even supposing that the 
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here: it seems that the image, even if Plato radically questioned the value of mimetic arts, can serve as a token of 
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 Ackrill (1973: 180-7) gives a valuable account of this passage. He points out that this example of reminding 
can be split into two logically independent moments, namely the recognition of the object in itself and as a 
reminder of something else. On this point, cf. also Scott (1995: 57) and Dimas (2003: 206-7). 
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what makes thing similar (or dissimilar) and this must have happened before we started using 
our senses, i.e. before the very moment of our birth, thus testifying to the pre-existence of those 
paradigms and the soul (74e-75d). Now Plato has to argue that we have forgotten this 
knowledge at birth and he described this process in well-known myths in Phaedo 107b-115a, in 
Phaedrus 245c-257b and in Republic X, 613e-621d.
158
 A single point of the Myth of the 
Charioteer can be discussed here: in my opinion when at 249b-c Plato points out that men 
understand when they unify numerous perceptions into a unity by means of calculation 
(logismo/j) and thus in virtue of the Idea (kat'eiådoj), he is once again referring to the 
capacity for organization of perceptions and thoughts recollection entails.
159
 For Plato learning 
and recollection are coextensive because both are rooted in the recognition of what allows the 
calculation of the „cause‟ (ai¹ti¿a); so, Plato‟s account is mainly focused on the stabilization of 
propositional knowledge. This aspect is very well explained by Scott (2006): the kinship of 
nature mentioned at Meno 81c reveals how the pieces of knowledge should not be considered 
as autonomous atoms, but particular attention must be paid to the “associative links” they bear 
(129), or, as he argues later, recollection is to be considered as “the synoptic mastery of a whole 
domain” (179), the progressive discovery of a pattern in the guise of a constellation of concepts 
(that will be the Forms in other dialogues). 
As this sketchy treatment tries to prove, anamnēsis is one of the most original Platonic 
conceptions, but its relevance in his thought goes far beyond a simple description of a human 
faculty. However, in what scholars believe to be late dialogues, Plato reconsiders the simple 
capacity of retention as fundamentally based on sensible acquisition
160
 and gives various 
accounts of memory, which have been very important in the history of philosophy. 
Surprisingly, it must be noticed that such successful models did not seem to meet the approval 
of Plato himself. 
Before setting out those models, at Theaetetus 163b-164c Plato makes some general 
observations about memory. Unlike Aristotle, he considers memory an intellective faculty; for 
mediation intervenes between sensation and what is retained in the soul. In fact, sensation and 
knowledge are not the same, since the latter entails some form of structuring the raw material 
of sensation before it is stored in our soul and in this guise it will be remembered. For instance, 
in the case of the language of barbarians, we can perceive the sounds of the word, without 
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 The theme of the judgment of souls can be found also at Gorgias 522e-527e. 
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 In opposition to recollection, Plato believes that „memory‟ etymologically “expresses rest in the soul, not 
motion” (Crat. 437b; transl. by Fowler). 
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grasping the sense of them and we will retain them according to our understanding. Thus we 
can perceive (and remember) the sounds they produce without knowing the meaning. This 
process is described by Ackrill (1973: 182) for the case of recollection. What can remind me of 
Simmias is not only the lyre qua a lyre, but also “a dark lumpy object sticking out from under 
the curtain” we do not recognize as a lyre can serve as a reminder: “the explanation will be in 
terms of features or aspects which we noticed, identified, or recognized”. Thus, what is 
required by any mnemonic activity is not full-fledged knowledge of the object, but at least 
some form of recognition of it. In this respect, it is not possible that a subject does not „know‟ 
what he remembers (163d).
161
  
Then Plato introduces the two main paradigms of memory in the Theaetetus, which are the 
Wax Block (191c-196d) and the Aviary (197c-199b) models. The former, in particular, was a 
manifest inspiration for Aristotle. It is introduced by Plato in the attempt to account for the 
possibility of false beliefs.
162
 The strained etymology that connects wax and heart based on 
Homer makes us think that this could be an older conception, perhaps not fully developed, but 
somehow already present in Greek culture.
163
 Probably for the first time, Plato gave a 
rudimentary physiological explanation of the model (191c-d; 194c-195b), which Aristotle 
certainly borrowed. I would not linger too much on this model because it is a locus classicus in 
the comparison between Plato‟s and Aristotle‟s theories of memory, and Lang (1980) is an 
important inquiry about this topic: therefore, I shall try to notice a few original ideas that the 
comparison of Plato‟s and Aristotle‟s texts suggest. 
Socrates supposes that human beings have something like a wax block in their souls and 
that one makes impressions upon it of his sense-perceptions and thoughts leaving an imprint 
like the stamps from signet rings. Thus, what leaves a trace in the block is remembered by the 
subject, what is effaced or is impossible to impress is forgotten or not known. Indeed Plato was 
the first to implement a physiological model so as to explain mnemonic failures with the 
constitution of the wax block in us. Of course, in Plato this remained a rough analogy and 
Aristotle dropped the crudest elements. For example, the block can be impure, or that the size 
of the block determines in each of us the amount of storage of impressions with the consequent 
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possibility of having overlapping imprints. What Aristotle did retain in his model is the 
influence of the consistency of wax – if it is too hard the impressions have trouble fixing, if it is 
too soft they easily fade away once imprinted. However, Plato considered those whose wax 
block has the right consistency as being good both at learning and remembering, while 
Aristotle will articulate more carefully this point, since the quick-witted, who learn more 
quickly, undergo a more intense movement that provokes a faster erasure of the trace. In that 
respect, Socrates‟ hypothesis seems to be less dynamic, because, once imprinted, there is no 
internal influence on the imprints. Furthermore, 194d suggests that there is not a direct 
influence of the external world on the block, since we hold the tablet and make the impressions 
by ourselves, stamping both perceptions and conceptions (eÃnnoiai) in the wax.
164
 However, 
for Socrates this model explains true judgements when I correctly associate a new perception 
with a trace already in me: judgements are nothing more than the recognition (a)nagnwr¯hsij) 
of the agreement between these two elements. Thus a false judgement consists in mismatching 
the perception and the trace (193b-d). But this model is rejected
165
 by Plato because it does not 
account for false judgements about abstract concepts and in particular about arithmetical 
objects (195e-196c).
166
 
On the other hand, in some other passages Plato seems to recall this model, which 
demonstrates an important persistence in his thought. Later in the Theaetetus (209c-d) the 
peculiar features of the objects are inscribed in us – e)nshmhname/nh – like distinguishing 
marks and are what allow us to recognize an object starting from a significant feature among  
others. In Ti. 26b-c Critias describes his youthful memories as encaustic paintings inscribed 
indelibly; more generally, at 45d-46a Plato hints again at a physiological conception of internal 
processes compatible with the wax block model saying that some residual movements in some 
parts of our body can cause the representation of images (fanta/smata) in our dreams, which 
can be remembered by the sleepers when they awake, opinion that will be clearly another 
„source‟ for Aristotle. 
The Theaetetus Aviary model was less relevant for Aristotle‟s De Memoria, and yet it has 
some points of interest for us. After the rejection of the Wax Block model, Socrates suggests 
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 Chappell (2004: 182) points out the deliberate action of the subjects who generate the imprints, a fact that 
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another analogy to account for false beliefs concerning non-perceptible items. Thus he suggests 
that Theaetetus imagines that human beings have an aviary within themselves
167
 so as to 
introduce an important distinction between holding (eÀcij) and possession (kth=sij) of 
knowledge (197b). This is again an empiricist analogy, since the aviary is supposed to be 
empty at birth and the birds/pieces of knowledge are caught throughout our lifetime (197e); this 
is in explicit contrast with the theory of recollection it has been sometimes compared to. The 
knower here is engaged in two different kinds of hunting (qh=ra): firstly, he will catch the birds, 
i.e. the pieces of knowledge, and put them in his aviary, and will acquire a dispositional 
knowledge, but only when he will hold them in his hands again he will be exercising that latent 
knowledge. These will be two prominent points in Aristotle‟s treatise. In the account I 
discussed in the first chapter, the difference between memory and remembering is essentially 
based on the polarity between eÀcij and e)ne/rgeia, in which the activity of remembering takes 
part, even if in Plato the eÀcij is not the disposition, but the actualization; furthermore, the 
metaphor of the hunt Aristotle uses to define recollective processes (451b18; 453a22) is clearly 
borrowed from Plato‟s aviary.168  
However, Plato found this model inadequate to account because of the possibility of 
falsehood without infringing the rule according to which knowledge cannot cause ignorance. 
For the same reason Theaetetus‟ suggestion to introduce in the aviary some „birds of ignorance‟ 
must be rejected. As we can see, Theaetetus‟ proposal is even less explanatory than the former 
one, because it does not include any recognition of the objects, thus excluding any possible 
explanation of false beliefs. In fact, Chappell (2004: 189) remarks that he who sustains this 
model does not comprehend that “thought cannot consist merely in the presentation of a series 
of inert „object of thoughts‟ [...] the thinking is not so much in the objects of thought as in what 
is done with those objects”. 
Finally, in the Philebus Plato introduces memory and recollection in his attempt to examine 
exhaustively the forms pleasure can take in our experience (31b ff.). First Socrates reminds 
Protarchus of the pleasure given by health and harmony, and of the one caused by the 
restoration of those conditions, e.g. the replenishment with liquid when someone is thirsty (31c-
32b). In addition, another form of pleasure and pain can be described: our soul, without the 
involvement of the body, can have the anticipation (prosdo/khma) of future pleasures and 
pains (32c-d). Then, Socrates states that this kind of pleasure is completely dependent on 
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memory (33c), and this obliges him to clarify what this faculty is. Notwithstanding the rejection 
of bodily analogies in the Theaetetus, the description Plato puts forward in the Philebus is 
strictly related to bodily occurrences. In fact, the distinction drawn by Socrates between 
affections (pa/qh) that reach our soul or not is only a quantitative watershed and not a 
qualitative one; for some affections do not exceed the threshold of body and leave the soul 
unaffected and incapable not only of experiencing pleasure or pain, but also of perceiving (33d-
e): aiãsqhsij remains the only source for memory, which can be defined as preservation of 
perception (swthri¿an ai¹sqh/sewj: 34a). The ensuing definition of recollection is quite 
surprising, because there is no mention of Plato‟s „theory of recollection‟, since recollection 
here is defined as the capacity of the soul for retrieving by itself (e)n au(tv=) what it had 
previously experienced together with the body, even after the loss of memory. This will 
establish the basis of the definition of desire as the state of being in an actual painful state, but 
at the same time having contact with the restoration of the state of equilibrium through 
memory, i.e. without the involvement of the body (35b-c). 
Once again the importance of recognition is fairly important in Plato. Memory and 
recollection concur in structuring our experience, since they coordinate past experiences with 
future expectations. The result of mnemonic capacities is inevitably an organization of the 
perceptual sphere that, on the one hand, orients the subject towards the restoration of the bodily 
equilibrium on the basis of the inner stimuli and, on the other, mediates the bulk of bodily 
acquisitions breaking the scheme of immediate action/reaction towards the environment thanks 
to the connection of the three temporal levels. In that respect, this model, not anymore in the 
form of a metaphor or an analogy, is truly „empiricist‟ and seriously takes into account the 
consequences of an acquisitive model of memory. For instance, Socrates mentions, without 
developing it, the „first-desire problem‟, which must be considered in the case of newborn 
babies who experience pain and pleasure for the first time, but, as Frede (1993: 37, n. 1) argues, 
these kinds of affections must be generally conceived as “intentional (object-directed) states, 
since all involve memory”. 
Shortly afterwards (38b ff.), Plato mentions memory again in addressing the issue of true 
and false judgments. Memory assumes now a new important cognitive role in the interpretation 
of reality and we can find an implicit distinction between the passive function of retention and 
the activity of representation in this new treatment. The soul is compared to a book, in which a 
scribe takes note of the information supplied by perception, true or false as the case may be. 
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When prompted by a new perception, another craftsman in us, a painter, draws an image
169
 
according to what the scribe has written and this picture will be used by the subject to 
formulate a judgment about this perception, e.g. whether the figure I see under the rock is a 
man or a statue. Different observations can be drawn from this account. Firstly, it seems to be 
connected with – or it may be a revision of – the Wax Block model; for the explanation of false 
judgments consists in mismatching the actual vision and the picture painted by the inner 
craftsman; however, now the model is very slightly off-balance toward the account of 
judgments based on sight. Even if Plato says that judgments can be taken by any other sense, it 
is difficult to imagine – and Plato does not give any hint about it – how an artist may represent 
olfactory or gustative „pictures‟ to compare with the present ones. Secondly, the work of the 
scribe is similar to guesswork based on the interpolation of raw sensible data that affect the 
body and the soul towards a coherent token to be retained. He acts as a filter between the 
external stimuli, selects only the significant ones and codifies them in a script „readable‟ for the 
painter; once again, this activity implies an organization of our perceptual sphere so as to create 
a mnemonic trace.  
In conclusion, Platonic reflections on memory and recollection represent a turning-point in 
the history of philosophy. For the first time an organic treatment deals with memory as a 
complex of activities and capacities related to the individual, treatment that questions the 
traditional ways of producing and transmitting cultural. The process of secularization is not yet 
concluded in his „theory of recollection‟, which, however, considers the individual knower as 
the focus of the activity. Therefore, Plato rejected the idea of memory as a set of traditional 
beliefs externalized in a static poetic repertoire and at the same time the new technical 
conception proposed by the sophists who turned this externalization into a thorough technē 
through the diversification of the supports (e.g. written records, mnemotechniques, etc.). Plato 
also was the first philosopher to inquire on the mechanisms of acquisition and retention as well 
as that of retrieval ones and how they participate in shaping our cognitive world.  
Plato‟s contribution fixed some fundamental questions later thinkers would face again. 
What I think is worth being reminded of again is the introduction of the theme of recognition. It 
seems to be a central issue in all the models discussed by Plato. In fact, whether we consider 
the objects of our mnestic or anamnestic activity as objective, like the Forms, or as coming 
from the past experience of our present life, the main problems the philosopher has to tackle are 
the possible solutions to the paradoxes of inquiry and discovery expressed by Meno. The 
existence of a mnemonic support does not guarantee the retrieval of its contents in any way, the 
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 Obviously, Plato here admits that painters‟ images can be faithful likenesses and not semblances. Cf. above, pp. 
64-5. 
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philosopher must explain the mechanisms that allow the subject to remember or recollect 
starting from that support. Moreover, it is highly significant that the models of the Theaetetus 
are proposed to account for the possibility of false beliefs, since memory will be a cognitive 
activity with a high rate of error, just as for Aristotle. On the other hand, when the focus is 
shifted to the results of the process, like in the theory of anamnēsis and in the Philebus, it is 
remarkable the importance Plato accords to these results in constructing our cognitive world. In 
different senses, these two works show how recollection establishes rational nexuses in our 
experience making it intelligible. Another element, apparently less close to this topic, will be 
relevant for Aristotle. The twofold status of the image defined in the Sophist, at the same time 
being and not being, will be decisive for the idea of memory as an image of something past, 
which is now absent in the external world, but at the same time present in the representation 
that the remembering subject pictures before his mind‟s eyes.  
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3. The De Memoria within Aristotle‟s psychological theory  
 
The decline of the traditional role of the poets corresponded to the rise of new intellectual 
figures, who applied poetical techniques to other fields. In this context the use of images and 
the awareness of their power in memorizing became more and more important. Small (1997: 
74) remarks that the practice of ekphrasis, i.e. “conjuring mental images of the scene” depicted 
in a painting to describe it, assumed an important role in the education of rhetors in the 
Hellenistic age. As Coleman (1992) shows, Aristotle was certainly interested in training 
methods in rhetoric and in the use of iconic supports for the improvement of rhetorical and 
dialectical skills. For instance, at Rhet. Γ 12, 1414a8-17 he compares the style of oratory to the 
art of skiagrafi¿a, especially used as the backdrop in dramatic performances:170 the particular 
technique of depicting shadows was used in this art “to produce an illusion of solidity at a 
distance” (LSJ [1996: 1609-10]). In speeches addressed to large gatherings of people, as in the 
assembly, sophisticated details may prove self-defeating for listeners with a distant point of 
view, who need a general picture of the fact, while before a limited and qualified audience, as 
in the case of forensic debates, the rhetor should pay much more attention to the details, since 
the judges already know the outlines of the question. Elsewhere (Metaph. Δ 29, 1024b21-6) 
Aristotle associates scene-painting and dreams as equally delusive. Again he describes the 
ontological status of these phenomena as Plato did in the Sophist (239c-240c) concerning the 
eiãdwlon, saying that they actually are something, but not the things the fantasi¿a appears to 
represent: in that respect they are not and are false. 
Likewise Aristotle inquires into the rules of poetical composition carefully considering 
fruition as an important feature of artistic experience. In that respect, he promotes what 
enhances memorability for the audience; at Poet. 7, 1450b34-1451a7, he suggests the poet 
composes unitary and coherent „plots‟ (mu/qoi), namely a „whole‟ (oÀlon) that has definite 
starting, middle and ending points, for a well-structured plot is easy to remember. But it is even 
more important for our discussion that for Aristotle the length of a tragedy must meet the 
further requirement of being limited.
171
 To show this, Aristotle resorts to an analogy: since 
beauty resides in order and size, the length of a tragedy ought to be embraced by the audience 
in a single span of attention to avoid mnemonic efforts, detrimental to fruition. Just in the same 
way, it is easier to grasp a size taken in at a single glance and this characteristic makes the 
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 It is interesting to note that Sextus Empiricus, Math. VII, 87-8, mentions two philosophers, Anaxarchus and 
Monimus, who are said to have likened ta\ oÃnta („things‟) to skhnografi¿a („scene-painting‟) and to the 
experiences caused by dreams or madness. 
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 Cf. also Probl. XVIII 9, 917b8-12. 
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object beautiful; for in a very minute animal or in a very big one, no one can appreciate the 
proportion as one could do in the case of a creature observed all at once by the beholder. 
Therefore forcing the audience to bring together the pieces of their perceptions to form a single 
image of the plot is not recommended by Aristotle to the tragedian because any act of 
unification entails to a certain extent distortion, or at least effort. My aim in this section is to 
show how Aristotle applies the same strategy to his theory of fantasi¿a and how the analogy 
he makes here with the size of animals is revealing of the approach he takes in the description 
of that faculty and how unifying and merging processes will play an important role in the 
formation of experience. 
However, Aristotle considered the problems of memorization and memorability also in 
rhetorical contexts demonstrating that he is far more sensitive toward mimetic activities than 
Plato; but he too saw corruption in public life when Gorgias first introduced a poihtikh\ le/cij 
in rhetorical speeches, thus mixing techniques that should be separated, so as to deceive the 
audience (Rhet. Γ 1, 1404a24-9). Actually, a proper speech should not go beyond the mere 
proof of the bare facts (1404a5-7), thus little room remains for the study of the modes of 
delivery, even if they deserve some attention insofar as speeches are addressed to listeners; 
therefore speeches must be fashioned in accordance with the fantasi¿a one wants to produce 
in the hearers, whereas no geometer would ever use such embellishments (1404a8-12). As for 
poetry, the parts of the speech should be easily memorable
172
 and a good epilogue consists in 
the recapitulation of the topic discussed,
173
 in short, ordered and numbered items are thought to 
be easier to remember, like verses in comparison with prose (Rhet. Γ 9, 1409b4-8). 
Moreover, memorization was a prerequisite for a dialectician and of course Aristotle 
considered it necessary to instruct his students in mnemotechniques to face eristic opponents in 
disputes and, unlike Plato, he probably theorized their use in those contexts. However, 
primarily he marked the difference between his methods and sophistic approaches. At Soph. El. 
183b35-184a4 Aristotle describes the rote memorization implied by Gorgias‟ technique as the 
imposition of the products of an art, whose rules may remain unknown by his pupils. Moreover, 
the teachers of eristics used to hand out prepared sophistical arguments to be learned by heart, 
structured as a set of question and answer that was supposed to cover the main problems of the 
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 Two examples will be enough for our purposes. At Rhet. Γ 5, 1407a20-6, Aristotle says that in a couple of 
connecting words (like me/n...de/), the correlative term must be introduced before the first one has been forgotten, 
namely without an excessive distance between the two; a „period‟ is instead defined (Rhet. Γ 9, 1409a35-b1) as a 
limited portion of text with a beginning and an end, in addition it should be covered by a single glance (me/geqoj 
eu)su/nopton). 
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 More correctly, reminding one of the arguments (a)na/mnhsij) is the fourth and last part of the epilogue of a 
speech (Rhet. Γ 13, 1414b12-3; 19, 1419b27-1420a8) and allows one to give the hearer a complete picture of what 
has been previously demonstrated.  
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argument in question; what results, though, is only an apparent and unsystematic knowledge. 
Still, Aristotle does not exclude the possibility of correct use of memorization: in Top. Θ 14, 
163b17-33 he suggests learning by heart some basic elements or propositions to be able to 
master the whole argument under which they fall. To corroborate this claim, he gives the 
example of people who have a trained memory and are able to remember the thing they want 
just mentioning the „place‟ (to/poj) in which they had previously classified a pattern of 
argument to recall; furthermore, those practices to a certain extent imply the use of imagery and 
Aristotle had probably devoted an autonomous work to the subject (Sorabji [2006: 26; 29]). I 
will not linger over this topic any longer, since Sorabji (2006: 22-31) has given a very 
convincing account of it in his essay on mnemonic techniques. 
I shall try, instead, to raise some objections to the use of this technique as an explanans of 
the controversial passage 452a17-24 in the De Memoria. Sorabji (2006:31-4) considers the text 
a description of what he calls the “technique of mid-points” and many commentators have 
found this solution to be definitive. Still, I shall individuate some weak points of this 
interpretation. Firstly, even if we consider the mnemonic technique of Top. Θ 14, 163b17-33 as 
a model for Mem. 452a17-24, it is worth noting that Aristotle introduces the latter discussing 
recollective processes, while the former passage seems a short-cut to avoid recollection in a 
sort of „meta-anamnestic‟ pre-organization of the material we want to remember later. The 
result is a „map‟ of places through which we instantaneously remember the item placed in a 
given point (eu)qu\j [...] mnhmoneu/ein [163b17-33]); no recollection seems to be implied 
here, since no effort must be done to retrieve a composite – but single – image, while we know 
that recollection is essentially a zh/thsij (453a12). Secondly, in the last section of this chapter I 
shall try to argue that even if Sorabji‟s textual reconstruction of 452a17-24 is by far the best 
one among those attempted,
174
 still it does not seem to describe a successful case of retrieval.  
In addition, we should notice that the positive opinion Aristotle seems to have of mnemonic 
techniques in the Topics, even if we admitted for the sake of argument that Aristotle suggested 
using them, instead of simply drawing an analogy, could be hardly extended to his 
psychological works. Indeed, it is striking that only one explicit remark about the improvement 
of one‟s memory can be found in the De Memoria (452a12), if the claim on the utility of 
frequent recollections to separate sharply the modalities of retrieval (451a12-4) is to be 
considered a quite general statement and not a specific prescription for would-be mnemonists; 
in any case, a technique of mid-points is not required here. In other occurrences Aristotle 
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 It has been widely accepted by scholars: cf. Cooper (1975: 65-6), Coleman (1992), Annas (1992: 298, n.3), 
Bloch (2007: 236-9). 
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directly refers to the place-system technique, but it is difficult to attribute to him some 
commitment to it on the basis of those passages. At DA Γ 3, 427b18-20 the mention of the 
„places‟ that someone exploits to improve memorization is used as a secondary confirmation of 
the possibility of visualizing an internal content or even as a parenthetical curiosity and at 
Insomn. 458b20-5, again about visualization, Aristotle says that some people believe 
themselves (dokou=ntej)
175
 to place a further image apart from the dream according to a 
mnemonic rule: this seems to enhance the memorability of the dream itself. Thus, the mention 
of „places‟176 at Mem. 452a12 should be read carefully in the light of Aristotle‟s caution; for he 
introduces with a dubitative form (dokou=ntej) the claim of those who declare that they 
recollect in that way. A direct commitment to those practices by Aristotle does not emerge from 
these lines, nor does an essential role of mnemonic techniques in describing physiological 
activities: they seem to be always used as explicative examples and the philosopher maintains 
an underlying detachment from them, unlike the possibly favourable tone found in the Topics. 
In conclusion, I shall try to reverse the order used by Sorabji in his study, taking the 
Aristotelian psychological reflections as the basis of any possible mnemonic technique, instead 
of considering the latter as a model for the former. The first step is to consider Aristotle‟s 
conception of phantasia, trying to compare Sorabji‟s imagistic proposal with other 
interpretations. 
 
3.1 The role of phantasia in the De Memoria 
 
Sorabji‟s (2006) tight connection between the mnemonic technique of mid-points and a 
pictorial conception of the phantasma involved in remembering as in the modern idea of 
imagination represents the height of the explanatory power of the imagistic conception of this 
„bridging‟ faculty of the soul, i.e. phantasia, and at the same time an opening for numerous 
attacks from different standpoints. However, considering phantasia as the presentation of an 
internal image remains the „canonical theory‟ of DA Γ 3 (Wedin [1988]), although some 
authors
177
 have emphasized the latent inconsistency of a treatment of a faculty that seems to be 
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 The exact phrase is oiâon oi¸ dokou=ntej kata\ to\ mnhmoniko\n para/ggelma ti¿qesqai ta\ 
proballo/mena (“Those, for example, who believe themselves to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects 
according to the mnemonic rule” [Barnes]: 458b20-2), where dokou=ntej can be interpreted as referred to the 
belief of the dreaming mnemonist in superimposing an image on his dreams, but in theory Aristotle could also 
mean that they believe to do it, while they are not doing it: either way, Aristotle does not suggest adopting such a 
technique, he is only referring to it. For a concise summary of the discussion of this passage, see Repici (2003: 
159). 
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 Since the subsequent passage does not seem to be an example of a „place-system‟, it has been suggested that we 
should emend the text in a)to/pwn (Bloch [2007: 43, n. 29]), a solution that could fit the passage very well. 
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 In particular Schofield (1979) and Frede (1992: 281). 
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wavering between perception and thinking. Furthermore, notwithstanding the number of 
criticisms against an imagistic, or even pictorial, conception of the phantasma, this paradigm 
remained unscathed for the De Memoria even for authors who tried to reconsider the 
conventional position.
178
  
Only recently some voices of dissent rose against the plausibility of picture-like images as a 
comprehensive account of phantasmata. In his review of the second edition of Sorabji‟s 
translation, Pavelic (2006) points out the difficulties of postulating quasi-visual occurrences of 
phantasmata instead of admitting „images‟ from other senses as well. His mention of Sens. 1, 
437a15-7 is quite appropriate, but not definitive. Here Aristotle argues that among the blind and 
the deaf-mute from birth the former are more intelligent because rational discourse is tied, even 
if accidentally, to audible words; sight instead brings about many more discriminations and 
contributes greatly to perception of common sensibles, but much less in the formation of 
abstract thought. However, another passage about blindness in the Eudemian Ethics seems to 
me even more relevant. At Eth. Eud. Θ 2, 1248b1-3, the blind are said to remember better not 
only than other disabled people but than anyone else, since they are not distracted by visible 
objects. Again, this claim would be striking if some visual or quasi-visual activity was 
essentially involved in phantasia. 
Pavelic‟s remarks are however the outcome of a reflection developed in the last decade 
after the doubts expressed by Nussbaum (1985: 228) about the exclusion from phantasia of 
„images‟ deriving from non-visual sources. In fact Modrak (2001: 234-7) had already included 
all kinds of sensuous „images‟ as support for memory, without letting the role of resemblance 
drop. Caston (1998) is indeed the most radical commentator among those who deny the 
imagistic terms often used to describe the phantasma (283): the only imagistic sense admitted 
by him is that the „image‟ is “capable of producing quasi-perceptual experiences” (283). 
More generally, the two metaphors of the signet-ring and the picture must be kept apart no 
matter how ancient the “alliance between eikōn and tupos” (Ricœur [2004: 51]) is. In the 
Philebus Plato clearly distinguishes the moments of encoding and decoding mnemonic traces in 
two different actions performed by two different „artists‟ in the soul (38b ff.) and albeit 
Aristotle conflated these two facets in a single process, he maintained the theoretical division in 
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 There are of course different nuances in each case: while Lang (1980: 385) goes even further speaking of 
„portrait‟, Annas (1992: 304) believes that the phantasmata involved in remembering are to be conceived as 
“images in a very literal way”. Nussbaum (1985: 231; 249-50) and Schofield (1979: 119) admitted the presence of 
„picture-like elements‟ in memory; Nussbaum observes the function of resemblance in that activity and from this 
remark she concludes that imaging has a place, but not “theoretically central” in phantasia (268). More 
sophisticated, although after all inconclusive, is Bloch‟s (2007: 64-70) position, for he claims that a non-physical 
facet in memory is entailed by the pictorial nature of the images, but the reference to images must be intended to 
be “to some extent metaphorical”. 
 83 
the nuance of the root mnh- declined as a noun or as a verb,
179
 with which he respectively 
stresses the retentive and the representative facets of the mnemonic capacity. For considering 
the two actions as personified by two different artists poses the further problems of how they 
are related and communicate, since Plato does not explain why he introduces two different 
codes and why the painter, who has to master both the codes, must rely on the scribe to take the 
notes. Actually, bridging the gap between the trace encoded and its presentation after some 
time has passed from the original experience is the focus of the entire first chapter of the 
treatise;
180
 in this sense a veiled criticism against the theory of the Philebus might be read, 
since Plato recognized the two operations but he did not explicitly relate them.  
In my opinion, an imagistic account of phantasia does not solve this aporia, while different 
approaches would give a better strategy for tackling the problem. Needless to say, such a 
thorny issue cannot be treated exhaustively in this thesis, but I shall try to show how the De 
Memoria does not require a literalist interpretation of the image presented, while the „seeing-as 
model‟ often proposed181 copes much better with the very diverse range of activities of this 
faculty. Firstly, phantasia is not a full-fledged faculty, because it does not have a specific 
object (Wedin [1988]), but the material it works on is supplied by sensation. Attributing a 
pictorial form of presentation to it would be a strong discontinuity with Plato‟s use of the word, 
which was focused on phainesthai as alternative to reality and reliability, respectively in an 
ontological and in an epistemological sense.
182
 
Actually, at DA Γ 3, 427b18-20 Aristotle seems to suggest that a form of „image-producing‟ 
(ei¹dwlopoieiÍn) takes place in phantasia and this is a fundamental passage for those 
commentators who have recognized the visual nature of presentations.
183
 This conception of 
imagination is admittedly drawn from modern British empiricists
184
 but Nussbaum (1985: 225-
7) and Wedin (1988: 90, n. 49) warn against the consequences that what the latter calls a “naive 
view of the images” would come up against. To single out just the most serious threat of this 
position: the image in itself does not have any intentionality, i.e. it does not intrinsically refer to 
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 Sorabji (2006: 14) is aware that the relation between the impression and the image was not immediate, but the 
relevance of this point has been completely appreciated only by Caston (1998: 257-8), who calls this aporia “the 
problem of presence in absence”. 
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 In various forms, this model could be ascribed to Nussbaum (1985), Frede (1992), partially Wedin (1988) and 
with a marked interest in intentionality to Caston (1996) and (1998). Phantasia in this model plays a fundamental 
role in the interpretation of sensible data. After that, its cognitive outcome has been interpreted as a complex 
perceptual structure (Frede) or as being essentially the bridge between internal states and the pra/gmata (Caston). 
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 Cf. Nussbaum (1985: 242) and Schofield (1979: 120). 
183
 E.g. Hicks (1907) and Hamlyn (1968). 
184
 The tight adherence of the two ideas of imagination is the guideline of Sorabji‟s edition (2006: 1 and passim). 
The problematic nature of this association is instead brought out by Nussbaum (1985: 223) and Schofield (1979: 
106). 
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any extra-mental object, as at the very least the phantasma involved in memory instead 
requires.
185
 Certainly, sight has a privileged status among other senses in the description of this 
faculty, but Aristotle himself accounted for this singularity pointing to the privileged status of 
sight as the sense par excellence (429a2-4).
186
 Once again, I mention the importance of the 
definition of eiãdwlon in the Sophist as a basic conceptual tool Aristotle had at his disposal for 
the description of an „intentional‟ phenomenon. However, it is noteworthy that Aristotle used 
the word eiãdwlon very sparingly
187
 and never in the De Memoria, where the term ei¹kw/n is 
clearly meant to convey the idea of representativeness rather than mere depiction. 
Before addressing again this issue, considering the end of the first chapter of the treatise, I 
want to show that the „seeing-as model‟ is best exemplified by what Schofield called “non-
paradigmatic sensory experience”. As Sisko (1996) argues, a material component in the 
acquisition of the trace is required, and actually the cases of after-images (DA Γ 3, 428a15-6; 
Insomn. 461b22-3, but in particular 459a24-b23) as residual movements in the sensorium, even 
after the stimulus has ceased, are testimonies of the bodily derivation of the images. But 
phantasia cannot be reduced to mere passive impressions like sensation. In fact, at DA B 12, 
424a18-9 the wax block analogy is used to explain that the reception of the form of the object 
without matter leaves no possible room for selection or elaboration,
188
 whereas, in particular in 
the Parva Naturalia, the role of a “central faculty” that acts “as the point of convergence – of 
recognition and discrimination – between the special channels of external sensation” (Kahn 
[1979: 15]) clearly emerges. 
Somehow, this faculty is at the top of a ladder whose first rung is aiãsqhsij of proper 
sensibles, that does not entail – or at least, entails in the lowest possible degree – error; but 
starting from perception of incidentals, this possibility constantly increases until error seems to 
be a normal condition in the cognitive experience of animals (427a29-b2) and, in particular, for 
those which possess it, in the exercise of phantasia, for this faculty intervenes whenever the 
object is not perceived accurately (428a11-5). Therefore, my working hypothesis is that the 
phantasma is the result of the interpretation of raw sensible data (or the interpolation of unclear 
ones) in a recognition that tends to identify the object. The anomalistic cases of phantasia, like 
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 Therefore, I take the kind of fantasi/a kata\ metafora\n referred to at 428a2 to be exemplified at 427b18-
20, like Frede (1992: 280, n.3; 285) and Polansky (2007: ad 427b27) already did and not to be the central feature 
of Aristotle‟s theory of phantasia. 
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 Another famous passage on this privileged status is Metaph. A 1, 980a23-7. 
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 As far as I know, in the psychological works eiãdwlon occurs, except for this occurrence in the De Anima, only 
in the De Insomniis and in the De Divinatione per Somnum. For the most part, it is referred to an analogy 
concerning images reflected in water (Insomn. 461a15; Div. 464b9-14) or to the Democritean theory of emanation 
(Div. 464a6, 464a11), which already clarifies the non-purely visual nature of eiãdwla; only in Somn. 462a11-8 
Aristotle seems to describe eiãdwla as a deceptive kind of phantasma. 
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 Cf. Nussbaum (1985: 258). 
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dreams, hallucinations, even memory-images, on which Schofield (1979) focuses, seem to be 
best explained by this conception. For instance, Aristotle thoroughly describes cases of 
apophenia, that is the recognition of a pattern where actually there are meaningless data, in its 
visual variation, namely pareidolia.
189
 A paradigmatic case is the recognition of definite objects 
in the random shapes of clouds (Somn. 461b19-21). Interpolating underspecified data sets is a 
natural tendency of the animals that possess phantasia and it supplies much more veridical 
material to our experience than Schofield‟s restricted conception of phantasia (1979: 114-5) 
allows.  
Schofield is right in his description of the phenomena as mainly deceptive, but he hastily 
equates the epistemic status of phenomena like hallucinations, dreams, fantasies on the one 
hand and memory-images on the other. I believe, instead, that Aristotle shows through 
anomalous examples the gist of what he intended with phainesthai on the whole. In normal 
conditions, the result of the interpolation of sensible data is scrutinized by a central faculty (the 
ku/rion), which discriminates the identification and the opinative faculty (do/ca) eventually 
assents to it or refuses it. This is the reason why the subject is essentially detached from the 
appearance until it is examined (DA Γ 3, 427b23-4). On the contrary, in particular conditions 
like in dreams or in hallucinatory experiences, the ku/rion does not examine the appearances 
and they “are taken as veridical by default” (Schofield [1979: 125]); likewise, some pa/qh, like 
cowardice, anger or love, happen to alter the ku/rion and its physical support: the stronger they 
affect the soul, the smaller the similarity required for the identification of the object we expect 
to see and consequently bigger the margin of error too (460b3-20). 
What Aristotle stresses when he attributes a high degree of unreliability to this kind of 
presentation is indeed the constructive nature of this activity that merges the bulk of unrelated 
aisthēmata in a single whole; phantasia remains a source of cognitive content over and above 
aisthēsis, and is actually the primary source of motivation for animals (Nussbaum [1985: 255]). 
In the plainest case a phantasma is a collation of several aisthēmata, like in the case of Poet. 7, 
1450b34-1451a7. Here, in my opinion, Aristotle describes the potential insufficiency of 
sensation for particular kinds of objects: in the case of a very big animal, we should relate 
different sights of it so as to have a unified picture, in the case of a small one, we have to 
picture ourselves the unclear elements. Another function that has been ascribed to phantasia is 
the creation of an overall perceptual structure,
190
 in some sense a development of the operation 
by which the subject merges different aisthēmata of an item to have a single trace; here, 
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instead, several images take part in the creation of a „panoramic‟ view of many objects 
consisting in encoding the spatial relationship existing between them, and between them and 
the subject.
191
 Therefore, in what is retained of an experience, there is something added, 
derived by interpretation, beyond the data supplied by sensation. Wedin (1988: 68), Frede 
(1992: 285) and Caston (1998: 262-3) seem to direct their interpretation towards the 
introduction of this further element; in other words phantasia “is image-producing insofar as 
images can be interpreted as forms or [re]presentational structures” (Wedin).  
Actually, this element introduces a further important issue: a „form‟ or a „structure‟ is a 
whole in itself beyond the separate data and the analogy with the concept of Gestalt
192
 is not 
improper, since Aristotle seems to hint at it in his distinction between „voice‟ (fwnh/) and 
„sound‟ (yo/foj). Whereas many sounds are produced by animals, strictly speaking voice is 
restricted to the particular case in which the animated being emits a sound meta\ fantasi¿aj 
tino/j and shmantiko\j ga\r dh/ tij yo/foj e)stiìn h( fwnh/ (“for voice is certainly a sound 
which has significance” [Hicks]: DA B 8, 420b31-3). In this passage, the imagistic 
interpretation is particularly weak, because it must postulate a “mental picture” (Hicks [1907: 
ad 420b32]), while animals that possess the capacity for emitting voice are able to 
communicate exclusively internal states,
193
 something that does not seem to require an 
additional intermediary element like a mental image. The main problem is not in my opinion 
that “on the image reading, it [i.e. voice] is sēmantikos not of an object, but of the mental 
picture”, but that this picture is meant to represent fear, pleasure or anger in visual terms, is 
highly unlikely; for it is important not to forget that voice denotes that the subject has had 
recognition of an object, but expresses its reaction towards the identified object and not the 
object itself, which requires a symbolization not accessible to beings without reason.
194
 
I make this point to stress that there is no need to postulate an explicit predication in the 
lower levels of recognition,
195
 but, at the same time, that Aristotle attributed some organization 
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 Some details of this task and, partially, of all merging processes are indeed problematic, since they imply a 
non-instantaneous process, which, in modern terms, would require short-term memory. Certainly, this operation 
cannot be conceived as performed in a nu=n, but Aristotle does not mention such a capacity among mnemonic 
abilities, because memory works upon phantasmata already formed. Therefore, the time span that elapses can be 
regarded as a case of „specious present‟, which includes the time required for performing the activity. Cf. above, p. 
10, n. 5. 
192
 See Frede (1992: 290). Cf. also Metaph. Z 17, 1041b11-31 where Aristotle states that what is compounded – 
e.g. a syllable – is not exhausted by the sum of its components – consonants and vowels – but is “also something 
else” (a)lla\ kaiì eÀtero/n ti). 
193
 See Pol. A 2, 1253a9-18. 
194
 A very useful reading on this topic is Labarrière 1984: 34-40, where the author draws a sharp distinction 
between the animal shmeiÍon as “une e(rmhnei¿a faible, simple „faculté d‟interprétation‟ induisant des 
comportements et exprimant des sensations”, and the human su/mbolon as an “e(rmhnei¿a forte, „faculté de 
traduction‟ mettant en jeu des opinions énonciatives affirmant ou niant quelque chose de quelque chose”. 
195
 See Frede (1992: 283; 287). 
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to ai¹sqhtikh/ fantasi¿a independently from thought: only a few animals could survive 
relying on mere sensation of proper sensibles, while for the most part animated beings need to 
integrate the bulk of unrelated sensations to carry out strategies of action in the environment, 
even though not too far beyond a stimulus-reaction scheme. 
 
3.2 Experience and recognition 
 
In the psychological works, what strikes the reader is the painstaking care with which 
Aristotle attributes or denies faculties to some species of animals; apart from the case of 
thought,
196
 he tries to manage these distinctions as gradual increases of the ability to interact 
with the environment instead of sharp separations. Still, the results are sometimes confusing 
because of the brief hints Aristotle has left in his works and of the difficulties in relating such 
capacities to each other. This is the case with „experience‟ (e)mpeiri¿a), that is said to come 
about from memory in some animals besides human beings. In my opinion the „seeing-as‟ 
interpretation provides valuable insights into some thorny aspects of Aristotle‟s theory of 
experience, in particular in its relation with memory. This aspect has been brought out by 
Castagnoli (2006: 143-4), who notices how the well-known claims of Metaph. A 1, 980a27-
981b10 and An. Post. B 19, 99b35-100b17 are not explicitly connected, as we would expect 
them to be, with the treatise on memory, that instead remains an „isolated‟, non-epistemological 
reflection. While Castagnoli (2006: 141-50) focuses his analysis on the epistemological 
consequences of the relation between memory and intellectual abstraction, my concern is 
primarily the observation of how e)mpeiri¿a comes to emerge from memories and conversely 
how it can affect our identifications of the ai¹sqhta /. In both passages, Aristotle describes a 
ladder towards knowledge, in which the higher rung always comes about and includes the 
lower:
197
 from sensation (aiãsqhsij), through retention we come to memory (mnh/mh), to 
experience (e)mpeiri¿a) when memories are collated, and eventually to knowledge of the 
universals (sofi¿a or e)pisth/mh as te/xnhj a)rxh/). Scott (87-156, in particular 107-17) rightly 
points out that this is a severe anti-Platonic view of how abstract thought arises in human 
beings, since it excludes a strong form of innatism; however, Scott also argues that what 
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 Certainly, the intellect is a human prerogative, but, as it is well known, every thinking act needs bodily support 
to work upon, that is provided by the phantasmata. Again, this has been interpreted by Sorabji (1979: 50-1) as a 
need for imagery in each case of thinking. 
197
 This is clear from the simile of the army in rout, in which the most undifferentiated element makes a stand 
allowing the more complex ones to consolidate their position (An. Post. 100a10-b5). For instance, the data coming 
from sensation can be confused to such an extent that the subject is not able to interrupt the flux of sensorial 
acquisitions; but if they are clear enough, phantasia can work on, organize and preserve them in a single „image‟; 
eventually, starting from one, or more than one, image, a subject can think or deliberate. 
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Aristotle describes in those passages is not “vulgar concept formation”, but the achievement of 
the first principles of a science, in other words that succession represents a scientific 
methodological model (110). I will not discuss in depth this interesting standpoint,
198
 but I do 
want to make a point about how e)mpeiri¿a could work in tight connection with memories even 
in a pre-rational way. 
Again, Scott (1995: 111) upholds his interpretation noting that the other references to 
e)mpeiri¿a entail a “post-rational” capacity, which seems to exclude animals. Nussbaum too 
(1985: 262, n. 64) agrees that Aristotle denies animals the acquisition of experience, but on the 
basis of three questionable passages, in my opinion: Eth. Nich. H 3, 1147b4-5; H 7, 1150b28 
and also Metaph. A 1, 980b25-7. The first two passages do not directly speak of e)mpeiri¿a, but 
only of the inability of animals to form a “judgment on the universal” (kaqo/lou u(po/lhyij) 
because their cognition relies only on phantasia and memory. The third passage, from the 
Metaphysics, is instead surprisingly ready to acknowledge that some animals “have but a little 
of connected experience” (Ross) (e)mpeiri¿aj de\ mete/xei mikro/n); actually this could be 
considered an understatement to deny this possibility at all, as often in Aristotle, but it could 
very well be a serious statement.
199
 However, this possible participation in experience should 
not entail any explicit conception of universals. 
There is probably room for other kinds of synthesis, certainly pre-rational, but at the same 
time requiring a further capacity that phantasia cannot fulfil and propaedeutic for the formation 
of proper concepts in rational beings. So far, Aristotle has described a bottom-up process that 
proceeds from the extra-mental objects to the creation of synthetic elements of cognition, 
namely the phantasmata, which can be retained in us as memories. Experience instead is the 
moment of collation of these pieces into something unitary, which also shapes the phantasmata 
themselves. Certainly, as Nussbaum (1985: 263-4) points out in her reading of the tricky lines 
at DA Γ 11, 434a7-10,200 only humans can weigh up their images to prefigure the consequences 
of their actions and they attain this result by the means of deliberative phantasia, which belongs 
to the rational sphere.  
Nonetheless, if animals kept their memories totally unrelated this would imply that their 
recognitions happen every time just as the first time, but this is not the case, since we have 
seen
201
 that Aristotle recognizes that some animals can be tamed and trained, and those are 
indeed the most similar to humans. However, animals cannot elaborate complex behavioural 
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 One possible objection is the context of the exordium of the Metaphysics, that seems clearly more concerned 
with the capacities of human beings as a species, rather than describing the scientists‟ methodological correctness. 
199
 For a brief reconstruction of the debate on this issue, cf. Sisko (1996: 147, n. 20). 
200
 By the way, this is another passage hard to reconcile with an imagistic conception of phantasia. 
201
 Cf. above p. 12 and n. 12. 
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strategies, implying memories and expectations
202
 connect the three temporal levels into the 
selection of an action. Still, I think that the internal traces of past events and objects are 
simultaneously mobilized in a far simpler activity that falls within e)mpeiri¿a, namely in 
recognition, that does not imply the use of intellective capacities. Describing phantasia I have 
stressed the importance of organization of the sensible data, but it is clear that past cognitions 
ought to play a role in this. For instance, if I have seen Coriscus many times, it will be typically 
easier for me to recognize him as the distant figure I see rather than for a person who has seen 
him only once; similarly, a domestic animal recognizes his master even if he wears different 
clothes. Of course, Aristotle‟s position is more complicated than that, since the criterion is the 
prominence of the trace, which can be increased through repetition, but it can result from a 
single strong impression that creates a vivid memory (451b14-6); however, the general outlines 
of the argument fit Aristotle‟s conception and certainly this element would explain Aristotle‟s 
insistence on the role of habituation in memory and recollection. As if our set of memory traces 
was a „magnetic field‟, Aristotle argues that repetition, and in particular conscious repetition, 
tends to establish habits in our mnemonic activities and favours successive activations of the 
most usual results (De Mem. 451a12-4; 452a26-b7). The latter passage is particularly revealing: 
it mentions the case of a name which someone is not able to remember straightforwardly and so 
he misspells it, distorting the one he wants to remember under the influence of a similar one. 
This possibility requires a further capacity for relating our mnemonic traces that is not included 
in memory itself (in particular if we conceive mnh=mh as personal memory) and, surely, is not 
the creation of a universal as a „scientistic‟ approach to the Aristotelian concept of „experience‟ 
would require. However, Aristotle‟s suggestions on how to manage one‟s mnemonic 
performances mark the substantial difference between humans and animals in this process; on 
the one hand, human beings can wield a voluntary influence on the relationships established, on 
the other hand, animals probably form this sort of metamnemonic structure exclusively on the 
basis of the power and the number of stimuli received, which affect their successive 
identifications. In other words, an animal is able to recognize its master not only through the 
agency of a memory image, which will tie it to the contingency of the context of acquisition; 
sometimes it is able to recognize its master even if he wears different clothes by isolating 
significant features (the face, the smell etc.) in its memory images and neglecting others 
(clothes, hairstyle etc.): but this is a task neither of memory nor of recollection for Aristotle.  
                                                 
202
 The connection between mnh=mai and e)lpi¿dej is frequent in Aristotle: cf. Eth. Nich. I 4, 1166a24-6; K 3, 
1173b18-9; MA 8, 702a5-7; Metaph. Λ 7, 1072b16-8. However, it is worth noting that neither this pair of terms 
nor the plural mnh=mai alone ever occur in the De Memoria, which reveals that Aristotle did not conceive the 
coordination of the traces as a task ascribable to memory: memory images are considered separately in mnemonic 
processes and connected as a source of motivation to act or just as concurring to form an „experience‟. 
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A useful tool to elucidate how this aspect of e)mpeiri¿a works might be the theory of pattern 
recognition used in cognitive psychology.
203
 In a first paradigm of this model, according to a 
„feature theory‟ (Reed [2000: 24-9]), pattern recognition can be summarized as a process in 
which we focus our attention on some features and neglect others and whenever a feature, or a 
set of features is perceived, we classify the object regardless of the non-corresponding 
elements. In other word, the subject isolates „distinctive features‟ through which he identifies 
the whole item. Plato at Tht. 209b-d clearly describes such a case of recognition: Socrates 
explains to Theaetetus that he would not remember him by retaining too general specifications 
of his young interlocutor; only if an imprint of his snub nose and prominent eyes together with 
other distinctive features of him will be inscribed in Socrates will he be able to recognize 
Theaetetus through the retrieval of those very traits. Evidently, the cases of pareidolia we have 
found in the De Insomniis
204
 result from the distortion of the same process, because some 
distinctive features are mismatched with objects that cannot support them; for instance we are 
led to identify a face whenever we see two close spots (the „eyes‟), a vertical and a horizontal 
lines (the „nose‟ and the „mouth‟), even if the object clearly is not a possible „support‟ (e.g. a 
cloud). However, the same cognitive tendency allows us to recognize Coriscus as the subject of 
a portrait. 
In conclusion, the analogy with the „interactive activation model‟ applied to word 
recognition (Reed [2000: 39-44]) might be useful to conjecture how the entire process works, 
even in Aristotle‟s theory of perception. I shall first apply it to word-recognition to exemplify a 
three-level model, but the analogy does not require a symbolic object of knowledge. The first 
element is obviously the extra-mental object, in this case a series of lines written on a piece of 
paper; so they are perceived through aiãsqhsij, without any elaboration. What comes to rest in 
us is a first identification of the primitive elements, i.e. the letters, in the form of phantasmata; 
however, we are still able to produce a further identification, collating the single letters in a 
single word, through the agency of e)mpeiri¿a. This process is not meant to be unilateral, since 
the subject can go along both ways: unintelligible elements are interpolated on the basis of a 
top-down identification suggested by the context to create a coherent pattern; a missing or 
illegible letter or a misspelled word may not compromise the recognition, if one selects the 
elements that create the pattern he expects on the basis of his previous readings. In the example 
I used before, an animal has raw sensible data from the perception of its master, then an 
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 In this discussion, my main source will be Reed (2000: 19-49). 
204
 Cf. above, p. 86-7. 
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internal process isolates some features (the „letters‟) and eventually recognizes its master (the 
„word‟). 
This capacity can be what Aristotle is ready to attribute to animals that are able to elaborate 
some experience (Metaph. A 1, 980b25-7), without excluding the possibility that experience in 
a strong sense is only a human prerogative. The subsequent example (Metaph. A 1, 981a7-12) 
better elucidates what Aristotle intended for experience: here he distinguishes experience from 
art on the grounds that the former can only recognize that a remedy has been beneficial to 
Callias or Socrates, observing their individual reaction to it, while art gives a rationale for that 
remedy, that turns to be beneficial to everybody in the same condition, i.e. explains why it 
works. Art is indeed the mobilization of many experiences to create a unity, which considers 
both the causes and the effects of an action, a judgment that an animal cannot perform. A 
trained animal can be taught to react in a particular way to a determinate stimulus, but it does 
not seem to be able to weigh up the consequences of its actions or implement them in proper 
behaviour. 
 
3.3 An analysis of some crucial passages of the De Memoria 
 
My reconstruction above is admittedly tentative, because Aristotle never tried to elucidate a 
framework that in the end turns out to be unclear to the reader; however, the interpretation I 
propose helps to avoid some problems of De Memoria, in the light of the recent challenges to 
the imagistic paradigm. This last section will be focused on three thorny passages of the treatise 
(450b11-451a2; 452a19-26; 452b19-24), which have received very different interpretations and 
represent the theoretical core of Aristotle‟s work. 
 
– 450b11-451a2: The twofold nature of the phantasma 
 
[1] a)ll' ei¹ dh\ toiou=to/n e)sti to\ sumbaiÍnon periì th\n mnh/mhn, po/teron tou=to 
mnhmoneu/ei to\ pa/qoj, hÄ e)keiÍno a)f' ouÂ e)ge/neto; [A-1] ei¹ me\n ga\r tou=to, tw½n 
a)po/ntwn ou)de\n aÄn mnhmoneu/oimen! [B-1] ei¹ d' e)keiÍno, pw½j ai¹sqano/menoi 
tou=to mnhmoneu/omen ouÂ mh\ ai¹sqano/meqa, to\ a)po/n; [A-2] eiã t' e)stiìn oÀmoion 
wÐsper tu/poj hÄ grafh\ e)n h(miÍn, h( tou/tou aiãsqhsij dia\ ti¿ aÄn eiãh mnh/mh 
e(te/rou, a)ll' ou)k au)tou= tou/tou; o( ga\r e)nergw½n tv= mnh/mv qewreiÍ to\ pa/qoj 
tou=to kaiì ai¹sqa/netai tou/tou. [B-2] pw½j ouÅn to\ mh\ paro\n mnhmoneu/sei; eiãh 
ga\r aÄn kaiì o(ra=n to\ mh\ paro\n kaiì a)kou/ein. hÄ eÃstin w¨j e)nde/xetai kaiì 
sumbai¿nein tou=to; [B-3] oiâon ga\r to\ e)n pi¿naki gegramme/non z%½on kaiì z%½o/n 
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e)sti kaiì ei¹kwn¯, kaiì to\ au)to\ kaiì eÁn tou=t' e)stiìn aÃmfw, to\ me/ntoi eiånai ou) 
tau)to\n a)mfoiÍn, kaiì eÃsti qewreiÍn kaiì w¨j z%½on kaiì w¨j ei¹ko/na, ouÀtw kaiì to\ 
e)n h(miÍn fa/ntasma deiÍ u(polabeiÍn kaiì au)to/ ti kaq' au(to\ eiånai kaiì aÃllou 
[fa/ntasma]. vÂ me\n ouÅn kaq' au(to/, qewr¯hma hÄ fa/ntasma/ e)stin, vÂ d' aÃllou, 
oiâon ei¹kwÜn kaiì mnhmo/neuma. wÐste kaiì oÀtan e)nergv= h( ki¿nhsij au)tou=, aÄn me\n 
vÂ kaq' au(to/ e)sti, tau/tv ai¹sqa/nhtai h( yuxh\ au)tou=, oiâon no/hma/ ti hÄ 
fa/ntasma fai¿netai e)pelqeiÍn! aÄn d' vÂ aÃllou kaiì wÐsper e)n tv= grafv= w¨j 
ei¹ko/na qewreiÍ kai¿, mh\ e(wrakwÜj to\n Kori¿skon, w¨j  Kori¿skou, e)ntau=qa/ te 
aÃllo to\ pa/qoj th=j qewri¿aj tau/thj kaiì oÀtan w¨j z%½on gegramme/non qewrv=, 
eÃn te tv= yuxv= to\ me\n gi¿gnetai wÐsper no/hma mo/non, to\ d' w¨j e)keiÍ oÀti 
ei¹kw¯n, mnhmo/neuma.
205
 
 
In this passage, Aristotle presents an aporia his theory of memory (and any representational 
theory of memory) has to face, and its solution. This is not a completely original formulation, 
because Plato at Tht. 163d-164b and 166b-c uses a lexicon which Aristotle certainly knew and 
somehow reproduced here. At Tht. 163d-164b, Socrates poses an objection against Protagoras‟ 
thesis that perception is knowledge considering that memory is related to a past perception or 
experience. Protagoras is envisaged by Socrates to defend himself from this „sophism‟ by 
saying that the object of my present memory is different from the object of my past experience: 
thus, the solution involves the negation of the representational nature of mnemonic processes, 
since the flux of becoming has necessarily changed both the subject and the object of memory 
in the meanwhile. The person who performs an act of memory is not the same subject who 
experienced the original perception and if the object originally was an extra-mental entity, now 
it is some kind of unspecified present mental image.  
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 “But then, if this is the sort of thing that happens with memory, does one remember this affection, or the thing 
from which it was produced? For if the former, we would remember nothing absent; but if the latter, how is it that 
while perceiving the affection we remember the absent thing which we are not perceiving? And if it is like an 
imprint or drawing in us, why should the perception of this be the memory of a different thing, rather than of the 
affection itself? For one who is exercizing his memory contemplates this affection and perceives this. How 
therefore will he remember what is not present? For at that rate one could also see and hear what is not present. Or 
is there a way in which this is possible and happens? For the figure drawn on a panel is both a figure and a copy, 
and while being one and the same, it is both, even though the being of the two is not the same. And one can 
contemplate it both as a figure and as a copy. In the same way one must also conceive the image in us to be 
something in its own right and to be of another thing. In so far, then, as it is something in its own right, it is an 
object of contemplation or an image. But in so far as it is of another thing, it is a sort of copy and a reminder. So 
again when the change connected with the other thing is active, if the soul perceives the image as something in its 
own right, it appears to come to one as a thought or image. But if one contemplates the image as being of another 
thing, and (just as in the case of drawing) as a copy, and as of Coriscus, when one hasn‟t seen Coriscus, then (not 
only in the case of the drawing is the experience of so contemplating it different from when one contemplates it as 
a drawn figure; but also) in the case of the soul, the one image occurs simply as a thought, the other, because it is a 
copy (as in the case of drawing), is a reminder” (Sorabji). 
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From [1] to [B-2] Aristotle emphatically highlights this problem with a tour de force of 
rhetorical questions, which outlines the problems of the two possible solutions, while in [B-3] 
Aristotle puts forward the representational nature of the phantasma as his way out of the 
dilemma. In [1] the question is already defined, since, if memory is to be conceived as 
essentially related to the phantasma, it is confined to two different modalities of representation 
that I shall call [A] and [B]. The only two operations possible on the phantasma are seeing it as 
the pattern it is meant to represent (i.e. „Coriscus‟) or as something denoting its extra-mental 
original that caused the imprint (i.e. „Coriscus as I have seen him in the agora yesterday‟). The 
same physical trace can support two different psychophysical operations: thus, the scheme is 
threefold; Aristotle will focus his attention on the “modus spectandi, that is, the way that we 
view the image” derived from the trace (Bloch [2007: 70]), trace that however preserves its 
own ontological autonomy. 
[A-1] and [B-1] suggests that there is no straightforward answer to the impasse and both 
clauses imply some difficulties. What emerges is that whichever the solution may be, it has to 
explain the nexus between the contemplation of the trace and its absent cause, to\ a)po/n, that 
any mnemonic act entails. In that respect, if [A] completely fails to address the problem, 
because considering the trace in its informative content says nothing about its cause, only 
option [B] stands, even if it remains unexplained. 
Furthermore, a second approach to the question in [A-2] and [B-2] reveals a second 
requisite for the mnemonic activity, namely that there are not additional physical entities that 
intervene in a memory act and that the modality of representation of the trace as a 
mnēmoneuma must work upon the same pa/qoj as the normal perception of it does. Thus, the 
dilemma is yet to be solved, in fact the difficulty concerning [B] is even worsened by the 
restriction on the same support of the phantasma. 
[B-3] instead presents the solution, in the form of an analogy with drawing. A picture is 
both the representation of something, e.g. an animal, and a likeness of the extra-mental objects 
from which it has been drawn; likewise, the phantasma is like a picture: it can represent the 
result of the original identification, but can also denote the aetiological process of acquisition. 
This statement requires some explanation. 
Translating the terms z%½on and ei¹kwn¯ as “figure” and “copy” is an established habit that 
translators, starting from Beare, have adopted, but which has been justly criticized. Apart from 
the strain on the Greek,
206
 this interpretation raises patent difficulties, since it considers the 
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 Actually, Bloch (2007: 33, n. 16), who follows the traditional translation, quotes interesting occurrences that 
have been interpreted in the same way, but then remarks that translating  z%½on as „animal‟ “is not impossible”. 
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phantasma as a self-referential object, while it essentially has an intentional nature. In other 
words, to say that considering our inner presentation in itself means recognizing it as a „mental‟ 
image
207
 is equivalent to say that sight is essentially seeing the „image‟ impressed on our 
retinas and not the external stimulus that caused it. Furthermore, the opposition between the 
“animal-in-the-picture” and the “copy” is not the one assumed by Sorabji (2006: 84). Sorabji 
argues that the animal “may be ten feet tall, and stalking its prey” and the copy “may be two 
inches from top to bottom, and [...] cannot be said to be stalking its prey”. Wedin (1988: 139-
40) presents a different alternative criticizing the traditional interpretation, which is a better 
position to come to the different reading I hold. Wedin says that “pictures are intrinsically dog, 
cat or triangle pictures”, but, if regarded as a picture of something else (vÂ aÃllou) they 
represent “some particular dog, cat, or triangle”. This demonstrates how the difference 
presented in this passage need not be about two different objects, but about how it is possible 
that the same physical trace can support two different visual angles: both the animal-in-the-
picture and the copy are related in different ways to the same object and neither considered here 
as the physical imprint retained in us. Indeed, Wedin‟s suggestion accounts very well for the 
interest Aristotle shows here for the objects of thought, since he considers the activation „in 
itself‟ (kaq'au(to\) of the trace like the presentation of no/hma/ ti hÄ fa/ntasma, which is not 
conceivable in Sorabji‟s interpretation. 
However, Wedin‟s interpretation does not address the very problem Aristotle tries to tackle 
in this passage, that is not only how it is possible that the same „image‟ could bear two different 
cognitive contents, but rather how it is possible that one of those could represent something 
absent. The difference drawn by Wedin is concerned with „images‟ referring to general as 
opposed to particular objects of knowledge, e.g. regarding an image as image of a man or as 
image of Coriscus qua individual; but in this case, temporal depth is simply excluded from the 
model. Equally important, Wedin‟s suggestion is also incompatible with the attribution of 
phantasia to some animals, which are in any case unable to regard an „image‟ as pertaining to a 
general class of items like „man‟, operation that requires the intervention of the nous. A last 
problematic point of his interpretation is the odd consequence that we cannot have experience 
of a phantasma about Coriscus, but only a mnēmoneuma of him, i.e. we cannot think of 
Coriscus, if not in the particular context of a former experience, fact that is a clear hindrance to 
the formation of abstract thought starting from particular objects. 
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 Admittedly, this interpretation fits very well with the emotional detachment from the image described in DA Γ 
3, 427b23-4. However, this remark belongs to the analogy with image-producing as fantasi/a kata\ 
metafora/n: cf. above, p. 85-6. In fact, the “non-paradigmatic sensory experiences” ascribed to phantasia do not 
imply such awareness. 
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The solution, instead, seems to be that Aristotle intended the difference as the difference 
between regarding the phantasma of Coriscus in itself, either as a man or as Coriscus qua the 
particular person I know, and observing it as the copy of something else, e.g. Coriscus as I met 
him in some past occasion, i.e. with an additional awareness that the image I am having of him 
is related to some particular past experiences.
208
 My answer still explains why Aristotle says at 
450b29 that the soul can examine the „image‟ kaq' au(to\ as no/hma/ ti hÄ fa/ntasma. He is 
not concerned here with these modalities of activation, which are two subspecies of regarding 
the phantasma as an „object of contemplation‟ (qew¯rhma), but Aristotle is focusing his 
attention on the upper distinction between regarding the phantasma as a qew¯rhma or as an 
ei¹kwn¯.  
On the other hand, my account addresses equally well the issue that the phantasma is about 
something absent, that was Aristotle‟s puzzle about the mnēmoneuma. In other words, the trace 
stores the extra-mental object as it has been recognized and not the (possibly blurred) 
perceptual context. In this sense, Wedin‟s stress on the inclination of phantasia toward general 
patterns should be accepted, since the „image‟ in itself represents the object, disregarding the 
context of acquisition: for instance, the „image‟ drawn by an erroneous identification of 
Coriscus can be used as the substratum of intellectual operations as well as one derived by a 
correct recognition. Conversely, using the same trace as a mnēmoneuma is the restoration of the 
nexus between the time-related perceptual context and the original identification; for 
considering the temporal depth of an event brings the subject back to the very moment of the 
original recognition: even with an undetermined awareness of this moment we know that the 
memory trace has been generated in a particular time that we do not happen to know now. 
In a slightly different vein, this is the solution suggested by Caston (1998), despite his claim 
that the intentional nature of the phantasma had been already noticed by Wedin (1988: 139-40) 
without specifying the important differences between the two models. Regarding the 
phantasma as a copy entails the further awareness that “this representation somehow derives 
from or is causally linked to the object it represents” (Caston [1998: 282, n. 80]). For this 
reason, he cleverly interprets the word aÃllou (“of another thing”) at line 450b25, which 
Aristotle uses to describe the activation of the trace implied in memory, as a genitive of source. 
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 This naturally fits Annas‟ (1992) interpretation, as she conceives memory as similar to our idea of „personal 
memory‟, and indeed, this is accepted by Caston (1998: 258, n. 18) in a cursory footnote; but the overlap is not 
complete in my opinion. Time depth is certainly a basic element of this form of memory, but not necessarily in a 
determined way as a past encounter with the object. For instance, we can remember that Coriscus often wears a 
particular cloak, but it is clear that we need not to remember each time he wore it: it is sufficient to remember that 
this is something that occurred more than once in my past experience. 
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Additional support for my account is provided by the analogy of the „image‟ as 
zwgra/fhma/ ti at lines 450a29-30.
209
  A zwgra/foj is a painter who “draws from life or from 
nature” (LSJ [1996: 759]) and therefore the emphasis is on the relationship between the painter 
and the object he is depicting. The same use can be found in Plato‟s Cratylus. Here, nouns and 
paintings are equated as “imitations of things” (mimh/mata eiånai pragma/twn tinw½n: 430b). 
But later on (432b-c), Plato explains the nature of this imitation. An ei¹kwn¯ is not, obviously, 
the reproduction of all the qualities of the object it imitates, otherwise “would there be two 
things, Cratylus and the image (ei¹kwn¯) of Cratylus”, or rather “two Cratyluses?” (Fowler). 
Thus, the dichotomy pra=gma/ei¹kwn¯ we have found at 450b20-7 is already present in Plato; 
there are two items, i.e. the object and its imitation, but the latter in its own nature points at the 
object through some key features, in other words it is more than colors on a canvas, or lines on 
a tablet. In addition, Plato‟s awareness that the image selects but a few qualities of the object 
might be an important antecedent for Aristotle‟s claim. The phantasma is usually handled 
without this awareness and only when one recognizes it as a selection of features, we grasp that 
what persistes in our organs is not a second Coriscus, but that the imprint represents a previous 
recognition of him, while we think of or imagine Coriscus we completely disregard the nature 
of the inner presentation and consider the extra-mental object it denotes. 
 
– 452b17-24: „Movements of the object‟ and „movements of time‟ 
 
Although at 450b11-451a8 Aristotle explains that the phantasma can be subject to different 
modi spectandi, he does not seem to clarify how the two mechanisms of activation differ from 
each other, apart from the addition of the awareness of the time depth in memory. In my 
opinion, 452b17-24 can be seen as a graphic representation of this difference. The 
interpretation of this passage is much debated and commentators agree that it will be very 
difficult to reach a definitive clarification: Aristotle very likely used exemplificative sketches, 
which are lost, to supplement his explanation. Thus, every interpretation has to deal with a text 
that is almost intelligible and consequently mine too will remain tentative.
210
 
 
wÐsper ouÅn ei¹ th\n A B  B E kineiÍtai, poieiÍ th\n G D! a)na/logon ga\r h( A G 
kaiì h( G D. ti¿ ouÅn ma=llon th\n G D hÄ th\n Z H poieiÍ; hÄ w¨j h( A G pro\j th\n 
A B eÃxei, ouÀtwj h( Q pro\j th\n I eÃxei; tau/taj ouÅn aÀma kineiÍtai. aÄn de\ th\n Z 
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 Caston (1998: 259) is the only one who stresses that the presence of ti mitigates the cogency of the analogy. 
210
 The discussion at 452a19-26 faces the same problems, with the further inconvenience of much more 
uncertainty in the manuscripts. 
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H bou/lhtai noh=sai, th\n me\n B E o(moi¿wj noeiÍ, a)ntiì de\ tw½n Q I ta\j  K L 
noeiÍ! auÂtai ga\r eÃxousin w¨j Z A pro\j B A. oÀtan ouÅn aÀma hÀ te tou= 
pra/gmatoj gi¿gnhtai ki¿nhsij kaiì h( tou= xro/nou, to/te tv= mnh/mv e)nergeiÍ 
(452b17-24).
211
 
 
 In the passage that precedes this one (452b7-17), Aristotle urges the need for 
understanding how time-lapses, either determinate or indeterminate, are estimated. He argues 
that as we distinguish magnitudes, our cognition of time is based on proportional changes in us 
(tv= a)na/logon kinh/sei) that reproduce the shapes and the changes (ta\ oÀmoia sxh/mata 
kaiì kinh/seij) of the outer world. Still, this does not explain why our knowledge of the inner 
changes should lead to the retrieval of the outer ones. But: 
 
eÃsti d' iãswj wÐsper kaiì toiÍj eiãdesin a)na/logon labeiÍn aÃllo e)n au(t%½, ouÀtwj 
kaiì toiÍj a)posth/masin (452b15-7). 
 
Perhaps just as one can receive in oneself something distinct but in proportion to 
the forms, so also in the case of distances (Sorabji). 
 
What obviously creates difficulties in understanding this passage is Aristotle‟s use of the 
generic terms eiãdoj and a)po/sthma, the second of which can have both spatial and temporal 
application. In addition, even if we accept the temporal interpretation as it seems to be 
suggested by the context, whereas the idea of a)posth/mata as referred to time-lapses is quite 
plain, how should one conceive a temporal eiãdoj? Therefore, there is strong disagreement on 
how to interpret the elements indicated by the letters of the example in exam, but the graphic 
reconstruction has remained substantially unchanged since its first formulation by Beare. 
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 “It is then, as though, if a person undergoes the change AB, BE, he constructs ΓΔ. For the changes AΓ and ΓΔ 
are in proportion. Why, then, does he construct ΓΔ rather than ZH? Is it that as AΓ is to AB, so is Θ to I? So one 
undergoes these latter changes simultaneously. But if someone wishes to think of ZH, he thinks in the same way of 
BE, but instead of the changes Θ, I, he thinks of the changes K, Λ. For these latter are related as is ZA to BA. 
Whenever, then, the change connected with the thing and that connected with the time occur together, then one is 
exercizing memory” (Sorabji). 
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Sisko (1997: 171-3), before spelling out his own interpretation, briefly summarises his 
predecessors‟ attempts. The most interesting ones are by far the accounts given by Ross (1955: 
249-52) and Sorabji (2006: 18-21; 108-10), who associated the example with the estimation of 
time-lapses. For both of them, the major cathetus of the triangle (AB) represents the time-lapse 
that extends from the moment of the present activation of a memory to the time of the event 
remembered. This conception is very plausible given the idea of a)po/sthma. The difference 
between the two interpretations lies instead in the eiãdoj, which is a very puzzling concept to 
implement in a temporal model. Ross suggested that the minor catheti (BE, ΓΔ,...) represent the 
duration of the events in questions, while for Sorabji they stand for the relationship between 
two different events, which we are able to date relatively to each other. A very good argument 
he uses against Ross is that for many occurrences one does not need to establish the duration of 
an event, for instance when he remembers a fact or a person (Sorabji [2006: 19]). Interestingly, 
Sorabji also admits that the introduction of a second time period in the diagram is somewhat 
unexpected, “for surely we only need to know about one, the time-lapse since the remembered 
event” (ibid.). 
This is a good starting-point for approaching Sisko‟s (1997) account, for he criticizes 
Sorabji‟s solution on the basis of the fact that Aristotle showed no interest in estimating relative 
time-lapses between two events, but simpler occurrences of remembering, e.g. that one has 
previously experienced something or that he has done something some time before, which do 
not require any reference to other time periods (172-3). Starting from this consideration, Sisko 
believes that the model proposed is simply too complicated to illustrate time-spans in memory, 
while it suits our cognition of magnitudes, which requires a similar scheme. On the catheti 
Sisko puts lengths of and distances from the objects so as to allow the grasp of perspective. In 
an example he gives in his article, Sisko (1997: 170) states that very similar changes affect the 
A 
  B Γ   Z 
 
  E 
Δ 
   
     H 
  Θ I 
  K Λ 
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first sensorium in the case of a 10 ft. rod seen at the distance of 20 yards and of a 20 ft. rod seen 
at a distance of 40 yards, which one has seen some time before. Therefore the ratios applied to 
the image determine the event remembered: whenever the ratio Θ:I is applied to the inner 
image, one will remember the 10 ft. rod, when instead K:Λ, then the 20 ft. one. The same 
process is applied to time-spans, without the complication of the double signature retained in 
the trace, both of the event and of the time. 
This interpretation is very interesting, but presents some difficulties as well as the others. 
Firstly, it is true that Aristotle here ambiguously hints at some intellectual involvement in the 
grasp of magnitudes (noeiÍ: 452b9 and 452b13; noh/sei: 452b11; nov=: 452b13), but the bodily 
marks are still acquired through the ai¹sqhtikh\ fantasi¿a and the calculation of the relations 
between distances and magnitudes is not entrusted to phantasia. One example is DA Γ 3, 
428b3-4, where Aristotle states that the sun appears to be a foot across and only the 
intervention of an intellective capacity allows us to believe it as bigger than the earth. 
Secondly, the context of the passage strongly suggests that Aristotle introduced the example to 
present a temporal model, which is analogous to the process of grasping magnitudes, but it is 
here particularly important, because the awareness of time depth is what distinguishes the 
mnemonic activation from the one occurring in the normal exercise of phantasia. Sisko (1997: 
174) argues that the grasp of magnitudes requires a more complicated model than the grasp of 
time-spans, but even supposing that this is the case for the sake the argument, he does not 
consider that time-relations are not graspable without the objects they accompany. This aspect 
has been pointed out by Taormina (2002: 59), who says that “la perception du temps 
présuppose les images, elle intervient alors sur celles-ci et en signale la différence”. So it is 
more likely that Aristotle wanted to elucidate the role of this kind of perception in memory and 
how the correct combination of the movements produces a proper mnemonic occurrence. 
In fact, a further criticism that undermines all the interpretations I have presented so far is 
that none of them explains how the two movements
212
 could possibly work together in an 
episode of memory; for Aristotle says immediately after the example that “whenever, then 
(ouÅn), the change connected with the thing and that connected with the time occur together, 
then one is exercising memory” (Sorabji). However, this consequentiality is unexpected, if the 
preceding example is to be taken to explain only one of the two movements: the sheer fact that 
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 Cf. above, pp. 37-9. With „movement‟ Aristotle means the process of generation of the trace, but also the 
„metadata‟ the trace has in itself. Every trace, to be recollected, must have something, that we can conceive as a 
„label‟ or a „signature‟ related to its content and something related to the time of its generation; these „signatures‟ 
allow the subject to connect one trace to another in a recollective chain. 
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they work in the same way does not imply that they are both required in memory, or that they 
cooperate. 
Therefore, I will try to interpret 452b17-24 as the junction between the analogy of their 
modi operandi and the conclusion that whenever they occur at the same time, one has an 
episode of memory. The train of the argument, in my opinion, is the following: (i) both the 
movements retain their objects through proportional changes in the body, which are smaller 
than the ones they reproduce from the outer world (452b7-17); (ii) furthermore, they happen to 
work jointly in memory (452b17-22); (iii) in fact, each episode of memory seems to require 
such movements (452b23-4); (iv) for whenever they do not occur simultaneously, one has only 
the illusion of having recalled something (452b24-9). In this way, the first three statements 
constitute a single argument, in which the premise (i) establishes the compatibility of the two 
movements, the example (ii) shows how they actually work in a single framework, which 
represents the very essence of memory (iii); the argument (iv) is an indirect confirmation from 
empirical failures that the two movements must occur simultaneously. 
The advantage of this reading is that in this way the diagram drawn on the basis of the 
452b17-22 example becomes meaningful in all its parts and addresses a fundamental problem 
of mnemonic activation; in addition, it saves the reader the trouble of contriving an 
“irrelevantly complicated” model, element that Sisko (1997: 174) admits to be a difficulty to 
his proposal. 
So the classic reconstruction of the diagram, which I endorse, comes to represent a 
complete operation of memory activation. To exemplify my interpretation, I give a legenda of 
the objects of the diagram shown at page 98. 
A = actual perceptual state; AE = phantasma; AB = movement of the time in the 
mnēmoneuma; BE = movement of the object in the mnēmoneuma; B = perceptual state of 
having a mnēmoneuma; ABE = mnēmoneuma; AΔ = aistēma1; AΓ = movement of the time in 
the aistēma1; ΓΔ = movement of the object in the aistēma1; Γ = perceptual state of having 
aistēma1; AΓΔ = event1; AH = aisthēma2; AZ = movement of the time in the aisthēma2; ZH = 
movement of the object in the aisthēma2; Z = perceptual state of having aisthēma2; AZH = 
event
2
. 
So the hypotenuses represent our cognitive experiences, on the minor catheti the 
movements of the objects and on the major catheti the movements of time. The starting point is, 
therefore, that a subject who is having the phantasma AE (e.g. about Coriscus) in the moment 
A can restore the two movements to retrieve the original moment B, in which the phantasma 
originated: thus, the triangle ABE represents the mnēmoneuma.  But the mnēmoneuma, as we 
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have already noticed, is essentially representative of some elements one has previously 
perceived. For that reason, the result of a mnemonic activation is the construction of the 
original movement of the object ΓΔ, which previously impressed the aisthēma AΔ in the 
moment Γ. This does not happen at haphazard, but in virtue of the proportionality between the 
inner movements and their counterparts in the original perceptions. Indirectly, also the 
movements of time and the ones of the objects are interrelated, in the sense that, to have in the 
present moment the same movement of the object (BE) from different original perceptions, the 
more distant in the past is the event, the stronger the original affection has had to be to persist 
in its actual strength.
213
 
One important point is that Aristotle is concerned with the minor catheti, since the 
simultaneous activation of AB and BE produces ΓΔ, which in my account is the original 
movement of the object. This is very plausible in Aristotle‟s conception of memory, for a 
mnemonic „image‟ basically represents a pragma, of which we have the additional awareness 
of temporal depth (prosaisqa/netai oÀti pro/teron: 450a21). This element distinguishes 
Taormina‟s (2002: 54-5) conception of perception of time. Like Kahn (1979: 8, n. 23), she 
recognizes that the absence of time from the list of common sensibles must have some 
importance in Aristotle‟s thought; in her opinion, discrimination of time-spans operates on the 
basis of the movements of the soul and the temporal dimension, which distinguishes the 
„before‟ and the „after‟, and orders the retrieved data in a structured succession. 
This reflection somehow undermines the independence from magnitudes in grasping time 
spans, implicitly defended by Ross (1955: 249-52) and Sorabji (2006: 18-21; 108-10) in their 
models, but with significant differences between the two interpretations; for while the former 
adopts the implausible idea that the restoration of both movements construes the duration of an 
event in the past, the latter related the minor catheti of the diagram with the relations between 
two past events, suggesting that anyway time-discriminations are tied with the acquisition of 
events. 
Coming back to the text, there is a further problem which Aristotle raises that concerns 
proportionality. It is not sufficient to recognize that the inner movements are merely analogous 
to the ones outside, but we have to assume that they bear a particular proportion, through which 
one can activate the proper movement of the object. In fact, starting from the same inner 
movements the application of different ratios entails different results and therefore events from 
the past supported by the same phantasma. The ratios Θ:I and K:Λ, which correspond to 
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 The same argument is used by Sisko (1997: 170) to justify his interpretation of the diagram as representing 
spatial dimensions. In his account, the more distant is the rod we remember, the bigger its actual length has to be 
because of perspective. 
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AΓ:AB and AZ:AB respectively, might be considered as metadata attached to the image, which 
mark the content as related to a certain time. So, in the last part of the example, Aristotle shifts 
his interest from the minor to the major catheti of the triangle, i.e. from the movements of the 
objects to the ones of time, and addresses the nature of temporal depth. The subject who starts 
remembering from the point A of the diagram, projects and places an event in the past thanks to 
a temporal awareness, which releases the phantasma from its immediate representative content; 
however the momentum which spans from B to E can represent several past encounters with 
the same object. Thus, Aristotle introduces the ratios to reduce the multiplicity of the possible 
acts of remembering to the discrimination of each case on the basis of the particular proportion 
applied to the movement of the time.  
This can be better understood in the light of the claim that the movement of time can be 
either determinate or indeterminate, which concludes this section (452b29-453a4). This remark 
could seem odd, since Aristotle has just said that one remembers a past encounter whenever he 
applies the correct ratio; however, as he points out at 452b23-4, activating a mnēmoneuma only 
means to restore the inner movements. This is sufficient to project the movement of an object 
from the past, which can remain temporally undetermined and nevertheless one can consider it 
as deriving from the past. When instead, the ratio is examined in itself by the subject, he is able 
to retrieve the exact moment of the encounter: for instance, in one sense one can remember 
Coriscus without being aware of the exact moment he saw him, in the other that he met him 
three days ago in the agora. 
Certainly Aristotle drew this distinction also to keep attributing memory to animals, which, 
however, cannot measure time in a determinate way.
214
 In that respect, what animals can do is 
only to recognize that the movement of time created by the projection (AΓ or AZ) is longer 
than the one that represents their present experience (AB); therefore they are aware in some 
way of temporal depths, since they can perceive that this additional movement goes beyond 
their actual sensorial acquisition and, then, that the phantasma points at some past occurrence. 
Needless to say, the interpretation I have put forward is not free from weaknesses and 
defects, a few of which I wish to illustrate here briefly. Firstly, as I have already noted, the 
massive use of a terminology related to intellectual activities throughout the passage is really 
puzzling: even for the grasp of magnitudes Aristotle uses the verb noeiÍn. Actually, this element 
represents a thorny problem for each interpretation considered. The only commentator who 
seems to suggest a different approach is Bloch (2007), who takes the lines 452b24-453a4 to 
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 On the issue about the relation between time and soul see Coope (2005: 159-72). 
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refer to the intellectual operation of „recalling‟.215 But, unfortunately, he does not spell out a 
thorough interpretation of the preceding passage; on the contrary he puts the whole 452b17-22 
example amid cruces in the text and declares that he does not hold a definite position on it, 
since it is doubtful whether the passage may be explained once and for all (101). In addition, at 
452b24-453a4 Aristotle seems concerned with both the modalities of the activation of the trace, 
both remembering – the corresponding verb is used three times – and „recalling‟. 
One other criticism against my interpretation might be that Aristotle hints at two different 
elements for each phenomenon. At 452b12-3 magnitudes are acquired through a proportional 
movement, which inscribes in us “similar shapes and changes” (ta\ oÀmoia sxh/mata kaiì 
kinh/seij) of the objects from the outer world; later on, at 452b15-7 again Aristotle argues 
that, like the eiãdh, also the a)posth/mata must be proportional to the outer movements. In the 
first case, I argue that the two elements can be conflated in the same movement of the object, 
which as a source of the phantasma retains the object in itself (as a sxh=ma) and at the same 
time is the result of a temporally related ki/nhsij; in the second passage, I take eiãdoj as 
referring to magnitudes and a)po/sthma to time-spans, which is a plausible solution, even 
though rather implicit in the text. 
 
– 452a19-26: Mnemotechnique or physiology of memory? 
 
After Sorabji‟s (2006: 35-46; 104-5) detailed account, few other things, if any, can be 
added on this passage. His textual reconstruction, based upon clashing variant readings from 
the extant manuscripts, seems the most fruitful and provides a clear idea about the progress of 
the argument: 
 
oiâon eiã tij noh/seien e)f' wÒn A B G D E Z H Q! ei¹ ga\r mh\ e)piì tou= Q 
me/mnhtai, e)piì tou= Z mnhsqh/setai! e)nteu=qen ga\r e)p' aÃmfw kinhqh=nai 
e)nde/xetai, kaiì e)piì to\ H kaiì e)piì to\ E. ei¹ de\ mh\ tou/twn ti e)zh/tei, e)piì to\ G 
e)lqwÜn mnhsqh/setai, ei¹ to\ D hÄ to\ B e)pizhteiÍ, ei¹ de\ mh/, e)piì to\ A! kaiì ouÀtwj 
a)ei¿. tou= d' a)po\ tou= au)tou= e)ni¿ote me\n mnhsqh=nai, e)ni¿ote de\ mh/, aiãtion oÀti e)piì 
plei¿w e)nde/xetai kinhqh=nai a)po\ th=j au)th=j a)rxh=j, oiâon a)po\ tou= G e)piì to\ B 
hÄ to\ D.
216
 
                                                 
215
 Cf. above, pp. 18-29. 
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 “As for example if someone were to think of the things denoted by A B Γ Δ E Z H Θ. For if he has not 
remembered at Θ, he will remember at Z for from here he can move either direction to H or to E. But if he was not 
seeking one of these, after going to Γ he will remember, if he is searching for Δ or B, or if he is not, he will 
remember after going to A. The reason why one sometimes remembers and sometimes does not, starting from the 
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Although I follow this textual reconstruction, I believe that this does not automatically lead 
to Sorabji‟s conclusions, namely that Aristotle is here describing a mnemonic technique. This, 
as I argue above,
217
 turns out to be unnecessary to reconstruct Aristotle‟s arguments. This 
passage, in my opinion, explains how correct recollective searches work on the whole and not 
in the particular case of the application of the place-system technique. Perhaps a kinship with 
these artificial mnemonic strategies of retrieval can be recognized, but the perspective should 
be inverted: at most the „places‟ are established by mnemonists exploiting and developing 
physiological structures, which, once recognized and studied, can be used for a voluntary 
control of the process: this will justify the prescriptive attitude of 452a12, in which Aristotle 
suggests to choose a starting-point to enhance recollections. 
Aristotle introduces this graphic example to explain why middle-points are good starting-
points, after having noticed that sometimes recollective chains do not seem to present an 
explicit link between the items connected. Aristotle‟s explanation for this is the multidirectional 
orientation of the research: starting from the same item, one can move to a habitual object that 
is clearly related to the former, or skip some elements to retrieve something which bears just a 
faint association. For instance, in the chain „milk‟-„white‟-„air‟-„fluid‟-„autumn‟ (452a13-6) he 
who is recollecting does not visit the habitual places of each point, but directly moves to a 
different ganglion, from which again several possibilities depart: in the case of „air‟, the 
habitual movement will be towards the other elements that constitutes the sublunary world, i.e. 
„fire‟, „earth‟ and „water‟, but he can also move to „fluid‟. Sorabji (2006: 104-5) has to admit 
that this example does not really seem an authentic case of the system of loci, since with this 
system “one can memorize in a given order a set of items that have no memorable relationship 
of their own”, while the five items used by Aristotle “do have a relationship of their own”. 
Therefore, the quickness and the familiarity of connections of some anamnestic chains are 
explained by Aristotle with a specific model that stresses the usefulness of having a starting-
point, which for him clarifies “the reason why those who have got one [i.e. starting-point] are 
thought (wrongly) to be using the place-system”. This possible way of reading the phrase to\ d' 
aiãtion at 452a13 should alert a commentator who wants to read the passage as an example of 
place-system. 
A second level of criticism is that place-system methods of memorization include many 
structures and not only the iteration of triplets, whose starting-points function as junction 
                                                                                                                                                           
same position, is that it is possible to move to more than one point from the same starting-point, e.g. from Γ to Z or 
Δ” (Sorabji). 
217
 Cf. above, pp. 79-83. 
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between many connections. Neither the well-known example of the rooms of a house 
associated with the items one wants to recollect, nor the technique used by Simonides to 
remember the guests who died under the fallen roof at Scopas‟ banquet, that is the semi-
mythical prototype of the place-system, necessarily entail such a disposition of the items, which 
instead typifies Aristotle‟s model. In these models the number of items per each batch is not 
specified. 
Thus, the kind of place-system introduced here must be confined to the particular case of 
the buildings overlooking a street,
218
 which is not equivalent to the example of the rooms of a 
house made by Quintilian, as Sorabji seems to assume. Actually, a graphic illustration of 
Sorabji‟s reconstruction219 reflects very well the compatibilities between Aristotle‟s text and 
this kind of place-system. It can be represented as follows: 
 
However, a difficulty has been already raised by Sorabji (2006: 33-4) himself whether it is 
possible “to skip over members of a series, and land precisely in the middle of a batch”. Thus, 
the middle-point must have the further capacity of leading the person who is recollecting to the 
middle-point of the next triplet; but in order to do so, Sorabji has to postulate “the incorporation 
of a symbol within the middle image of each batch of three”. This is arguably a complication 
that forces us to read something that is not in the text.  To clarify the problem, this difficulty 
can be applied to the example of a mnemonist who is recollecting starting from the 
visualization of a street and of the overlooking buildings. The street serves as connection 
between the items, but it is not significant in itself and is not related to something to be 
remembered; it is only the backbone of the image superimposed on the items, which connects 
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 Sorabji (2006: 23) mentions the case described by Luria of the mnemonist Shereshevskii, who applied the 
place-system to Gorky Street in Moscow. 
219
 A very similar one has been found in a medieval manuscript: see Bloch (2007: 239). 
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them in a unity. In that respect, this one too is not a fitting analogy, since it is not based on the 
iteration of triplets, as Aristotle‟s system is. 
There are ultimately many reasons to suggest a different interpretation of the passage, 
which should start in my opinion from considering whether this example might fit Aristotle‟s 
theory of recollection as a psychophysical capacity shared by all human beings, instead of the 
narrow context of mnemotechniques. For this purpose, I shall take into serious account 
Aristotle‟s point that recollective searches are a sort of reasoning akin to deliberation, and 
which take place in something bodily (453a6-16). Our passage can be considered in my opinion 
an explanation of how good anamnestic chains can successfully retrieve items by plotting a grid 
on the physical trace to organize its content. So the rational activity upon the trace will be the 
recognition in it of meaningful connections between the items and the traces, a reconstruction 
that allows the subject to orient himself within the information stored and thus to direct his 
efforts toward the more plausible alternative, gradually excluding portions of the field of traces 
which after the analysis have not led him to the goal. 
Starting from this framework several graphic reconstructions of the argument can be drawn, 
but I think the most promising is the application of the gnomonic measurement on the trace. 
The definition of gnomon has been given by Euclid (Elem. II, def. 2): “in any parallelogrammic 
area let any one whatever of the parallelograms about its diameter with the two complements 
be called a gnomon” (Heath). This measurement consists in dividing the original figure in as 
many modular figures construed on its diagonal as it can undergo with the method of reiterated 
subtraction. In a forthcoming article, Cattanei (2009) shows the importance of this method, 
known as „Euclidean algorithm‟, much used in ancient geometry,220 in deliberative contexts, 
also outside philosophical discussions. For instance, she mentions a passage from Thucydides 
(I, 138, 3), in which the historian compares Themistocles‟ quickness in deliberating to the 
gnomon. 
This could be an interesting solution for the passage examined and a graphic reconstruction 
could help to spell out this model. 
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This model is graphically similar to Sorabji‟s, since the outlines of a possible reconstruction 
are limited by the text, but the application of gnomonic measurement to the example gives a 
different standpoint to interpret the passage in the light of Aristotle‟s theory of recollection as a 
whole. The recollective process begins with setting a search-directrix, which is the diagonal 
from A to Θ: if this point is not the one the subject was looking for, this directrix will serve as a 
„middle line‟, on which he can establish new starting-points. The next one is Z, from which one 
can move in both directions, towards E and H; if again the item to be recollected is not in one 
of those points, then Γ will be assumed as the new starting-point and so forth, until the search is 
exhausted by reaching the extreme point A. In this sense, like in deliberation, the subject 
applies a strategy that put which conists in using the most items he can and tries to orientate 
himself within the disposition of the set of traces, whose knowledge the subject gradually 
restores as he goes along them again. With the imposition of this grid of metadata, one is able 
to map his experience and connect the different items in the same anamnestic chain. But, unlike 
deliberation, we must conceive this operation as not necessarily conscious, since the 
connections are essentially originated by physical alterations, which sometimes are out of our 
control. 
Basically, Aristotle recognizes two main movements that contribute to map the bulk of 
traces one has: the usual ones, that are the vertical and horizontal lines in my reconstruction, 
connect items strongly related thanks to the „laws of association‟ described at 451b18-20; the 
unusual ones, instead, are peculiar to each recollective act and are established only on the basis 
of a faint association by the subject. The „middle line‟ plays this role of connection and allows 
A 
Θ 
Z 
Γ 
  H 
E B 
Δ 
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us to cover a wider range in our recollections. Comparing again this passage with 452a14-6 the 
unusual movement from Z to Γ can be conceived as the one from „air‟ to „fluid‟, while the more 
natural one from „air‟ to „earth‟ or „water‟ may be represented by the one from Z to E or H. 
In its general outline, my model roughly works like Sorabji‟s recognition of a place-system 
theory, but it has three advantages. It does not require to postulate complex techniques of 
memorization, which Aristotle does not even introduce and does not seem to intend as a central 
part of his treatment of recollection. Moreover, it avoids the problem of skipping from a 
middle-point to another ignoring the sides of the triplet, since the line drawn at the same time 
represents a figure construed by the subject and links pre-existing pieces of information 
embedded in the trace. In conclusion, it can be noticed how this interpretation suits Aristotle‟s 
remarks about the diseases that affect recollection: in principle, the more quick-witted the 
person is, the longer the „middle line‟ will be (or rather the wider will be the area covered by 
his recollection) and the faster will the connections between the items present in the trace be. 
But in the case of the melancholics or of those who suffer from excessive moistness (453a14-
31), the movements will be dispersed because of the impossibility of controlling them and the 
result will be an incessant, but inconclusive attempt to recollect; the same will happen to those 
who undergo a strong passion, like anger or fear, that directs their movements toward unwanted 
mnemonic objects, even preventing them from receding from the wrong movements. On the 
contrary, the physiological process entails a rigid control of all the phases of the search until the 
sought item has been recollected. 
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Conclusions 
 
As I have tried to show, the De Memoria represents the first philosophical analysis of 
memory as a personal faculty, since the heavy use of analogies and metaphors by Plato and his 
ambiguous lack of commitment to them do not allow us to recognize a definite Platonic model 
in the Theaetetus or in the Philebus. However, Aristotle owes Plato some of the most 
successful analogies used to describe the physiological mechanisms of memory. In particular, 
the definition of memory as eÀcij hÄ pa/qoj of a perception or of a piece of knowledge 
(449b24-5) seems to be a „scientifical‟ account of the model in the Philebus, which attributes 
two specific tasks to two different „artists‟ in the soul.  
On the one hand, with eÀcij Aristotle isolates the moment of retention of the memory trace, 
which in Plato was exemplified by the scribe. The scribe selects and encodes the stimuli from 
the outer world and his writing is made to last in the soul. Aristotle includes this operation in 
his model, but he uses the analogy of the imprint of the Theaetetus in order to exclude 
rationality from the selection: for Aristotle the objects directly influence the bodily support. 
Therefore, the only two variables of the system are the stimulus from the object and the bodily 
constitution that receives the imprint; however, since what is preserved is the form of the 
object, in some sense we can say that there is a process of encoding in the genesis of the trace. 
Actually, encoding and decoding the language of the trace is the main problem for 
Aristotle‟s model, as I tried to show in the discussion of 450b11-451a2.221 To the pa/qoj of the 
central organ that receives the imprint must correspond another one that allows the subject to 
represent it after some time has passed. Aristotle recognizes proportionality between the inner 
and outer objects as the criterion that bridges the two codes. Thus, the activation of the trace, 
common to memory and recollection, is based on decoding the temporal information together 
with the one related to the content. If I am right, this process is exemplified at 452b17-24.
222
 
However, Plato‟s and Aristotle‟s achievements were possible only thanks to a traditional 
reflection on memory as cultural preservation and transmission, which provided them with 
some important instruments to describe memory as a personal faculty. On the one hand, the 
traditional methods of cultural transmission included some implicit conceptions that played a 
role for the philosophers, like the idea of inscription of a mnemonic token within somebody, 
the primacy of sight as the best vehicle for preserving a lasting and vivid impression and many 
others. On the other hand, Orphism and Pythagoreanism, which had a strong influence on 
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Plato‟s thought, had the role of focalizing memory on personal experiences and privileged an 
ascetic approach to restoring memories from former lives. 
In this sense, Aristotle‟s place in an overall development of the conception of memory in 
ancient Greece is the forefront of the secularization of centuries-old practices which marked 
memory as possession of social power. This process began with Simonides and the sophists, 
who understood how mnemonic techniques could be exploited in a changing society. Aristotle 
does not seem interested in these aspects, if not (perhaps) in the very restricted field of 
dialectical debates. The emphasis some authors put on the elaboration of a mnemonic technique 
by Aristotle is excessive: I have argued that the interest Aristotle exhibited for the description 
of memory as a psychophysical capacity of individuals is the real originality of his account. My 
interpretation of 452a19-26
223
 is an attempt at reconsidering this original contribution, the 
ancestor of the current interest in the bodily mechanisms of memory. In light of these 
considerations I believe that the passage 452a19-26 is primarily concerned with the application 
of an interpretative grid of metadata to the set of traces the subject possesses and only 
incidentally with the fact that a similar strategy can be used by a mnemonist to exploit the 
physiological model at its best.  
In conclusion, with a suggestive analogy, Aristotle‟s idea of memory resembles at the same 
time a topographic and a magnetic account of the traces and of how they interact. One‟s set of 
memories is placed in a unique configuration given by one‟s personal experiences: in some 
sense they constitute a geography, in which the more relevant items appear like mountains in a 
landscape, which attract the activations and the anamnestic movements towards them; 
therefore, the objects neglected for a long time tend to be gradually „submerged‟ and forgotten. 
However, this is a personal landscape, and an external „observer‟ could be surprised by the 
unusualness of connections that can be made: for instance, if the recollective chain „milk‟-
„white‟-„air‟-„fluid‟-„autumn‟ (452a14-6) may be significant for someone, it may be a random 
selection of items for someone else. In my opinion, the recognition of this inner geography is 
an important Aristotelian achievement against a tradition that exalted collective processes of 
memorization as a means to transmit a cultural heritage, even if Aristotle‟s account can be 
considered a development of Plato‟s scattered intuitions into a coherent account. Of course, this 
consistency is not complete because of a sometimes obscure text, but Aristotle‟s conceptions 
remain a milestone for any theory of memory and recollection for his systematic approach to 
the phenomenon.  
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